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policy REVIEW

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George Bush and the Future of Conservatism
Jack Kemp

What I Learned in Cedar Rapids
Pete du Pont

Boom Time for Black America
Joseph Perkins

The Contras' Valley Forge
Col. Enrique Bermudez

Jailhouse Capitalism
Jack Eckerd

A Tale of Two Superpowers
Afghanistan ≠ Vietnam

Jesse Jackson's Brain Trust
Scott Steven Powell

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A platform in search of a candidate

Many a political pundit has noted that people generally vote their pocketbooks. They tend to elect the candidates they believe capable of steering the nation toward better times—more jobs, a higher standard of living, and the achievement of both personal aspirations and national goals.

Now, in the midst of the presidential campaign, we're listing some points that are often overlooked in all the speechmaking, but bear directly on America's economic health—a platform in search of a candidate, so to speak. In a nonpartisan spirit, and with profound respect, we urge that the next President:

● Make it his top priority to bring the budget deficit under control. The deficit poses a clear and present danger to every living American, and to future generations who will have to pay today's staggering debt. The budget deficit is inexorably linked to the trade deficit. The latter offers clear evidence that America is simply using more goods and services than it produces, importing the difference, and borrowing to pay the bill.

Much of the borrowed money comes from abroad. This requires high real-interest rates in the U.S. to keep attracting foreign funds. As a result, foreign companies often can raise capital in their own countries at cheaper rates than their U.S. counterparts, and use the money for the new plant and equipment that translates into greater productivity. So American industry is placed at a competitive disadvantage in world markets, and fewer jobs for Americans are created.

High U.S. interest rates also mean high mortgage rates, making it more difficult for Americans to afford the homes they want, with enough left over for other necessities such as the education of their children and adequate medical care.

A prime way to narrow the deficit is to curb government spending. Between 1974 and 1987, government outlays rose from 19 percent of GNP to almost 23 percent. A cap on government spending as a percentage of GNP should be enacted to roll back this gradual rise, or at the very least keep it from climbing more.

● Raise levies on consumption—the money people spend—rather than from taxes on money earned, if the need for new revenues proves absolutely inescapable. Such a tax could be written to ease the burden on those least able to pay. Furthermore, it wouldn't penalize American business, which is precisely what higher income taxes do. A consumption tax would also tap into the vast underground economy, and make taxpayers out of those who now escape the income tax.

● Encourage increased productivity in the private sector. American productivity—output per hour—lagged badly in the 1970s and earlier in this decade. This country is still playing catch-up. In the final analysis, increased productivity is the key to a higher standard of living, and to achieving balance in the nation's trade statistics.

One way to boost productivity is through more research by the private sector. (Japan spends only slightly more of its GNP for R&D than does the U.S., but, unlike Japan, much of America's R&D spending reflects its commitment to a strong defense.) The existing tax credit for R&D is scheduled to expire at the end of 1988. It should be extended. We also favor the current proposal to permit the allocation of at least 67 percent of a U.S. company's research expenses to domestic income, for purposes of the foreign tax credit.

● Take a zero-based look at all existing regulations, including environmental regulation. Some regulation is necessary, but it should also be cost-effective. In the '60s, regulatory zeal cost the nation millions of dollars that could have gone into plant and equipment, but didn't. Industry simply can't afford needless expense that brings minimal benefits, because such outlays act as a brake on productivity and make it more difficult to compete internationally. An Economic Impact Statement should be required before any regulations are enacted. Such a statement should include an examination of international competitiveness.

● Shun protectionism. Nothing would stifle the economy—and turn "better times" into a mockery—faster than trade barriers and global economic warfare. There must be recognition of the fact that America's economy is part of a vast, interdependent global system. At the same time, we should insist on fair trade—reciprocity—among all trading partners. The current GATT negotiations offer the best vehicle for meeting these goals.

Unfortunately, when a candidate mentions the word economics, eyes sometimes glaze over and a fearful epidemic of yawns may erupt. But "better times" is an acceptable euphemism—and the platform we suggest will surely help bring them about.

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GOP Victory in 1988

The Key Is A Unified Conservative Agenda

Representative Jack Kemp

History shows that the Republican Party wins, as in 1980, when it unites behind a clear, populist conservative agenda. The party loses when it fails to do so, as in 1986. The 1988 presidential primaries demonstrate that Republican conservatives are pulsating with ideas about how to lead America—but the ideas often go in different directions. If the conservative movement is to fill its proper role of setting the direction for the Republican Party, it must unite behind an agenda to build on the successes of the Reagan years.

In 1980, the Republican Party was out of power, and conservative activists had the initiative. The biggest issues were well defined. The average citizen felt threatened by double-digit inflation, high taxes, and unemployment. He watched Americans being held hostage in Iran and the Soviets invading Afghanistan while U.S. foreign policy floundered. And even President Carter admitted the existence of a cultural "malaise"—though he cast the blame on the American people instead of its leaders.

The dividing lines between liberals and conservatives were clearly drawn over these issues. Conservatives coalesced behind a single, understandable, and popular agenda: tax and spending cuts to reduce the burden of government and to restore noninflationary economic growth, a rebuilding of our national defense, and a renewed support for traditional values. There was a tacit bargain by which conservatives involved in one part of the agenda would "sign off" on and support the rest of the agenda. And there was a willingness to suspend secondary policy differences in order to focus on the common challenge of defeating an incumbent Democratic president and replacing the liberal Democratic majority in Congress.

We were successful. Ronald Reagan won the 1980 election, and the Republican Party took over the U.S. Senate. We quickly scored major policy victories in two of the three areas—the economy (the 1981 tax cuts and spending cuts) and the decision in 1981 to rebuild our national defense.

Activists Lose Momentum

But success in achieving these objectives, ironically, had the effect of checking conservatives' momentum because specific further goals had not yet been agreed upon. When it is not on the offensive, the activist wing of the Republican Party, which is interested in *changing* the status quo according to populist conservative principles, loses ground to the party's larger establishment wing, which is interested in *managing* the status quo.

Despite its smaller size, only the activist wing can set the direction for the whole party; and through the party, the direction of the whole political system. Its influence in setting course is leveraged, like the rudder on an ocean liner. But whenever we change the status quo, the establishment types immediately take over to manage the new status quo, even though they often disagree with and seldom understand the fundamental logic behind the original change.

Status Quo Managers Take Over

On the economic issue, we began with the tax and spending victories of 1981. Almost immediately, a backsliding began, supported by Republican status-quo managers and Democrats alike—though in the new post-Kemp-Roth climate, the tax increases were referred to as "closing loopholes" and "revenue enhancement." Tax increases occurred on a yearly basis—1982, 1983, 1984—until some of us mounted a counteroffensive, joining insurgent Democrats to put through a rate-cutting tax reform. The tax-increasers exacted their price—ridiculous complication rather than simplification, and several unwise revenue-raising provisions. But they did not succeed in turning the 1986 tax reform into a net tax increase. We cut the top marginal income rate to 28 percent from 70 percent in 1980 and doubled the personal exemption for all family members to $2,000.

On foreign policy, we also began with a victory: the 1981 decision to reverse the previous disinvestment in our national defense. In 1983, President Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). We supported democracy in El Salvador and encouraged anti-Communist democratic freedom-fighters in several countries as a direct challenge to the Brezhnev Doctrine ("once a Marxist-Leninist state, always a Marxist-Leninist state"). The results

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were as predicted by advocates of "peace through strength." The Soviets continued their bullying tactics. They tried to stop the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles by our NATO allies in 1983. They walked away from the strategic arms negotiating table. They shot down a commercial airliner and murdered a U.S. Army officer. Soviet clients states like Nicaragua were encouraged to wage war on their own people. But when President Reagan and the allies stood firm, the Soviets eventually changed their tactics from confrontation to negotiation. Yet just at that point, status-quo managers like Secretary of State George Shultz took over the negotiations—on INF, on Nicaragua, on Afghanistan—and in their haste to sign agreements, they have thwarted the original purposes of policy.

Untried Social Agenda

In the social area, it is difficult to point to any major policy victories. The ongoing efforts of Secretary of Education Bill Bennett have changed the terms of debate about education. But the problems of abortion on demand, drugs, crime, welfare dependence, the assault on religious and family values—all are nearly as disturbing today as they were eight years ago, and AIDS has been added to the list.

The conservative social agenda was not tried and failed—it was largely left untried. With strategy in the hands of status-quo managers, no pitched legislative battle comparable to those in the economic and defense fields was ever waged over a major social issue. As a result, the social agenda never had the chance to benefit from the "tacit bargain" I mentioned earlier—from being part of a consensus conservative agenda. By the time of the battle over Robert Bork's nomination to the Supreme Court in 1987, the ground had been reclaimed by liberal Democrats in the Congress.

Rhetorical Victories, Policy Failures

All this helps explain why, since the early successes in key areas, conservatives have often been more successful in changing prevailing political rhetoric than in changing policy. Today, almost everyone talks about incentives; almost everyone talks about reducing the deficit; almost everyone favors a strong America; almost everyone professes concern for the family, the work ethic, safe neighborhoods, drug-free schools. This is a tribute to the power of our issues. But when everyone adopts our rhetoric, it is also harder to explain real policy differences—both within and between parties. In the Democratic Party, "fiscal discipline" has become a new code name for tax increases; "competitiveness," a new name for protectionism; "helping the family," the battle cry of those who would do just the opposite. And with establishment Republicans, the new rhetoric is not matched by a determination to put it into action.

Most of us have heard conservative colleagues wonder aloud whether the best thing would be for the Republican Party to lose the 1988 general election. But as Pat Buchanan has pointed out, four years of President Dukakis is too high a price to pay, even to retire George Shultz. It would be like standing by and watching your house burn down to get rid of the mice. And it wouldn't solve the problem of what conservatives stand for. In or out of power, unless conservatives set the agenda for national debate, we lose ground.

There is a second, related lesson in the past eight years: To be effective, the conservative movement and its agenda must be unified. We cannot survive merely as a loose coalition of social, economic, and defense conservatives. Freedom, growth, and the family are not three different issues. They are three different aspects of the *same* issue. Human nature is one thing, not three things. Today's issues are not easily compartmentalized as "social" or "economic" or "international." For example, reforming the tax code involved social as well as economic policy. Trade involves economics as well as foreign policy. Negotiations over strategic arms or the freedom fighters involve social philosophy as well as foreign policy. Conservatism might be roughly defined as common sense about human nature. As such, the conservative movement can and should be broad enough to accommodate a wide variety of people. In fact, the great strength of populist conservatism is that most Americans are basically conservative in their values, whether they use the label or not. But to reach this majority, conservatives must bring a reasonably unified vision to bear on every problem—economic, social, or international. Unity does not require absolute unanimity, but it does require some kind of broad consensus, or else our energies will be dissipated.

The conservative movement cannot survive merely as a loose coalition of social, economic, and defense conservatives.

The Republicans had an exceptionally strong field of candidates in the spring of 1988. This is a testimony to the caliber of people drawn into Republican politics in recent years. But the diversity of candidates also symbolized the fragmentation of the conservative coalition. Each seemed to have a different idea of the future conservative agenda. Pete du Pont articulately advocated extending the idea of incentives to the spending side of the budget, and even to social problems like drugs. Pat Robertson argued, equally articulately, that the leading issue today is the decline of moral standards. Bob Dole staked his campaign on the need to deal with the deficit, which became a symbol for a variety of concerns about the economic future. Al Haig forcefully advocated realism in foreign policy. Each made a powerful case. But each, I believe, was ultimately hampered by seeming to offer only parts of a comprehensive and consistent agenda.

Why Bush Won the Primaries

My own problem was somewhat different. In my campaign I set out, first, to identify myself as one of the key

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

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Kemp: The Democrats' issue is how to manage plant closings; the Republicans' issue is how to create plant openings.

architects of our successes under President Reagan, and second, to offer a comprehensive, coherent, soup-to-nuts development of the conservative agenda, particularly in ways that would show contrasts with Bush and Dole. The trouble with this strategy was that George Bush successfully neutralized the first part and largely preempted the second.

Bush did an excellent job of positioning himself as the heir to Ronald Reagan. American voters are forward looking, and few people cared whether Bush had run against Reagan and his policies in 1980. In a curious way I believe even the Iran/Contra affair benefited Bush in the Republican primaries: Events cast Bob Dole as a Reagan critic, and Bush as the loyal defender of Ronald Reagan, for whom Republicans have deep affection.

Bush's line that "in my family, loyalty is not a character flaw" struck a chord, because it converted what critics considered a weakness into a strength. But neither personal loyalty nor the advantage of the vice presidency would have been sufficient if Bush had not adequately positioned himself on the issues.

In my campaign I offered the following agenda. On defense and foreign policy, I would focus on aid to freedom-fighters, exporting democratic capitalism to less developed countries, and early deployment of SDI. On economics, my agenda included opposing tax increases and Social Security cuts, starting a counteroffensive against protectionism based on free-trade agreements, cutting capital gains tax rates, promoting free enterprise zones and urban homesteading in pockets of poverty, and restoring financial stability and fiscal discipline with a gold standard. On social policy, I proposed; regaining the initiative on the right to life by making constitutional protection for the unborn an issue in Congress, not just the executive and judicial branches; a comprehensive plan to stop the spread of AIDS through routine testing, confidential tracing, and AIDS education based on right and wrong; a return to the "ABCs" of education—Accountability, Basics, and Character; and a plan to roll back the burdens imposed by government programs and taxation on the traditional family with further tax and budget reform.

Bush benefited, to start with, from association with policy initiatives already adopted by the administration, many of which I hoped to list as fruits of my own efforts. The administration had supported Kemp-Roth and the 1986 tax reform. It had advocated, though not always energetically, enterprise zones, urban homesteading, and tenant management of public housing. Several appointments to the Federal Reserve had shifted the focus away from the domestic money supply toward commodity prices. Secretary of the Treasury James Baker had altered the official goal of international monetary policy away from "benign neglect" toward greater exchange-rate stability. During the campaign he even advocated using the gold price as an indicator for coordinating economic policies.

Bush's "Right" Positions

Bush cemented this connection by acting to remove doubts about his commitment to the 1980 and 1984 GOP platforms. By saying "no tax increase, period"; by advocating a dramatic cut in the capital gains tax; by charging Dole in New Hampshire with "straddling" on tax increases; by pledging to finally enact enterprise zones; by associating himself with Bill Bennett's education reforms; by disclaiming his support for cuts in Social Security; by pledging to support SDI—in these and other ways, Bush took "right" positions and narrowed the opportunities for his opponents to use these issues to overcome his advantages as vice president.

Indeed, by the end of the campaign all the candidates had "taken the pledge" against tax increases, promised to deploy SDI, to support freedom fighters, to support the right to life, to combat AIDS, and so on. I felt justified in telling my supporters, as I withdrew from the race, "We have not failed, because our ideas are winning."

In short, George Bush maintained the advantages of the vice presidency, not because issues didn't matter, but because they did. He emerged as the victor by outlining his support for the consensus agenda hammered out in 1980 and 1984. The fact that he did not propose to go very far beyond it may account for a lack of intensity among the voters. But Bush did correctly recognize the need to endorse a comprehensive conservative agenda.

Bush also had the considerable advantage of being able to describe his agenda simply—the Reagan agenda. I offered what I consider the logical development of the conservative agenda begun under Ronald Reagan. The trouble was that all the candidates claimed to be offering the same thing. I found it difficult to describe my vision differently

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and still describe it simply—as essentially one thing, not three things, or ten things.

Standards, The Issue of 1988

In retrospect, the unifying theme for conservatives in 1988 has been the need for standards. On social issues, people are asking for a restoration of moral and social standards shaped to the needs of the family, not vice versa. The leading economic issues are also a question of standards—spending discipline, responsibility in ensuring open trade, and a sound monetary standard. The foreign policy issues concern the need to hold other nations to the standards of human freedom and civilized conduct—whether large, like the Soviet Union, or small, like Nicaragua. I am convinced that "standards" are also a great organizing theme for the Republican Party in 1988.

Here are some of the insights I gained on specific issues in light of the presidential primaries, and what I think they imply for the future.

What Voters Think of SDI and Arms Control

The biggest foreign policy event of the campaign was the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in December, which seemed to signal a change in atmosphere in U.S.-Soviet relations. Curiously, though, the INF treaty that emerged from the summit does not seem to have changed many votes. The first two finishers in Iowa, a fairly dovish state, were Bob Dole, whose support for the treaty was reluctant, and Pat Robertson, who opposed the treaty. Arms reduction is popular, but the numbers are not matched by intensity of support for a certain policy. George Bush received a good response when he said the INF treaty would be good for his grandchildren. So did Pete du Pont when he complimented Bush for his World War II war record—and reminded Bush that he fought not just for peace, but for peace with freedom. Americans also believe in acting in good faith. I received a warm reception when I said, "We should not sign new treaties until the Soviets have complied with previous treaties."

People seemed enthusiastic about the technological possibilities of the Strategic Defense Initiative. They responded favorably when I suggested that the ultimate arms control is to shift from sole reliance on offensive weapons toward strategic self-defense—and that as president I would not only research and test, but research, test, develop, and deploy SDI. Despite, or rather because of, its popularity, SDI did not turn out to be as cutting an issue in the Republican primaries as I had expected —since by the end of the campaign, all the Republican candidates pledged to deploy SDI at some point. Policy experts know that a major delay in SDI deployment could kill SDI. But the average voter sees little difference between "research, test, and deploy SDI immediately," and "research, test, and deploy SDI as soon as it's ready." As far as voters were concerned, all the Republicans are for SDI—as soon as possible. Since the Democratic presidential candidate will oppose it, SDI should be a cutting issue for Republicans in the general election. It was SDI, as much as anything, that brought the Soviets to the bargaining table. And SDI becomes more, not less, important if Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) are pursued, since any further reduction of our offensive nuclear deterrent would increase the relative effectiveness of Soviet strategic defenses and conventional forces.

Confusion Over Contras

I found it relatively easy to make the case for supporting democratic freedom fighters in Nicaragua, Afghanistan, and Africa. It's not a hard sell. The key, however, is to explain what we are trying to achieve as well as who and what we are against. The public's understanding of our policy goals, and how they have been undermined by the liberal Democratic Congress, was increased by Ollie North's Iran/Contra testimony. Unfortunately, the administration itself has not made a sufficiently forceful or coherent case. In fact, with its capitulation to Jim Wright's peace-at-the-cost-of-democracy plan, the administration has thoroughly confused its message about the goals of American policy. The administration has also downplayed evidence of Soviet and Cuban activities in Nicaragua. Releasing our intelligence on Soviet and Cuban involvement, as John F. Kennedy did concerning Soviet missiles in Cuba, could do a great deal to explain to the public the reasons for U.S. policy toward Nicaragua.

In or out of power, unless conservatives set the agenda for national debate we lose ground.

On the whole, conservatives need to do a more thorough job of laying out the goals of foreign policy, so that the public is better equipped to judge the merits of agreements. To do this effectively we need to spend more time on concretely relating strategy to goals such as political, economic, and religious freedom in other countries.

Gold and Taxes as Political Issues

The enactment of the 1986 tax reform, and the bipartisan coalition that put it into law, has drained some of the strength of the tax issue as a liberal/conservative or party issue. The economic ideas that once seemed so bold have become to some extent conventional wisdom. Because tax reform added unnecessarily to the complexity of the tax code, however, simplification is probably more popular today than before tax reform. People still like the idea of a modified flat tax you could fill out on a postcard.

The federal deficit remains a powerful symbol of our remaining economic problems. Everyone agrees the federal deficit should be reduced; the key question is how. The 75 percent surge of revenues since 1980 shows the problem is not that taxes are too low. And the mushrooming Social Security surplus indicates the deficit's cause is not Social Security cost-of-living adjustments. It's not yet recognized that Congress's ability to finance deficit spending at home and abroad was vastly expanded by ending the gold-based Bretton Woods monetary system in 1971. Meanwhile, the entire $148 billion federal deficit last year

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was accounted for by interest on the national debt—at interest rates three times as high as the pre-1971 average. The only way to restore balanced budgets, exchange rate stability, and 3 or 4 percent interest rates is to restore the discipline of a modern gold standard.

The most important economic event during the campaign was the stock market crash of October 1987. I believe the crash proved my warnings that standing pat on the status quo is a dangerous strategy. However, I found myself in a curious position. The same critics who had annually predicted the failure of Reaganomics for eight years seized on the stock crash as evidence that the tax cuts would finally lead to disaster. I was the only candidate who explained that the stock crash was not caused by what we did under President Reagan but by what we failed to do. But I probably spent too much time answering opponents who blamed the deficit on the tax cuts, and not enough time explaining my solution to the deficit. Defending the administration's tax cuts did not differentiate me from the administration's vice president.

A failure by conservatives to convey legitimate concern for civil rights was partly responsible for our inability to prevent the shameful treatment of Robert Bork.

The issue of honest, stable, predictable, reliable money received a good response in areas of the country suffering most from monetary instability and high interest rates, such as Iowa. Al Haig did me a favor in one of the debates by demanding that I explain why I was the only candidate in favor of the gold standard. By the end of the campaign, I would call for a "dollar as good as—" and audiences would respond "gold!" However, compared with the tax issue in 1980, far less groundwork has been done on the monetary issue. To the press, the gold standard today seems as far-fetched as claiming in the 1970s that we could cut tax rates while reducing inflation at the same time. But because of its inherent connection with the federal deficit, the trade deficit, and economic instability, the gold issue will not go away.

Why Gephardt Faded

One of the most encouraging results of the primary campaign was the revelation that protectionist sentiment at the grass roots isn't very strong. The slickly packaged Gephardt strategy quickly peaked and quickly faded. And in South Carolina, George Bush won decisively by campaigning (as I did) for free trade, while Robertson and Dole campaigned as protectionists. Voters seemed more receptive to the idea of competitively lowering trade barriers by establishing free-trade areas than to threatening a world trade war.

Social Security is a good example of the importance of taking both economic and social issues into account when setting government policy. I am firmly convinced that the most consistent conservative position is to make Social Security work—not to phase it out—while continuing to expand private retirement saving. The inescapable fact is that phasing out pay-as-you-go Social Security today would either increase the national debt by several trillion dollars or impose a several-trillion-dollar tax increase on the baby-boom generation over its lifetime. And it would hit traditional families hardest by removing or offsetting benefits for spouses, widows, and dependents.

Though it was important for the future of the conservative movement for Pete du Pont and me to hash out the issue, both of us could have used the time pursuing the front-runners. The past support of establishment Republicans for cuts in Social Security COLAs misperceives Social Security's relation to the federal deficit. The growing Social Security surplus is financing—and encouraging—deficit spending in the rest of the budget. Cutting Social Security COLAs does nothing to address this. The real answer is to roll back the 1988 and 1990 payroll tax increases and hold taxes, and the trust fund surplus, only to what the system needs. This would give families more after-tax income to save or spend on rearing their families. It's also time to remove the benefits penalty for continuing to work after age 65. Social Security was a key issue for me in New Hampshire until Bush repudiated his support for any attempts to tamper with the COLAs as the Senate did in 1985.

Bork, Abortion, and the Voters

The social issues most on voters minds in the GOP primary were abortion, AIDS, and drugs. However, the most important political event for the social agenda during the campaign was the fight over the nomination of Robert Bork to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court is the focal point for almost all the social issues, and the bitter controversy over the Bork nomination reflected that. I considered it so important, both to the conservative cause and to my own campaign, that I paid for television commercials on behalf of Bork.

However, the Bork nomination demonstrated that the decisive battleground over the Court right now is not in the Supreme Court, but in the Congress. First, of course, the president's judicial appointments are subject to Senate confirmation. This alone makes it a mistake to put all eggs into the basket of a behind-the-scenes nomination strategy. Second, the Senate's vote was swayed—or at least, not deterred—by the election-style campaigning for and against Bork's confirmation. And conservatives lost that fight. Bork stood for the idea that the courts should interpret the law, not legislate. Americans believe this, but they also believe it matters whether the law being faithfully interpreted is right or wrong. And, until conservatives gain a more consistent reputation as defenders of equal opportunity (not the liberals' racial quotas), they will be in a poor position to allay fears that they don't want to, or are unable to, correct any legal anomalies that might crop up.

For such reasons, the progress of the conservative social agenda has stalled. In my campaign I proposed, in addition

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to pursuing judicial appointments and executive branch initiatives, that pro-life forces should mount a real attempt to overturn *Roe* v. *Wade* by simple statute—just as *Dred Scott* was overturned by an act of Congress in 1862. The effort would be controversial—but that's exactly what is necessary. Populist conservatives cannot win victories unless they take issues to the people.

At the same time, we must strive to be more inclusive. Twenty million abortions after *Roe* v. *Wade,* simple arithmetic indicates that perhaps as many as one-quarter of adult women may have had an abortion. And though many now regret the decision, they cannot undo it. Our task is to prevent the further taking of innocent life today and in the future. While being resolute in our efforts to end abortion, we must also, for example, put forward initiatives to help make adoption a real alternative.

Conservatives and Equal Opportunity

Equal opportunity must also be at the heart of the conservative agenda and the Republican platform. Some argue that with my heavy emphasis on enterprise zones, urban homesteading, and tenant management, I made the mistake of "using a general election strategy in the primary." This attitude is defeatist and shortsighted. As I have already suggested, a failure by conservatives to convey legitimate concern for civil rights was partly responsible for our inability to prevent the shameful treatment of Robert Bork. And if conservatism is common sense about human nature, then the vast majority of minority and poor Americans must be viewed as potential conservatives, not written off. On the Democratic side, Jesse Jackson went as far as he did because he spoke to people about a serious social issue like drugs. Jackson fell short of the nomination, not because he was black, but because on most other issues—notably his blame-America-first foreign policy—he was farthest to the left of all the Democratic candidates. I believe that in 10 years, one-quarter of the Republican Party will consist of conservative blacks, conservative Hispanics, conservative Asian-Americans—or else the Republican Party will resign itself to permanent minority status.

Now, the almost irresistible tendency of the Republican establishment is to believe that the way to win support is to tone down our message, selectively forget parts of the GOP platform, minimize the importance of new initiatives, and avoid controversial issues—particularly the social agenda. That happened to some extent even in 1980, when the establishment climbed aboard the Reagan campaign after the convention—and Reagan's lead over Carter dropped nearly 10 points in two months. In 1984, the often themeless reelection campaign won a personal landslide for President Reagan—but other than the tax-increase issue, the administration failed to get a policy mandate and a Congress to support it in the second term. The same lack of apparent purpose lost control of the Senate in 1986.

The Democrats' Vulnerabilities

In the general election the Republican Party faces the same challenge as the conservative movement within the party. Unless conservative activists keep moving forward with new initiatives, they lose influence—and the Republican Party loses its sense of direction. In the same way,

Julia Jones

If conservatism is common sense about human nature, then most minority and poor Americans must be viewed as potential conservatives, not written off.

unless the Republican Party puts forward an agenda for progress that sharpens rather than narrows the differences between Republican and Democratic Party leadership, the party slips back into minority status.

Why on earth should the Republican Party pretend it has no major differences with the Democrats? As I said in my campaign, this year's election will determine the future of our country for years to come. Ronald Reagan pulled us out of the decline that threatened in 1980; but this year we will determine our future direction. The gap between the two parties is widening and deepening each year, not narrowing.

It was generally accepted by the post-World War II generation that the Democratic and Republican Parties agreed on many common ends, but disagreed on the means to achieve them. Today this is no longer true. On the great questions of our time—freedom, growth, and the family—

The Democrats have now adopted the pro-family rhetoric that they disdained in 1980. But they are using it to promote policies that are patently anti-family.

there is now fundamental disagreement over the very goals we should try to achieve. And in each of these areas, the liberal Democrats are incredibly vulnerable.

Dukakis vs. Truman

The doctrine of support for freedom, that bears President Truman's name is a perfect example. Under the Truman Doctrine, the United States stood willing to support any people who would fight for democratic freedoms against Communist aggression or dictatorship in their homelands. Perhaps the best example was our unflinching

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Mike Caputo

Kemp with Contra leaders: It's easy to make the case for supporting freedom fighters in Nicaragua. The key is to explain what we are trying to achieve as well as who and what we are against.

support of the people of Greece, the ancient birthplace of democracy, to stop a Communist revolution. President Kennedy said we should "fight any foe, bear any burden" in defense of freedom. Compare that firm resolve with the statement of Michael Dukakis that he can live with a Soviet Communist client state in Nicaragua—armed with advanced MIG fighters—in pursuit of "peace." But peace at the cost of freedom and democracy is no bargain. In fact, it is not peace at all; it is servitude. The goal of our foreign policy must be lasting peace with freedom, with human rights, with democracy. The leadership of the Democratic Party disagrees.

When George McGovern called for abortion on demand in 1972 he was a political exception, and the 1972 Democratic Party platform's pro-abortion plank was a shocking departure from the traditional Judeo-Christian values that had been largely supported by both parties. Who could have foreseen that four elections later, every Democratic presidential candidate would have to pass a pro-abortion litmus test? The Republican Party proudly proclaims in its platform its readiness to champion the rights of the unborn child. The Democratic Party won't even let pro-life groups buy advertising in their convention program.

In 1984, the often themeless reelection campaign won a personal landslide for President Reagan—but, other than the tax-increase issue, the administration failed to get a policy mandate and a Congress to support it in the second term.

Still further evidence of the divergence of the two parties is the approach to the AIDS epidemic. Though there were important differences among the Republican candidates, there was broad agreement that, while people with AIDS must be treated with compassion, the behavior that spreads AIDS must be addressed as a moral and social, not just a medical, problem. The Democratic candidates seemed to agree that the answer to AIDS is to spend more money and step up indoctrination in the techniques of "safe sex." The way to highlight this difference is not to move toward the Democrats, but to take the next step beyond the status quo, with plans to prevent the spread of AIDS with routine testing, confidential tracing, and education based on right and wrong.

Pro-Family Rhetoric, Anti-Family Policy

Day-care is another example of this divergence of fundamental philosophy. The Democrats have now adopted the pro-family rhetoric that they disdained in 1980. But they are using it to promote policies that are patently anti-family. Their proposal for federally regulated and subsidized day-care would force more mothers of young children out of the home and effectively shut down religiously oriented child-care. The Republican response cannot be to offer half-doses of the same poison. We must establish the principle that traditional families are treated at least as well as other households—as we did successfully in doubling the personal exemption. On day-care, this means we must put forward initiatives like Congressman Clyde Holloway's revenue-neutral plan to restructure the child-care credit, providing a credit to all families with preschool children, not just those in which the mother works outside the home.

The Republican Party must mount a new offensive over the family issues. The approach of the liberal Democrats is to get the federal government to intervene in replacing the functions of social institutions like the family. The Republican attitude is that the goal of federal policy is to see to it that the family, the church or synagogue, the school, the voluntary organization, the neighborhood, the workplace, and the local government, are allowed to fulfill their proper roles.

The New Politics of Special Interests

Finally, there is profound disagreement on economic goals. The Democrats were bludgeoned by Walter Mondale's disastrous defeat in 1984 over the tax-increase issue. One of my most enjoyable moments during the campaign was to watch Al Gore taunting Dick Gephardt for having voted for the Kemp-Roth tax cuts—but refusing, when pressed, to favor its repeal. But the Democrats have not stopped trying to use the government to transfer resources to special interests. They have only changed their tactics: for example, by placing greater emphasis on direct government controls and regulations to redistribute favors such as trade protectionism, or imposing mandatory health insurance and plant-closing requirements on American business.

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But there is an inherent contradiction in their approach: In an international economy, each of these measures undercuts the "competitiveness" that is supposed to be their goal. In the final analysis, they cannot argue against the creation of 16 million new jobs in eight years—with lower inflation and higher real incomes—that has been the direct result of the supply-side Republican economic strategy. The Democrats think the issue is how to manage plant closings; the Republicans think the issue is how to create plant openings.

On each of the major issues, the only winning strategy is to clarify, not to blur, the differences between the parties. American voters will elect more Republicans to the Congress nowadays for one reason—to change things; they elect Democrats to manage the status quo. Whenever Republican strategy is to try to pick up Democratic votes by offering a little less of what the Democrats are offering, we begin losing our base in the Congress, and a Republican administration is forced to trim its sails or strike its colors.

The same thing is true at the state level—and battles in the state legislatures over redistricting after the 1990 census will determine many seats in the Congress. Voters will not elect Republicans to compromise with Jim Wright and the liberal Democratic Congress—only to replace them.

The key to such a victory is twofold: we must put forward a specific conservative agenda for progress and opportunity—and we must unify behind it. Republicans cannot be the governing party only by looking back to 1980 and 1984. Those platforms must serve as our starting point. But both were themselves forward-looking and sometimes controversial efforts to give substance to our promises of change for the better. The Republicans can win in November only if we continue to move forward by adopting a consensus conservative agenda for the 1990s. If we do so and campaign on it, we can win a national mandate to enact our proposals. Then we must follow through—and risk having to grapple once again with the problems of success.

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What I Learned in Cedar Rapids

Pete du Pont Discusses His Presidential Campaign

An Interview by Adam Meyerson

Elections are the ultimate laboratory for political ideas, the test market for policy proposals. Op-ed articles, conferences, position papers are all important in shifting the policy debate, but in our democracy a political idea never makes real headway until it is converted into a campaign issue and wins a mandate at the ballot box. Each election season is thus a great experiment for the politician of ideas, an opportunity to learn which ideas need to be refined, which given more emphasis, which perhaps abandoned. But just because an idea is not immediately popular does not always mean it should be discarded: As in the commercial marketplace, where successful new products frequently fail the first time, it may take years for a political message to attract broad support.

With these thoughts in mind, *Policy Review* asked Governor Pete du Pont to discuss the reaction of Iowa and New Hampshire voters to the principal issues on which he based his 1988 primary campaign. The interview was conducted in April 1988 by *Policy Review* editor Adam Meyerson.

Pete du Pont is a former three-term U.S. congressman and two-term governor of Delaware. He wrote the lead article in the fall 1985 issue of *Policy Review,* "Kamikaze Economics: Prosperity and Growth Are Imperiled by Protectionism."

Policy Review: **What do you see as the major accomplishment and major weakness of your campaign?**

du Pont: The greatest accomplishment was that we encouraged American voters to think about the central themes of the campaign—the coming financial crisis of Social Security, the need to replace welfare with work, our horrendous drug problem, competition in education, and a phaseout of farm subsidies.

Our greatest problem was a lack of visibility on television. But I would sum it up this way: I was a candidate of change in a year in which Republican primary voters were not much interested in change. Everyone would agree that the welfare system is a disaster for those it touches, taxpayers and welfare recipients alike. But does it really have to be fixed this year? Yes, the baby-boomer will tell you the Social Security system is not going to provide his family a secure retirement, but that is 25 years away, do we really have to solve that problem in the primaries of 1988?

I think voters understood that what I was saying was true, and that those issues need to be addressed. But since things are comfortable now, do we really have to change the course of the ship this year? I argued that we did, but many people felt that maybe we could go on for a while as we were.

Further, this is an enormous country. To get your ideas into the consciousness of the voters you have to talk about them again and again and again. I would predict that all our campaign issues will become more prominent within the next presidency. But it may take more than one campaign to bring them to the consciousness of not only voters, but political leaders.

I think Jack Kemp said that the problem with his campaign was that he could not beat Ronald Reagan. He could beat Bush or Robertson or du Pont or Dole, but he couldn't beat Reagan. Well, I look at it a little differently. The success of the Reagan Revolution dulled the appetite of revolutionaries to create another.

P.R.: Which of your central campaign themes do you think had the greatest impact on voters?

du Pont: The biggest response came when I talked about the Social Security crunch that the next generation perceives so clearly. Social Security will be fine for 50-year-olds, so I didn't get much response among older audiences. But when I talked with people in their 20s, 30s, and early 40s, a lot of heads would nod.

Don't tell me that the issue didn't create interest or influence events. I think I made the Social Security Administration a little nervous, and the issue reached so strongly into public consciousness that the Advertising Council and the Social Security Administration ran ads on television saying the system was solvent and everything was fine!

The welfare proposal got the second strongest reaction, because even the welfare mothers I spoke with know that working is really their only key to opportunity.

The farm plan was the proposal that probably led to the most shrugging of shoulders. People agreed that farm sub-

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sidies are too costly and counterproductive, but the general attitude seemed to be that they've been around for such a long time, they can't be changed.

P.R.: How about your proposal to revoke the driver's licenses of teen-agers caught with drugs?

du Pont: In retrospect, I am not sure that our proposal went far enough. We intended it as a symbol of what needed to be done and a good idea for helping young people to avoid drugs. But I think that we perhaps needed to advance a broader proposal—the punishment and reward aspects of the proposal. Drugs is at the top of the list of worries of every parent of a teen-ager, because one thing that can really destroy a son's or daughter's life is crack or cocaine.

P.R.: Why didn't education vouchers become more of a campaign issue?

du Pont: I found this very frustrating. The polls show that 73 percent of the parents of America would like to choose schools for their kids, yet the specific proposal by our campaign to provide this choice didn't quite catch on. We might be seeing here something similar to the polls that show widespread unhappiness with Congress but enormous satisfaction with one's own congressman. In the same way, in education, a huge percentage of the people are saying that the schools are not good enough but an equally large percentage are happy with the school their children attend.

Still, I think that of all of our campaign proposals, educational choice is likely to be the first that will come into effect. Many school districts are already experimenting with vouchers. The National Governors Association recommends more choice; the Education Commission of States has come to that position. After all, the solution is so simple! You don't have to redesign the curriculum, you don't have to add three minutes to a math class, all you have to do is give parents a choice on everything from math curriculum to prayer in school, and all those problems solve themselves, because you have the choice, as a parent, to send your child to the school that you believe in.

P.R.: Was it difficult to make a national campaign issue out of vouchers, when education is more a state and local responsibility?

du Pont: Most of the questions I was asked were not about the voucher principle, which people accepted, but about its implementation, the mechanics. What would happen right here in Sioux City where there are several schools? Could my children go to the Catholic school? Could they go to a private school for learning disabled children? Could they choose between public high schools, and what about school busing, what routes would the buses take? All these mechanical questions would obviously have to be worked out. But voters seemed to accept our proposal that the federal government help pay for implementation of a choice plan of any school district that wanted one, leaving the implementation up to the local districts.

UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos

"My biggest response came when I talked about the Social Security crunch that the next generation perceives so clearly."

But let me add in regard to all these policy questions, this would have been an entirely different race if an incumbent vice president weren't running. All these issues were overshadowed by the fact that we had an excellent administration under Ronald Reagan, and his vice president was there to succeed him. Many voters never got to whether Pete du Pont was better than Jack Kemp on the issues. They simply were going to vote for George Bush because he carried the flag for the Reagan administration. The policy debate simply did not determine the election results.

P.R.: You spoke strongly against the INF treaty. Why do you think the treaty is so popular?

du Pont: Well, in every American living room there is a yearning for less risk, and many people thought that the INF must be okay if a strong anti-Communist like Reagan supports it. Reagan's switch was critical to public opinion. Another factor was that the INF involves removing missiles 3,000 miles from America. I'm not sure many people saw the threat a weakened Europe would pose for a free America.

Probably my most effective argument against the INF was the proposal that any intermediate-range missile reduction be accompanied by conventional arms reductions. Everyone understood that if you take away the missiles, the greatest guarantor of peace, while leaving in place Soviet conventional superiority, the greatest threat to peace, you put the freedom of our allies at risk. That struck a very responsive chord, but again, people said, "Ronald Reagan is for it, it must be okay." So the president's changing sides was a fatal blow that made arguing against the treaty very difficult.

P.R.: Why does there seem to be so little public enthusiasm for the Nicaraguan freedom fighters?

du Pont: We haven't persuaded the American people that what happens in Central America is important.

I don't think that Pete du Pont or Ronald Reagan or the

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"The farm plan was probably the program that led to the most shrugging of shoulders."

Republican Party or, for that matter, *Policy Review* has really made the case for the freedom fighters that the mass of voters understand. Some intellectuals understand it, but out at gas pumps and Rotary Club meetings, people don't see why we should care much about what happens in a tiny country like Nicaragua. They don't see a Communist presence in Nicaragua as ultimately leading to the destabilization of Mexico. Unfortunately, if Mexico is destabilized, it surely will seem more important than it seems today. I don't think we've carried the message. We've got a few generals on this issue, a few colonels, but not many troops.

The success of the Reagan Revolution dulled the appetite of revolutionaries to create another.

Every once in a while Daniel Ortega helps us by visiting Moscow or by breaking up a demonstration, but Nicaragua is a long way away from Iowa or New Hampshire. And you know, there has been an isolationist streak in the United States dating back to 1787, which says that what people want to do in other countries is no concern of ours. We saw this before World War I and World War II. And we saw it sprout again in the Democratic Party, particularly after Vietnam, and it is still apparent in attitudes toward Central America.

P.R.: When you talked about the Strategic Defense Initiative, what statements won applause?

du Pont: In the foreign policy area, conservatives have the single strongest political opportunity this year. Wherever I talked about SDI, I would start out by simply saying, "You know, if one single Soviet missile was fired this afternoon, in anger or by mistake, aimed at Cedar Rapids, Iowa, or Portsmouth, New Hampshire, there is nothing we could do about it—except give you 15 or 20 minutes warning and then wait for it to land."

Most people didn't know that, and when you put that to them they are shocked. "Surely, we have some system there!" they say. Well, no there isn't, and that is why we need the Strategic Defense Initiative. And that is a very effective argument. I think the potential support for SDI is very, very strong. It wasn't much of an issue in the Republican primaries because all the Republicans supported SDI. But against Jesse Jackson or Mike Dukakis in November, this could be a potent issue for George Bush. A lively debate would be good for the country. So would one on Central America.

P.R.: How did SDI usually come up on the campaign stump?

du Pont: Usually with the traditional defense budget question, "Can't we get rid of this deficit by paring down defense?" Well, I would say, Yes, we probably could build the Midgetman instead of the MX and save a little money, and probably have a better defense as well. And yes, we could probably shrink the number of colonels over at the Pentagon and we can certainly do a better job of weapons procurement, and all those things would save a little money. But there is one area where I think we have to add money, and that is in constructing the Strategic Defense Initiative.

The most common criticism from the crowd was usually, "SDI won't be 100 percent effective." Then I would point out that nothing is 100 percent effective. And they would say, "If 20 percent of the missiles are going to get through, does that make it worth building?" My response, which was usually persuasive, was, "It depends on which town you are in. If one of them gets through, and you are in that city, it may not seem worth it. But if you are in the city where one of the missiles is stopped, then you and your family are saved."

P.R.: How much did your no-tax-increase pledge help you?

du Pont: A great deal. As you saw in the final debate in New Hampshire, I was able to dramatize the pledge by presenting it to Bob Dole and demanding that he sign it. Of course, this didn't distinguish me from the others. Jack

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Kemp had signed the pledge, and got some mileage in New Hampshire by focusing on his tax-cutting record. George Bush had more or less said he was against tax increases, and I think his proposal to reduce capital gains taxes is politically feasible. In fact, I think we can see further tax reductions if Bush makes a no-tax-increase pledge a central issue of his campaign.

Once in a while I would ask, "Hands up all of you who feel that taxes should go up in your family," and I have never met an American family that feels undertaxed. This should be a central issue in the campaign if for no other reason than that the next president is going to need help when Congress starts trying to raise taxes again. A mandate based on a no-tax-increase pledge in 1988 is necessary to fend off the forces of the tax increasers in 1989.

One of the things I learned as a governor about working with a legislature, is that if you give them the eye of a needle, they will drive an 18-wheeler right through it. You dare not utter even a suggestion that you might support a tax increase. As soon as you have said that, you have lost the war.

P.R.: Do voters care much about the budget and trade deficits?

du Pont: They care in the abstract, but at the same time they are aware of our prosperity in spite of the deficits. People say they would like balanced budgets, but even with deficits we have the highest employment in our history, we're in the 65th month of an economic expansion, and spendable income is up and inflation is down.

Protectionism peaked as a political issue a year ago and is now on the wane. Most people understood that government protection could not help them in the future. The collapse of the Gephardt campaign is perhaps the best evidence of this. He was riding high for a long time, because this is one of those issues that people loudly beat the drum for the first time they hear it. The more they think about it, the less they like it.

The same thing happened to Bruce Babbitt. He became the darling of the media because he advocated enormous tax increases, but the more the Democratic primary voters began to think about that, the less they liked it.

P.R.: What social issues are most on voters' minds this year?

du Pont: Drugs certainly have to be at the top of the list, and also the teaching of values in our schools. Voters want their kids to say the Pledge of Allegiance, they want schools to teach abstinence as a way of avoiding AIDS for unmarried persons. Even more than that, there is a desire that America set a code of moral conduct for itself. The term social issues usually refers to prayer in school and abortion, but I think the umbrella has become larger than that. The central question now is, what values do we try to pass on to the next generation? Sixth graders need help in defining right and wrong, true and untrue, and good and bad. They're not always getting that help now.

"I have never met an American family that feels undertaxed."

P.R.: Why did Dukakis and Jackson emerge as front-runners for the Democratic nomination?

The potential support for SDI is very, very strong and could become a potent issue for George Bush. A lively debate would be good for the country. So would one on Central America.

du Pont: First, I think the Democratic Party is continuing its rush to the left. It is not a drift any more, it is a rush. Jesse Jackson is succeeding because he comes with the biggest built-in constituency and because of all the Democratic candidates he is by far the most interesting. He has something to say. Of course his specific proposals would be disastrous for America, but he has a message. Dukakis doesn't have a message, Simon really didn't have a message. Gephardt had a message that was rejected. Joe Biden had a lot of emotion, but he had no message. And I think that Jackson has become the candidate of message in the Democratic Party and Dukakis is a survivor of the regional semi-finals of the liberal technocrats. The Democratic Party hasn't learned from McGovern or Carter or Mondale. And God bless them, I hope they continue down that path.

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THE MUNICH MEN

How Chamberlain and Roosevelt Invited World War II

ANDRÉ RYERSON

The negotiations which led up to the Munich Agreement of September 29, 1938, were the nearest approach in recent years to the settlement of a major international issue by a procedure of peaceful change.

—E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years Crisis* (1939)

The perspective of time routinely changes the profile of events. Men of dignity turn indecent, and the seemingly stiff-necked and backward, as the theater of history slowly shifts the lighting, appear heroic.

On October 2, 1938, an exhausted but exhilarated Neville Chamberlain wrote to his sisters of recent events in which he had played a premier role, and described his impression of Adolf Hitler in Munich. "Hitler's appearance and manner when I saw him appeared to show that the storm signals were up, though he gave the double hand-shake that he reserves for specially friendly demonstration. Yet these appearances were deceptive. His opening sentences, when we gathered round for our conference were so moderate and reasonable, that I felt instant relief."

Democracy's "Little Worms"

As his words reveal, the British prime minister arrived at the Munich conference in a state of fear and hope, acutely attentive to the demeanor of Germany's unpredictable Führer. The master of the situation was clearly Hitler. If Hitler would not accept the entreaties of Chamberlain that Germany take the western portions of Czechoslovakia "peacefully"—that is, under the aegis of an agreement with Britain and France—and took them instead by force, the tissue of civilization that maintained Europe in peace since World War I would be torn, and terrible destruction of civilian populations from the new weapons of mass annihilation would ensue. Aerial bombardment, the British government believed, entailed horrors that made conventional thinking about diplomacy, warfare, and traditional balance-of-power equations, essentially obsolete.

The "instant relief" felt by Chamberlain at Hitler's reasonableness did not convert to the substance of peace that the British prime minister so desperately sought. Quite the contrary, it assured Hitler that the democracies, mesmerized by the memory of 1914-18 and numb at the prospect of a war likely to be worse, would do nothing to check Germany's program of aggression. The Western democracies had fallen over themselves to give their imprimatur to the Nazi demand to seize Sudeten Czechoslovakia. While Chamberlain returned home from Munich without the slightest doubt that he had performed an act of great nobility, Premier Edouard Daladier of France flew home with a sense of shame. As for Hitler, he judged the leaders of the democracies to be such cowards that in private conversation he later characterized them as "little worms." On March 15, 1939, he violated the Munich Agreement—not six months old—by invading the rest of Czechoslovakia.

PBS, Where Are You?

This September will mark the 50th anniversary of the Munich Agreement. One wonders whether network news programs, special observations by the Public Broadcasting System, lengthy newspaper analyses will focus public attention on this event, burned into the conscience of a generation as an act of shame, with anything approaching the energy shown in 1985 to mark the 40th anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima.

Munich was not an exception to the mood of the period, but rather its emblem and culmination. It looked to promises made on paper by an aggressor, while ignoring his record of violations and the continuing reality of his aggression.

"The question for Germany," Hitler told his generals in November 1937, "is where the greatest possible conquest can be made at the lowest cost." He would effect his plan to achieve "living room" for Germany by first conquering Austria and Czechoslovakia. Secret though the meeting with his generals was, Hitler's behavior in the months that followed made his intentions clear to all but the most naive observers or determined pacifists. He bullied the leaders of Austria with threats of violence, then seized the country in March 1938. Similar threats were directed against Czechoslovakia on the claim that Hitler was just supporting the rights of German-speaking Czechs, and on May 22, Ger-

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André Ryerson for *Policy Review*

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man troop movements triggered world fears of an imminent invasion. For once in the decade a sensible response occurred: France and the Soviet Union promptly declared their commitment to fulfill their treaty obligations to defend Czechoslovakia, Britain cautiously joined them, and Hitler was compelled to retreat. Typical of headlines in Britain, France, and the United States was: "HITLER BACKS DOWN, DEMOCRACIES' FIRM STAND HALTS CZECH INVASION." Had the democracies maintained this policy, even then, as late as the spring of 1938, World War II might well have been prevented.

Aggression and expansion, if allowed to go unchecked, begets more and worse aggression.

Chamberlain's Betrayal

Such was not to be. Terrified by Europe's coming so close to war in May, and completely failing to learn the proper lesson, Chamberlain began a feverish campaign to placate Hitler, and so, he hoped, save the world from war. The method was to give Hitler the Sudeten area of Czechoslovakia that he wanted. Chamberlain sent Lord Runciman to Czechoslovakia where he met with pro-German landlords, who guarded their castles with Storm Troopers. He returned to Britain with the recommendation to grant Hitler's wishes. The obstacles to this were the understandable Czech reluctance to cede vital territory to a hostile neighbor, and the treaty obligations of the Soviet Union and France to defend Czechoslovakia. The French commitment was by far the more important, since the Soviet Union was separated from Czechoslovakia by Poland. But Chamberlain demoralized the French by telling them that if the Czechs stood firm against Hitler and France supported the Czechs, Britain would not stand by France. Chamberlain then hastened to Hitler's mountain retreat at Berchtesgaden on September 15, pledging to deliver the Sudetenland to Germany. And so the ties that should have joined the democracies were dissolved by Chamberlain's adventure in personal diplomacy, and the French felt compelled to join in the sacrifice of an anti-fascist ally, a betrayal billed as a "peace initiative." On September 19, Chamberlain informed the Czech government of its hopeless situation. Two days later, Czech President Edvard Benes gave in to Chamberlain's demands that he capitulate.

Having been handed so much on a silver platter, Hitler proceeded to add ever more outrageous and humiliating conditions to his proposed occupation of western Czechoslovakia. This was what precipitated Munich—Hitler's accurate intuition that so long as he threatened war, Chamberlain would pressure Benes and Daladier to almost any concession to "resolve the Sudeten problem."

On September 30, the Munich Agreement was signed by Mussolini, Hitler, Daladier, and Chamberlain. It gave the Sudeten portion of Czechoslovakia to Germany. The Czechs were not invited to participate, in what was, essentially, their own funeral. Chamberlain asked Hitler to sign a brief statement promising Britain (but not France, or anyone else) peaceful relations thereafter. This became the bit of paper that Chamberlain proudly waved upon his return to England, assuring his countrymen that he had gained "peace in our time."

"A Far-Away Country"

With the Munich Agreement, Chamberlain surrendered no British land. Nor did Daladier give up a single inch of French soil. Munich turned on something far more insidious, and more tempting, than an act of national sacrifice (much less of surrender) by the two democracies: it involved instead *the sacrifice of others,* made in the hope of keeping their own nations safe from war. The logic was: Let an expansionist state feed on a few small countries of marginal interest to the West, and its aggressive appetite will be satisfied. What Britain and France "gave up" was the national integrity of a third party, itself excluded from the conference: Czechoslovakia.

To join in this sordid act, it was necessary for the democracies to view the Czechs in a certain light. Revealing a reaction rooted in animal psychology, Chamberlain was utterly callous toward the weaker, victimized power of the dispute, but infinitely understanding of the bully. His position alternated between viewing Czechoslovakia almost as a *provocateur* for leading Europe into war by not ceding portions of her territory to Germany, and treating the dispute as a distant and obscure quarrel of no consequence to Britain:

> How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing.

This simple argument, offered by Chamberlain in a 1938 radio broadcast, has since enjoyed an extended life. It was used by those who objected to American involvement in the defense of South Korea, and later of South Vietnam, following Allied efforts to resist acts of Communist aggression, glaring in the first case, disguised as a civil conflict for a time in the second. Why should Americans, a sensible and modest people, sacrifice their sons in the battle "because of a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing?" The answer seemed unduly abstract, and to be understood, has always required some knowledge of history and a measure of worldly wisdom. It is that aggression and expansion, if allowed to go unchecked, begets more and worse aggression. The aggressor is not appeased, but exhilirated and made bolder by his victory.

The Isolationists' Myopia

Using language more subtle and complex than Chamberlain's, Jonathan Schell in *The Time of Illusion*—a 1975 book widely used in American colleges today—makes essentially the same argument with regard to Vietnam:

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> For if the Vietnam war was primarily a local affair, rather than a rebellion under the control of World Communism, then it was not a test case of anything. Then, instead of being one of those limited wars between global forces of freedom and global forces of totalitarianism which the theorists had foreseen in their books, it was just a civil war in a small country.

The refusal to see the larger impact of material events, the effort to keep them local, particular, purged of consequences for the future, marks the isolationist and pacifist perspective. Chamberlain conceded, in his 1938 radio broadcast to the nation, that under certain conditions war could be envisaged, but not for so small a matter as the territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia:

> If we have to fight it must be on larger issues than that. I am myself a man of peace to the depths of my soul. Armed conflict between nations is a nightmare to me; but if I were convinced that any nation had made up its mind to dominate the world by fear of its force, I should feel that it must be resisted. Under such a domination life for people who believe in liberty would not be worth living; but war is a fearful thing, and we must be very clear, before we embark on it, that it is really the great issues that are at stake, and that the call to risk everything in their defense, when all the consequences are weighed, is irresistible.

Czech Mate

This argument, after a decent interlude, has enjoyed a gradual renaissance, especially in the aftermath of the Vietnam war. It is heard increasingly today from politicians of both American political parties. What Chamberlain failed to grasp in offering it was that an aggressor—endowed with a modicum of political sense—will carefully avoid making any one act of his expansion fit the cataclysmic life-or-liberty challenge that Chamberlain defined. Quite the contrary, the aggressor will deliberately reduce the import of his act to "a local dispute," to "just a civil war in a small country." After a succession of "local disputes," settled with the help of the aggressor, the gradual awakening of those who would resist is then too late.

By being given the Sudetenland, Hitler won an immense geopolitical advantage. Over the years the Czechs had built first-class fortifications there. Losing them was a severe blow to Czech defensive capabilities and morale. Until their abandonment by Britain and France, the Czech people's willingness to fight an invasion was energetic, fueled by nationalism and backed by modern and well-equipped armed forces. But seeing their cause so egregiously betrayed by the West sank the Czechs into despondency and bitterness. The Allied cause thereby lost the equivalent of 35 army divisions, a nation with advanced industry and the greatest arsenal of central Europe. With the conquest of all of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, these passed to Hitler instead.

Hitler's Moral High Ground

Every aggressor appeals to a higher value to justify his acts. In the case of Germany's claim to the Sudetenland,

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Neville Chamberlain: Hitler's opening sentences were so moderate and reasonable that I felt instant relief.

Hitler appealed to Wilsonian principles, no less, for was it not true that much of the region had majorities of German-speaking people? And was it not plain that they were unhappy with Czech rule, and might prefer to become part of the new Germany? Self-determination, affirmed Hitler from this moral high ground, required that the Sudetens be free to make themselves and their territory part of the nation of their choice.

Against this position stood the Treaty of Versailles, the document that created modern Czechoslovakia, and which deliberately included the Sudetenland in the new Czech nation, both to assure its economic viability and because the resulting frontier conformed to the border that historically separated Germany and Bohemia. Germans had long settled the region with the clear understanding that they were entering another nation. In democratic Czechoslovakia, furthermore, minorities were granted rights gener-

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Gertrude Stein announced after Munich that Hitler ought to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

ous by any standard and beyond those found anywhere in Europe. And nothing prevented the emigration of German-speaking Czechs to Germany. Last but not least, the carefully constructed defensive fortifications in western Czechoslovakia—all the more valuable in view of Hitler's aggressive behavior in remilitarizing the Rhineland and annexing Austria—if lost, would leave the Czechs defenseless should Germany continue its expansionist policy.

Above and beyond these particular arguments, however, was a principle that should have appeared to Chamberlain beyond question: No nation is entitled to seize its neighbor's territory, and any threat to do so must be promptly and resolutely opposed. In his commitment to a policy of peace at any price, the British prime minister decided to interpret this self-evident principle of international comity in a most curious way. If Hitler could be given what he

The Munich Agreement initially found approval from 59 percent of Americans.

wanted, without the German army engaging in *actual hostilities,* civilized mores would be preserved. The veiled threat of force, and yielding to it, were apparently acceptable, so long as physical violence was avoided. "I don't see why," Chamberlain wrote his sisters in late 1937, "we shouldn't say to Germany, 'Give us satisfactory assurances that you won't use force to deal with the Austrians and the Czechoslovakians and we will give similar assurances that we won't use force to prevent the changes you want if you can get them by peaceful means.' " This fetish for nonviolence (and the refusal to tell Hitler that some of his desires might be illegitimate) was evident in Chamberlain's appeals to Hitler, as he offered rights over Czechoslovakia beyond even those Hitler had demanded. In March 1938, he told Parliament:

> In the meantime, there is no need to assume the use of force, or, indeed, to talk about it. Such talk is to be strongly deprecated. Not only can it do no good; it is bound to do harm. It must interfere with the progress of diplomacy, and it must increase feelings of insecurity and uncertainty . . .

The Evil of Renouncing Force

Two decades ago, James L. Payne, in a book provocatively titled *The American Threat,* sought to sober American thinking and rhetoric with the harsh realities of a world where violence exists. If we renounce the use of force, and the threat to use it when our adversaries cross certain lines, then they will cross those lines, and increase their initiatives in proportion to our laxness. Moral lectures on the peaceful settlement of differences—as Aristotle pointed out some time ago—have not proved effective in controlling men of violence. By inhibiting police action on the part of the democracies, on the other hand, a one-sided rhetoric against the use of force widens the opportunities for aggressors everywhere. The root problem, argued Payne, is an abiding American ignorance regarding foreign policy, caused by a moral astigmatism not unlike Chamberlain's compulsion to ban even talk of force in dealing with aggressors:

> Unfortunately, the American tradition of debate on foreign policy practically ignores the role of threats and their beneficial consequences. About the evil effects of power, we are well informed. The tragedy of war is repeatedly emphasized. We question and criticize our motives with energy. Our moralistic, critical tradition of free debate on foreign policy focuses upon the dangers of using force for evil purposes.
>
> We do not have, however, a tradition of debate which protects us against the evil consequences of a failure to use force.

To foster such a tradition, and thus correct the conceptual balance, ought to be one of the functions of observing the anniversary of Munich.

This in no way means that the engagement of troops should be casually resorted to; any such decision must always be carefully deliberated. But to foreclose the use of force, where a situation warrants it, leads to resorting to it on a far grander scale, because of miscalculations by our adversary that democracies are "little worms" or "paper tigers." On several occasions in the 1930s, a very low-cost military action (such as France opposing the German remilitarization of the Rhineland, when France was powerful and Germany was weak) could have shown Hitler, together with the heads of Italy and Japan, that a policy of

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A "far-away country," Czechoslovakia was 600 miles from England. Its conquest by Hitler, made inevitable by Munich, put Germany in a much stronger position to start World War II.

territorial expansion would be met with force. Instead, we gave an impression (actually false) that we would tolerate anything, and the final cost to correct this false impression—World War II—was 50 million lives.

America's Smug Indifference

Against the clear image of Chamberlain photographed as he waves a bit of paper bearing Hitler's signature, the American role played in the Munich betrayal fades in the public mind. Though not a direct participant, the United States as the leading and most powerful democracy, set the tone for Britain and France with its attitude of smug indifference to world events, tacitly informing the totalitarian states that they could have a free hand in the invasion of their neighbors. Franklin Roosevelt, while marginally better than his Republican rivals, nonetheless displayed very poor leadership through the decade, and even showed himself on numerous occasions to be lagging behind public opinion on issues of foreign policy.

On March 21, 1935, President Roosevelt encouraged the Nye senatorial committee to develop neutrality legislation. Senator Gerald P. Nye of Wisconsin headed the isolationist committee, which alleged that America's entry into World War I had been caused by arms manufacturers, the "merchants of death," a preposterous accusation to lay at the headstone of Woodrow Wilson. Nye and like-minded senators were surprised and delighted by the president's initiative, and in August the first of a series of calamitous Neutrality Acts passed the Senate without a dissenting vote. The arms embargo feature of the Act treated aggressors and their victims as morally identical and compelled the United States to deny arms to all "belligerents." Secretary of State Cordell Hull was dismayed by Roosevelt's initiative and its legislative consequence.

It was a triumph of American provincialism and a windfall for aggressors. In 1936, the second Neutrality Act was passed. One week after Roosevelt signed the legislation, Hitler announced that his troops were entering the Rhineland in violation of the Versailles Treaty and the Locarno Pact. France asked the United States at least to condemn publicly Hitler's move. Roosevelt refused.

FDR Panders to Isolationism

Instead of checking isolationist fever, the American president was pandering to it. Though historians have focused on Republican isolationism, the Democratic Party platform on foreign affairs in 1936 also paid homage to Senator Nye's ideas and the odd alliance of pacifists on the left with isolationists on the right: "We shall continue to observe a true neutrality in the disputes of others," it affirmed, as the Democratic Party committed itself "to work for peace and to take the profits out of war; to guard against being drawn, by political commitments, international banking, or private trading, into any war which may develop anywhere." Making clear that he shared these views, Roosevelt announced in Chautauqua, New York, on August 14, 1936, in his only major campaign address on foreign policy: "We are not isolationists except in so far as

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we seek to isolate ourselves completely from war. . . . I hate war. I have passed unnumbered hours, thinking and planning how war may be kept from this nation." President Roosevelt went on to cite the "merchants of death" theme as he praised the new neutrality legislation. Rarely has so popular a president ever lost so important an opportunity to enlighten the people, choosing instead to curry favor with a dangerous provincial moralism about the cause of war and the nature of America's role in the world.

As the historian Robert A. Divine makes clear in his excellent 1965 study, *The Reluctant Belligerent:* "In a very real sense, the neutrality legislation misled Hitler, encouraging him to believe that America was indifferent to the fate of Europe."

The refusal to see the larger impact of events, the effort to keep them local, particular, purged of consequences for the future, marks the isolationist and pacifist perspective.

In May 1937, yet another American Neutrality Act was passed. Ten weeks later, Japan attacked China. Britain recommended to the United States that we at least send a joint protest to Tokyo. Roosevelt refused. Even Chinese pleas for American mediation were turned down.

The Brussels conference of November 1937 was a disaster, for it revealed that neither the U.S. nor Britain was willing to show some leadership in discouraging Japanese aggression. The Japanese disdained to appear at the conference, to which they were invited to defend their policy. In 1938, Hull began an unofficial embargo on the export of planes to Japan after the Japanese began bombing Chinese civilians, but Americans continued to supply petroleum and scrap iron essential to the Japanese war on China.

When Hitler once again violated the Versailles Treaty by forcibly annexing Austria in March 1938, America issued no protest, and tacitly recognized the German act by turning the U.S. legation in Vienna into a consulate.

On September 26, President Roosevelt endorsed the appeasement process by cabling Hitler, Chamberlain, Daladier, and Benes, urging "a peaceful, fair, and constructive settlement." The next day he sent a personal message to Hitler calling for a conference of European leaders. But there was no suggestion that the United States should attend, and Roosevelt went out of his way to assure the Führer of American nonparticipation: "The government of the United States has no political involvement in Europe, and will assume no obligations in the conduct of the present negotiations." This gratuitous concession amounted to carte blanche from the United States, allowing Hitler to press his most ruthless claims on Czechoslovakia.

When Roosevelt learned that Chamberlain would fly to Munich, going the extra mile to satisfy Hitler's most outrageous demands, he promptly sent the British prime minister a two-word cable: "Good man."

FDR's Hesitant About-Face

It slowly dawned on Roosevelt that trying to co-opt the forces of pacifism and isolationism, however ingenious as a domestic political tactic, was harvesting consequences of a disastrous sort for the larger world. On October 5, 1937, FDR addressed foreign policy for the first time since his isolationist Chautauqua speech a year earlier, and in the manner of a trial balloon suggested that there might be a difference between an aggressor and his victim: "The peace, the freedom, and the security of 90 percent of the population of the world is being jeopardized by the remaining 10 percent, who are threatening a breakdown of international order and law." As a result, "a quarantine of the patients" might be in order. This metaphor, suggesting the need to end the policy of complete neutrality, was endorsed in a front-page editorial in the *Washington Post,* supported by the *New York Times,* and even evoked sympathy from most editorials in the Middle West. But the "Quarantine" speech caused howls of protest from the isolationist press, which was enough, it seems, to unnerve the president in considering a change of direction in foreign policy. At last Roosevelt saw fit to follow public opinion, but only to the extent of privately suggesting to Senator Key Pittman of Nevada that he propose some revisions to the Neutrality Act, declining to take a public stand on the changes, much less to call for full repeal. The proposed changes were to replace the arms embargo with a "cash and carry" policy: Any nation might purchase American arms, but would have to carry them through potentially dangerous international waters in its own ships. As China hastened to point out, this change would be to the advantage of Japan.

Senator Pittman decided to hold hearings on the changes, and the process dragged. Finally, at a June 1938 press conference, the president spoke out, but without challenging the neutralist principle that America must treat all "belligerents" alike. In July the president invited half a dozen senators from both parties to the White House, encouraging them to adjust the Neutrality Act, but they turned down his appeal. Republican Senator William Edgar Borah of Idaho assured him that there was no danger of war. In September 1938, Roosevelt addressed Congress and called for a return to "the ancient precepts of the law of nations" by ending the arms embargo, while expressing his determination to keep the country out of war.

American "Peace Bloc"

To prevent even this adjustment to the policy of neutrality, a "peace bloc" was organized in September by Senators Nye, Borah, and La Follette; soon they had the aviator-hero Charles Lindbergh, the socialist Norman Thomas, and former president Herbert Hoover making radio appeals to the nation. Fearful of taking on the pacifist-isolationist alliance himself, Roosevelt quietly asked Clark

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Eichelberger, an able opponent of isolationism, to rally public opinion for revision of the neutrality legislation that FDR himself had helped create in 1935. Together with Alfred E. Smith, former Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, and headed by a distinguished midwestern Republican newspaper editor named William Allen White, Eichelberger formed the Non-Partisan Committee for Peace through Revision of the Neutrality Act. In a single month, they turned the tide. The revisions easily passed both houses, becoming part of the Neutrality Act of 1939.

The Munich Agreement, a Gallup Poll showed, initially found approval from 59 percent of Americans questioned. The distinguished commentator Walter Lippmann spoke well of it. Yet barely a month later another Gallup Poll showed that nine out of ten persons believed Hitler intended to seize more territory in Europe. In January 1939, Roosevelt discreetly questioned the wisdom of neutrality in his annual address to Congress. By February, a Gallup Poll showed that Americans were evenly divided on whether to repeal the Neutrality Act. In March, as Hitler invaded the remainder of Czechoslovakia, the Gallup Poll showed a strong 66 percent majority of Americans in favor of repealing the Neutrality Act.

By the summer of 1939, polls revealed that 82 percent of Americans favored the prohibition of war supplies to Japan. In July, Congress introduced resolutions to this effect. Secretary of State Hull opposed these measures, not wishing to "provoke" Japan. But to stem the tide of public opinion, Hull agreed with Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg to give the Japanese six months' notice to terminate the joint commercial treaty of 1911.

Silence Over Stalin, Too

After the complete destruction of the Czechoslovak state, Britain and France finally wakened sufficiently to draw the line of their appeasement policy at Poland. But with the evidence of Munich in hand, Hitler shrugged and crossed the line. On September 1, 1939, German troops invaded Poland. World War II had begun.

In accordance with the secret provisions of the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 23, Soviet armies entered Poland from the east on September 17 and thus sealed the country's fate. Soon Soviet and German troops met and greeted each other, as partners, on a line running from East Prussia to the Carpathians.

Roosevelt did not protest.

Stalin then forced the Baltic states to allow Soviet military occupation, the preamble to their total incorporation into the USSR. Roosevelt did not protest. Stalin applied the same pressure on Finland, but the Finns refused the invitation to be occupied. On November 30, Stalin's armies invaded Finland without declaring war. Roosevelt saw no reason to protest. The heroic resistance of the Finns created spontaneous public support in the United States for their cause. Roosevelt was embarrassed, but continued to say nothing. Only when the Soviets bombed Helsinki did the president issue a weak statement against "this new resort to military force," asking manufacturers to suspend the shipment of airplanes to Russia. But when the Finnish ambassador asked for American assistance, FDR politely refused.

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Aviator-hero Charles Lindbergh made isolationist appeals to the nation.

Thus President Roosevelt made clear to the world that, whether it was done by fascists or by Communists—Mussolini, Hitler, the Empire of Japan, or Joseph Stalin—totalitarian expansion would not provoke even a few words of censure from the United States.

The "phony war" that followed, as journalists dubbed it, did not last six months. His gains consolidated, Hitler on April 9, 1940, took Denmark, and in the war's first combined operation of land, navy, and air forces, took the southern half of Norway. On May 10, German forces invaded the Netherlands. Two days later they invaded France.

The world witnessed these events in a state of shock. What did President Roosevelt do? Nothing.

White and Willkie to the Rescue

Real leadership came once again from private citizens, Clark Eichelberger, and the small-town Kansas editor, William Allen White.

White sent a telegram to several hundred prominent men and women on May 17: "As one democracy after another falls under the mechanized columns of the dictators, it becomes evident that the future of western civilization is being decided on the battlefields of Europe. . . . The time has come when the United States should throw its material and moral weight on the side of the nations of western Europe great and small that are struggling in battle for a civilized life."

Within hours White received enthusiastic replies, and on May 20, White announced the formation of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies. The commit-

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tee was supported by such diverse figures as the millionaire banker J. P. Morgan and David Dubinsky, head of the International Ladies Garment Workers. By June, four out of five Americans favored more material aid to Britain. On June 29, White met with Roosevelt, and warned him: "You will not be able to lead the American people unless you catch up with them." White came away from the interview feeling the president has lost both his tongue and his nerve. He began campaigning to compel the president to answer Churchill's mid-May request for 40 or 50 over-age American destroyers. Half the British destroyer fleet of 100 ships had been sunk in convoy duty by the Nazis. The U.S. had commissioned 172 destroyers and could spare

Of randomly selected courses dealing with the period from World War II to the present, only one out of eight paid attention to the prewar policies of isolationism, pacifism, and appeasement. Courses typically begin with the end of the war and the American bombing of Hiroshima.

those needed by Britain. The survival of Britain was in the balance. Roosevelt dawdled through May, June, July, despite a personal appeal from King George. On August 4, General John J. Pershing called on radio for the arms transfer, observing: "If the destroyers help save the British fleet, they may save us from the danger of another war." The Century Group, a subgroup of White's committee, then devised the idea of exchanging the destroyers for U.S. bases on Britain's possessions in the Western hemisphere. This finally budged the president. But FDR wanted a guarantee against any political risk before he approved the plan. His GOP rival, candidate Wendell Willkie, the president insisted, must first give his consent. So White visited Willkie, and Willkie privately agreed he would not attack the idea. As to the general public, polls showed that 70 percent of Americans approved the destroyer deal.

"I Hate War"

Thus, well before Munich, and for two years thereafter, the United States took an attitude entirely in harmony with the strategy adopted by Chamberlain for avoiding war. Roosevelt's repeated asseverations ("I hate war") much resembled those of Chamberlain in a sort of transatlantic competition for rhetorical vacuity, as if the issue at hand were the popularity of war and carnage.

Then, as now, the desire to spend on domestic social programs was given as a reason to avoid spending money for defense. Chamberlain, like Roosevelt, wanted to use public funds to deal with the remaining effects of the Great Depression. Chamberlain told his Birmingham constituents in April 1938, "The very idea that the hard-won savings of our people, which ought to be devoted to the alleviation of suffering and to the opening out of fresh interests and recreation, to the care of the old and the development of the minds and bodies of the young—to think that all these savings should be dissipated on the construction of weapons of war is hateful and damnable."

A policy of restricting defense spending was all the more attractive in view of the idea, widespread at the time, that wars are caused by weapons and are no one nation's fault, arising rather from "international misunderstandings." Hitler ingeniously fed this school of thought in the democracies by professing a deep concern for peace, soberly recommending nonaggression pacts, and calling for total disarmament. It inhibited Western arms spending while Germany's and Japan's increased. Only with the impact of later events do we forget these beguilements and their anesthetizing effects, not unlike similar appeals today aimed at making defense spending appear heartless and absurd. No less a figure than the historian Arnold Toynbee declared himself convinced, in 1936, of the sincerity of Hitler's desire for peace. On the avant-garde side of the cultural fence, Gertrude Stein announced after Munich, with an entirely straight face, that Adolf Hitler ought to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

Taylor's Defense of Appeasement

Not many observers have since attempted to exonerate Chamberlain and his policies, but the parliamentarian Iain Macleod and the historian A. J. P. Taylor are among the few. After the war, Macleod underlined how militarily weak Britain was in 1938 and that, lacking the means to stop Hitler, appeasing him by steering Germany toward Czechoslovakia became the only sensible policy. At best, this argument shows what sinister consequences lie in store for democracies that consider arms spending to be wasteful: Without deliberately desiring what follows, such policies make dangerous and dishonorable conduct increasingly "logical." A nation moves from the claim that spending on armaments increases tensions, to concessions made to one's adversary because, as a result of the previous policy, the nation is in no position to fight. Such was the sequence in Chamberlain's career.

A. J. P. Taylor goes further, denying that appeasing an aggressor is in fact a bad idea. True, it didn't work in the case of Hitler, "But he was a human phenomenon who occurs once in a thousand years." Taylor—who states aloud what many politicians today seem privately to think—concludes: "Appeasement was a sensible course, even though it was tried with the wrong man; it remains the noblest word in the diplomatist's vocabulary." One may admire his honesty, but the examples are many that prove Taylor wrong, from the Persian Wars of antiquity and the Renaissance conflicts examined by Machiavelli, to the detailed record of the 20th century. Regrettably, Taylor's wishful thinking, which prevailed in the 1930s, is being revived in the West once more.

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Much in the manner of moralizing clerics and Greenham Common feminists today, Sir Stafford Cripps in 1937 publicly exhorted armament workers to make use of "the most glorious opportunity" they ever had: "Refuse to make munitions! Refuse to make armaments!" As to the Labour Party, its executive voted against conscription in 1938, even after the invasion of Prague by German armies had shaken Chamberlain himself.

Appeasement Today

This autumn, in which the 50th anniversary of the Munich Agreement will be observed (or ignored), will also see an American presidential election. Rarely have the two parties so diverged on foreign policy, essentially because the candidates of one party are uniformly opposed to equaling our adversary in arms, see possible technological inventions to correct the balance (notably strategic defense) as "destabilizing," place a 1930s-like faith in the value of arms agreements, such as SALT I, SALT II, and the ABM Treaty—which specifically gave the Soviet Union numerical advantages in offensive missiles, while inhibiting our deployment of defensive technologies to balance them—and now, cannot wait to pass the proposed INF Treaty, which defies verification and will weaken the security bonds linking the United States to our European allies. They put a higher value on professions of peace by our adversary than on his acts and the state of his arsenal, and, finally, are prepared to abandon allies on three continents fighting to regain control of their territory from totalitarians. The tendency is affecting both political parties, and Afghan *mujahideen* may soon suffer a fate similar to what the Czechs endured in Munich: the sacrifice of their vital interest by a great democracy afflicted with a love of paper agreements and its own convenience. The same end may await the people of Central America, starting with "a far-away country" such as Nicaragua, which in fact is closer to Louisiana than Louisiana is to the state of Maine.

Does the younger generation share these attitudes? The National Association of Scholars recently conducted a study of foreign policy courses taught in American colleges. Of randomly selected courses dealing with the period from World War II to the present, only one out of eight paid attention to the prewar policies of isolationism, pacifism, and appeasement that contributed so significantly to the initiatives of the Axis powers, leading finally to general war. Courses on the contemporary age typically begin with the end of the war and the American bombing of Hiroshima.

What makes the blunders of the prewar period, of which the climax was Munich, so important for the Western conscience to retain is that all the instincts that then elicited the policy of appeasement remain alive in the Western democracies today. Among the parallels between the prewar period and today that ought to disturb us are four in particular: a double standard regarding the use of force, by which radicals are permitted to employ force to gain their ends while democratic elements that oppose them are enjoined to rely on words alone; a faith in arms control treaties, whose effect is to inhibit defense spending by the democracies, but not by their adversary, whose policies are the cause of our requiring high defense budgets

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President Roosevelt made clear to the world that, whether it was done by fascists or Communists, totalitarian expansion would not provoke even a few words of censure from the United States.

in the first place; attitudes of indifference or expediency toward allies fighting for their freedom; and faith in personal diplomacy over established principles of statesmanship in a harsh world of power relations.

The 1955 edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica,* under "World War II," summarizes the prewar period's beguilement with disarmament in terms that disquietingly resemble the present:

> Throughout the period between World War I and II, the Western democracies clung persistently to the concept that disarmament in itself would bring peace. Indeed, this became almost the only continuing element of their policy. Even in the face of the most significant acts of aggression on the part of Germany, Japan, and Italy, the disarmament conferences went on. No disarmament agreement of any substance were concluded by the Axis powers, a fact significant enough in itself; but all the while they went on arming. The democratic governments were informed of this rearmament, but they chose to ignore it. They fastened only the more firmly to the hope that the more convenient policy of disarmament would induce peace. . . .

The root of this attitude was what it remains today:

> This tendency arose in large part from the expressions of great bodies of well-meaning people, in both Great Britain and the United States, who firmly believed that no arms meant no violence. It was com-

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bined with the ever-present reluctance of political parties in power to take the responsibility of imposing on the electorate the added tax and personal burdens which armament involves.

If such an epitaph is not to be reprinted by survivors of another cataclysm, the lesson must be learned, taught anew to each generation so that the price paid in lives will not have been for nothing.

Cultural Memory Hole

The survey of American college courses cited above, unfortunately, suggests that foreign policy is being taught to students so as to extinguish the lesson. Munich and what it meant is beginning to slip down a cultural memory-hole.

The excuse for this suppression of hard-earned knowledge, apparently, is the "lesson" of Vietnam, a simplistic lesson made to reverberate back on the earlier 1950 American action to halt the surprise attack by North Korea on the South, with the Allied resistance in many college texts now cast into retrospective doubt by the Vietnam experience, and a neo-isolationism indifferent to "a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing."

James L. Payne put the lesson of the 1930s this way, using terms that an academic mind may more readily appreciate:

> World War II constituted, in effect, the most atrociously expensive research grant in history. We paid a fabulous sum to test certain theories about how war comes and how peace can be maintained. We ran the experiment and collected the results. Yet now, with a disconcerting disregard for facts so dearly purchased, some are slipping into the same misconceptions and sophistries as before.

Are the attitudes of neo-isolationist professors and politicians having any influence on younger sectors of the electorate? A recent poll of the baby-boom generation very much suggests they are. Asked whether they would enlist in the armed forces in the event of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, of Americans aged 18 to 44, only 27 percent said they would. Even in a conflict on the North American continent threatening our borders, which one might think would rouse a near unanimous response to defend the nation, only 60 percent said that they would be willing to enlist. For any strategic interest abroad, or in the Third World, the figure drops to 19 and 16 percent. As the writer William Greider commented, this is "a stunning political fact" that our country's leaders will have to take into account: "The patriotic consensus that supported the cold war for several decades, as well as Americans' engaging directly in battle against Communist forces, has vanished, at least among the young."

No sensible person wants to engage in war. But the willingness to defend allies that are attacked belongs to the equation, learned at dreadful cost, for precluding the event.

The specter of Munich, a veteran as old as fear, abides unnoticed but alive and well. The lesson it once taught a generation fades with each passing year, like the names on soldiers' gravestones. ☎

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Boom Time for Black America

The Middle Class Is Surging Under Reagan

Joseph Perkins

Jim and Jackie McLean were among seven entrepreneurs honored in January by President Reagan at a special program hosted by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. In this decade, the McLeans have built their Baltimore-based independent travel service into the largest such enterprise in the state of Maryland. The husband-wife team operates 14 offices in four states and employs more than 100 workers. Their 11-year-old firm—Four Seas and Seven Winds—grossed more than $25 million last year from more than 300 corporate clients, ranking it among the 50 largest black-owned businesses in the country.

The 1980s—with a conservative, free-market president in the White House—have been go-go years for black entrepreneurs like the McLeans. Indeed, the black economist Andrew Brimmer estimates that total black business receipts increased to $18.1 billion last year from $12.4 billion in 1982, translating into an annual average growth rate of 7.9 percent for black businesses since 1982 (compared with 5 percent for all U.S. businesses). This remarkable growth in black business has fomented a spirit of optimism among black entrepreneurs, encouraging many to launch ambitious ventures rarely, if ever, undertaken by black businessmen in previous decades.

Outpacing the Fortune 500

The impressive performance of the black business sector is not an aberration. Indeed, if the state of black America is gauged by "positive" indicators those that measure blacks' progress rather than "negative" indicators that measure pathology, the 1980s have been a boom decade for blacks.

Most debates about the state of black Americans focus on negative indicators: the number of blacks in poverty, the number of blacks on welfare, the number of unemployed blacks, the number of teen-age pregnancies, the number of black criminal offenders. This emphasis offers a very skewed picture of black progress. Most blacks are not poor, most are not on welfare, most black teen-age girls don't get pregnant, and most blacks are not criminals.

The best measure of the overall status of blacks is the extent of gains by the majority of the black population. And, measured by such indicators as the number of blacks enrolled in college, the size of the black middle class, the rate of increase in black family incomes, the rate of black employment growth, and the numbers of blacks in the professions, blacks have fared quite well in the age of Ronald Reagan.

The success of black enterprise in the 1980s has been so overwhelming that it almost overshadows black progress in other important areas. As mentioned, total sales of the black business sector have grown at a healthy clip through much of the decade. Even more impressive, though, is the performance of the larger black businesses. In its 1986 listing of the top black companies. *Black Enterprise* magazine reported "record" growth for most of the firms on its list. Gross sales for the top 100 black firms rose by nearly 15 percent from the previous year, it reported, easily outpacing the growth in the nation's gross national product and "outdistancing the Fortune 500, which grew by a meager 2.8 percent." In 1984, *Black Enterprise* boasted that "when one compares the sales-per-employee ratio of the top 25 companies on the latest *BE* 100 list, the *Venture* 50 list and *Inc.* 500 list, the numbers are unambiguous: $141,407 for the *Black Enterprise* companies, and $121,044 and $95,039 for the *Venture* and *Inc.* companies respectively."

Since mid-decade, things have gotten even better for black business. In its June issue this year, *Black Enterprise* proclaims, "The nation's largest black businesses have been gripped by a new spirit of corporate renewal." It adds that "black businesses have achieved explosive growth in recent years, branching out into new industries and boosting the size of everything from sales volume to employee rosters."

New Breed of Entrepreneur

The 1980s have seen the rise of a new breed of black entrepreneurs, perhaps best represented by Reginald Lewis, the black Wall Street attorney who successfully orchestrated a $985 million leveraged buyout of Beatrice International two years ago. Lewis established the TLC Group, Inc. in 1984 with $1 million of his own capital and $24 million in bank financing. A year later, he purchased McCall Pattern Co., the second largest sewing pattern

Joseph Perkins *is an editorial writer for the* Wall Street Journal.

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maker in the United States for $20 million. To satisfy the bank debt on the acquisition, Lewis publicly sold a $22 million bond issue—a move few black entrepreneurs dared attempt in decades past.

By 1985, McCall was producing $60 million in sales for TLC Group, and in 1987 Lewis sold the pattern company to a British firm for $95 million, realizing a 95-to-1 return on his initial investment. Lewis used his profits to secure financing from Drexel Burnham for acquisition of Beatrice International, the food manufacturer and distributor. His new company, TLC Beatrice International Holdings, posted sales of $1.8 billion last year (which would have place it No. 205 on the Fortune 500 if it were publicly held). Lewis has transformed a company that he started with only $1 million of his own capital into a $1.8 billion enterprise.

Of the five largest and, arguably, most successful black-owned companies in the U.S.—Lewis' company and, in order, Johnson Publishing Company, Inc., Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., H. J. Russell Company (a construction firm), and Motown Industries (the entertainment company)—not one has been built on minority set-asides or other racial preference programs. Indeed, Atlanta-based H. J. Russell is eligible to compete for millions of dollars in federal, state, and local minority contracts but its founder, Herman J. Russell, adamantly refuses to be relegated to race-based set-aside programs.

In the 1980s, the most successful black entrepreneurs are those, like Lewis, who look to the marketplace rather than to the government for opportunity. In fact, Lewis cites the current laissez-faire climate in the financial industry, which enabled the junk bond market to flourish, for offering the best opportunities for black entrepreneurs in history. Reagan deserves some measure of the credit for opening up these opportunities for black businessmen by promoting free-market policies throughout his tenure.

Middle-Class Mobility

The success of black entrepreneurs in the 1980s is rivaled only by the gains of the black middle class. Black social scientist Bart Landry, a visiting scholar at the Joint Center for Political Studies, estimates that this upwardly mobile class of blacks has grown by a third in this decade, to 4.8 million in 1988 from 3.6 million in 1980. His definition is based on employment in white-collar jobs as well as on income levels. In 1985, nearly a million black families claimed annual earnings of $40,000 or more; another 300,000 had earnings between $35,000 and $40,000. All told, the middle class now constitutes more than 40 percent of black households, and is larger than the black working class, or the black poor.

The negative indicators so often used in defining black progress are completely irrelevant when discussing the black middle class—the largest income class in black America. Writes Landry, who last year wrote *The New Black Middle Class:* "The attention given to the rapid growth of female-headed black families—gives the impression that the black family is falling apart. Nothing could be further from the truth. The higher one rises up the class ladder, the more stable are all families, black and white. In the upper middle class, about two-thirds of all black families are still headed by two parents. The majority have both spouses working full-time, generating combined earnings that translate into a solid middle-class living standard." In the 1980s, adds Landry, "More and more blacks, are . . . finding the American Dream within their reach."



Reginald Lewis: Junk bonds offer black entrepreneurs the best opportunities in history.

Landry is borne out by recent Labor Department data. Between 1985 and 1986, median income for black families across the board rose by nearly 3 percent in real terms. The numbers for the black middle class have been even more impressive. In 1985, black families with earnings between $25,000 and $34,999 saw their real income increase by 14.3 percent; those with earnings between $35,000 and $49,999 saw an increase of 11.8 percent; and those with incomes above $50,000 saw an increase of 7.5 percent. The following year was even more bountiful. Those in the first earnings category saw income gains of 14.7 percent; those in the second, 12.4 percent; and those in the third, 8.8 percent. The steady rise in earnings also means a steady increase in total money income for the black population.

Blacks have benefited disproportionately from the Reagan boom: They gained 15 percent of the new jobs, even though they account for only 11 percent of the working-age population.

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Like most top black businessmen, construction tycoon Herman Russell doesn't depend on race-based set-asides for his company's success.

Brimmer conservatively projects an increase of 7 percent this year, to $238 billion. This follows a 13 percent increase in 1987.

Explosive Job Growth

The rise in black incomes is largely attributable to the explosive growth of jobs over the last five and one-half years. Over that span, total black employment has grown to 11.5 million from 9.2 million, a gain of 2.3 million new jobs! And blacks have benefited disproportionately from the Reagan boom: They gained 15 percent of the new jobs, even though they account for only 11 percent of the working-age population. In the meantime, the black jobless rate has been cut by almost half since 1982. At the same time, the black employment rate—the percentage of working-age persons holding jobs—has increased to record levels, from 49 percent in 1982 to 56 percent today.

Even black teen-agers have profited from the great job boom of the 1980s. Since 1983, some 122,000 young blacks have been added to the job rolls, driving down black teen-age unemployment by 20 percent over that span. Moreover, the young blacks that choose to work earn virtually as much as whites. Indeed, Brimmer noted last year, that "over the last few years, the average earnings of black teen-agers have risen in step with those of their white counterparts. For example, between the third quarter of 1980 and the first quarter of 1987, the median weekly earnings of both black and white young workers (ages 16 to 24) rose by 30.6 percent."

Billion-Dollar Managers

The black middle class has also prospered during the current job boom. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission reported last year that the number of black managers and officers in corporations with 100 or more employees increased by 30 percent between 1980 and 1985, to 215,000 from 165,000. Over the same span, the number of black professionals increased by a staggering 63 percent, to 189,000 from 116,000. The 1980s have also seen the emergence of a cadre of black executives at leading Fortune 1000 companies.

Jerry O. Williams, president and chief operating officer of AM International, oversees day-to-day operations for the $1.2 billion concern, which markets and distributes graphic equipment and supplies. He is odds-on favorite to become the first black CEO of a Fortune 500 company. A. Barry Rand, vice president at Xerox, manages a division that produced $4 billion in revenues in 1986. Kenneth I. Chenault, an executive vice president at American Express, oversees the company's Platinum Card/Gold Card division. Robert M. Beavers, a senior vice president at McDonalds, is responsible for 1,600 restaurants in seven regions that account for $2.5 billion in sales.

Steady Growth in College Enrollment

This burgeoning of the black professional, managerial, and executive ranks in the 1980s coincides with the steady growth of the black student population at the nation's colleges and universities in the 1980s. Even though the number of college-aged blacks has decreased this decade, black college enrollment increased by 4 percent between 1980 and 1985, to 1.05 million from 1.01 million, according to the U.S. Bureau of Census. In February of this year, the U.S. Department of Education reported that the rate of college enrollment for the 18-to-24-year-old black population had increased to 28.6 percent from 26.1 percent a year earlier. That rate is expected to improve this year, based on recent reports from college admissions offices throughout the country that a greater number of black students will be enrolled in freshman classes this fall. In fact, *The Chronicle of Higher Education* recently reported that, at some institutions, the increase could be "50 percent or more" over last year.

The 1980s have also seen improvement in the black high school graduation rate. A recent Census Bureau report indicated that the proportion of blacks 18-to-21 years old earning high school diplomas increased to 71 percent in 1985 from 66 percent in 1980. Conversely, the black dropout rate declined over the same span to 17.5 percent from 23 percent. The growing proportion of black high school graduates, along with the increase in black college enrollment ensures that the black middle class will continue to grow at least through the remainder of this decade.

On balance, the majority of black Americans have made considerable progress in the 1980s. More blacks are staying in high school, graduating, and going on to college. More blacks are working than ever before, in better jobs, and for higher wages. The black middle class has burgeoned in the 1980s to unprecedented size, emerging as the dominant income group in black America. And black business has flourished, creating wealth in the black community.

The 1980s have been a decade of opportunity and blacks have been among the biggest beneficiaries. Much of the credit must go to Ronald Reagan, who initiated the policies that fostered the economic growth and job creation in the 1980s, and that produced the prosperity that most black Americans enjoy. ☎

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
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

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— **Thomas Sowell,** Author, *A Conflict of Visions*

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— **Peter Kreeft,** Boston College


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CUBA HELD ACCOUNTABLE

A Victory for Freedom at the United Nations

RICHARD S. WILLIAMSON

Earlier this year in Geneva, the United Nations Human Rights Commission agreed by consensus to launch an investigation into Cuba's human-rights record. The decision marked a dramatic departure from the U.N.'s too frequent double standard of pointing an accusing finger at only a handful of countries, especially Israel, Chile, and South Africa, while ignoring the gross human-rights violations of the Communist world; and it may lead, at least temporarily, to a partial relaxation of Fidel Castro's totalitarian grip over the Cuban people. The Geneva victory is also an example of how, in this age of bloc voting by developing countries, the United States can successfully advance important national values and interests at the U.N.

In the face of repeated attacks on American interests by U.N. bodies, the U.S. has scored isolated yet significant triumphs in recent years. In 1982, thanks to a strong effort by Jeane Kirkpatrick and her team, the General Assembly ceased referring to Puerto Rico as a "non-self-governing territory." In 1983 and 1984, moves to expel Israel from the International Atomic Energy Agency were blocked. In 1986, the General Assembly adopted a series of reforms proposed by 18 high-level experts, including a reduction in the number of U.N. staff by 15 percent, and agreement that budgetary levels would be adopted by consensus.

These victories taught us that to succeed in the U.N., the United States needs to identify precise goals, to make our concerns known to other countries, and, most important, to persevere in the face of initial defeat or protracted conflict. This approach guided the U.S. decision to seek to restore the norms and standards contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, by using Cuba as a test case for overturning the double standard in U.N. human-rights attention.

Rebuff on Ethiopia

The U.N. Human Rights Commission (UNHRC), consisting of 43 members, meets every year in Geneva in February through early March to determine whether governments are complying with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly in 1948 after being drafted under the leadership of Eleanor Roosevelt and John Foster Dulles. The UNHRC also studies thematic human-rights issues such as religious intolerance and the abuse of psychiatric medicine.

In recent years the UNHRC has focused primarily on countries in Latin America friendly with the U.S., such as Guatemala, El Salvador, and Chile. Only in 1984, five years after the Soviet invasion, did the UNHRC agree to investigate the situation in Afghanistan. It also agreed that year to investigate Iran. But apart from Afghanistan, no ally of the Soviet Union has ever been subject to a UNHRC investigation.

In 1986 at the UNHRC, the U.S. delegation informally circulated a resolution criticizing the Ethiopian government's resettlement policies, which had resulted in the death of at least 100,000 people. The U.S. resolution failed to attract any support. African countries rallied around their fellow African government. Our Western allies felt that the groundwork, particularly consultations and lobbying for support from other nonaligned countries, had not been sufficiently prepared. In any case, our allies argued that the world was preoccupied with the plight of the starving Ethiopian people, and that open criticism of the Ethiopian government might jeopardize the ongoing efforts of the international community to relieve their desperate plight. Our resolution was withdrawn.

Cuba's Naked Prisoners

Following the rebuff our Ethiopian resolution received in early 1986, the State Department bureaus of International Organization Affairs, Inter-American Affairs, and Human Rights conferred with the U.S. Mission in New York to come up with another approach to the U.N.'s human-rights double standard.

We realized that for tactical reasons we had to focus on a single country rather than on all major human-rights violators in order to enlist the support of Western and other like-minded countries. A decision was quickly reached to bring Cuba to the attention of the UNHRC. Because almost all the major international human-rights organizations have denounced the violations of human rights in Cuba, this could not be construed as the U.S. government vs. Castro. The Organization of American

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States, Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists, the European Parliament, the European Community, and the Spanish government had all expressed concern about human-rights abuses in Cuba.

A 1986 Amnesty International report cited the barbaric conditions imposed on Cuban political prisoners (more political prisoners per capita than any other country): crowding them naked into small, windowless cells for months, withholding proper medical treatment, and intentionally degrading them (for example, by throwing buckets of excrement over them).

In the summer of 1986, members of an unofficial Cuban human-rights committee, headed by Ricardo Bofill, were detained and imprisoned after meeting with French journalists. Bofill fled to the French Embassy in Havana where he remained in hiding until January 1987. During this same period a 17-year-old boy was arrested while distributing copies of the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. He later died in custody under unexplained circumstances.

Terror Masquerading as Law

Our decision to target Cuba was facilitated by the availability of new and up-to-date information furnished by political prisoners released in the early '80s by the Cuban government. The release of these prisoners, many of whom had served sentences since the early part of Castro's rule, was accompanied by a tightening of controls on Cuban society. We learned that in 1983 the Cuban government tried three individuals for the crime of sabotage. Merely for discussing the possibility of forming an independent Solidarity-style union, these Cubans were put on trial for their lives. When the guilty verdict was returned against them, the judge refused to comply with the political directive to impose the death sentence. The judge herself was removed, tried for incompetence and political bias, and sentenced to 80 years. Another judge then imposed the death sentence, which was subsequently reduced to 35 years after an international outcry.

The complete subservience of the Cuban judiciary allows terror to masquerade as law and is only one aspect of the Cuban dictator's pervasive system of repression. Brutality is employed to dehumanize the regime's opponents. Raul Carmenate was arrested at the age of 16 and spent nine years in prison. He has testified, " . . . we were beaten until we fell to the ground . . . and led to work completely nude. One of our companions was made to cut furrows of grass with his mouth."

Through the infamous Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, Castro's secret police turn child against parent, neighbor against neighbor. Daily life is closely monitored by these committees, which exist on practically every block in Cuban cities and towns. Members are expected to observe and report anything "unusual," including strangers in the neighborhood, reception of foreign radio or TV broadcasts, or critical comments about the government.

There are no guarantees for freedom of assembly or association in Castro's Cuba. All group meetings are monitored by the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution or State Security. A 1983 OAS report stated:

> Membership in the people's organizations—including the large union and peasant associations—is practically a prerequisite for any routine activity, since membership affects admission to universities, promotions, access to certain kinds of vacation or recreational activities, the obtainment of non-perishable products that require that a union certify that the buyer is an "advanced worker."

There is no freedom of the press, as all outlets of the media are controlled by the state and operate strictly according to party guidelines. Artistic and cultural freedoms are nonexistent in Cuba. Many of Cuba's most distinguished literary and artistic figures have been "erased" from cultural outlets. Religious broadcasts are completely prohibited, except for news of foreign clergy defending the Castro regime. Only 200 priests remain in Cuba compared with 720 before the revolution.

To succeed in the U.N., the United States needs to identify precise goals, to make our concerns known to other countries, and, most important, to persevere in the face of initial defeat or protracted conflict.

India's Cynical Ploy

U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Vernon Walters introduced our first resolution on Cuba at the U.N. General Assembly in 1986 to test the water and to lay down a marker for the 1987 UNHRC, which was to meet two months later in Geneva. As soon as the U.S. resolution was tabled in New York, the Cuban delegation also tabled two hastily drafted resolutions alleging violations of the rights of blacks and native Americans by the U.S. government. These Cuban papers, intended only as a foil to our own, did not take us by surprise. The United States, as an open society, is always prepared to defend its human-rights record, especially against countries such as Cuba. However, the Cuban resolutions provided the General Assembly majority with the means of avoiding the issue. The members of the UNHRC agreed to an Indian motion to take no action on either the U.S. or the Cuban resolutions.

In what turned out to be a full dress rehearsal for our successful campaign in 1988, our first UNHRC resolution on Cuba was circulated in Geneva in early 1987. It expressed deep concern over "serious human-rights violations in Cuba, particularly the rights to freedom of expression and association, freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, and freedom of thought, conscience and religion," and appealed to the Cuban government "to release

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all those detained for their political views and activities and to allow any Cuban who might wish to leave or to return to Cuba to do so without hindrance." The resolution also called for an investigation of human-rights violations.

The United States made a major effort to build support for its resolution. The U.S. Delegation in Geneva extensively lobbied other UNHRC delegations. President Reagan sent personal notes to heads of state. The State Department sent more than 400 cables urging support. Victims of Castro's prisons—some lame or blinded as a result of their incarcerations—came to Geneva to personally testify to the inhuman brutality they experienced as Cuban political prisoners. And Ambassador Vernon Walters himself went to Geneva to present the resolution and eloquently address the Commission.

Among those voting against us in 1987 were Colombia, Peru, Mexico, Argentina, and Venezuela, countries that profess a belief in and respect for democratic principles and fundamental human rights.

Latin American Double Standard

Nonetheless, the UNHRC in 1987 voted by 19 votes to 18 with 6 abstentions to adopt procedural motions again put forward by India to take no action on either the U.S. resolution or Cuban resolutions aimed at the United States. The U.S. had expected the procedural gimmick to be used again and in all our contacts had emphasized the need to allow our resolution to receive fair consideration on its merits in an up-or-down vote. We let it be known that we could not understand the motives of countries who voted to "muzzle" us on this issue. Among those countries voting for the Indian motion were Colombia, Peru, Mexico, Argentina, and Venezuela, countries that profess a belief in and respect for democratic principles and fundamental human rights.

The closeness of the vote on the Indian procedural motion made us all the more determined to redouble our efforts to have Cuba placed on the UNHRC agenda at its next session. Our experience impressed upon us the need to begin our campaign early, immediately following the 1987 UNHRC session.

Following the vote in Geneva, a member of the Indian delegation approached me on the floor of the assembly to discuss the disappointing result. I told her that I was unable to understand why India, the world's largest democracy, would side with Cuba on a question of the applicability of objective human-rights standards. She laughed as if I were unusually naive and said, "After all, Ambassador, it's only politics." Presumably, she was reflecting the imperative of bloc voting within the U.N., where members of the so-called nonaligned movement band together to protect each other from international criticism and scrutiny.

1988—The Strategy for Victory

Our strategy for 1988 counted upon the support of allies such as Britain, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany whose views on human rights coincide with our own. They would provide a diplomatic base for our effort with the developing country majority in the UNHRC who would have to be convinced through hard lobbying. In the course of routine consultations in New York within the Western group we repeatedly raised the subject of Cuba to solidify our support base.

Members of Congress were briefed and enlisted. They were asked to use their influence with contacts in other countries to support our effort at the UNHRC. The Congress adopted a resolution urging the U.N. to look into Cuban human-rights practices. Another congressional resolution said that countries' positions on our Cuban resolution were to be taken into account in setting foreign assistance levels. Both were adopted unanimously. The level of bipartisan support for this diplomatic undertaking was unusual and certainly reinforced the point that all Americans are concerned with the situation in Cuba.

We devoted a great deal of attention to public outreach because our strategy was to focus publicity upon the situation in Cuba so that even if we lost within the U.N., the word would be spread about the true nature of Castro's regime. The U.S. Information Agency (USIA) helped to disseminate the new details we had learned from former Cuban political prisoners about human-rights abuses.

The issue of Cuba was placed on the agenda of meetings between State Department and foreign diplomats whenever appropriate. We made it clear we would again bring up Cuba's abuse of human rights at the 1988 UNHRC session. This served to shore up support from those countries that had voted with us in 1987, and to remind those who had not that we would keep coming back on this subject until we were satisfied that they fully understand its importance to us.

Lobbying Venezuela

The efforts of our ambassador in Venezuela, Otto Reich, exemplifies our work in capitals. Ambassador Reich went to the Foreign Ministry immediately after the 1987 vote to register our serious concerns. Every few months he went back to talk to both Venezuelan President Jaime Lusinchi and Foreign Minister Simón Alberto Consalvi to say how disappointed the United States had been by their vote on this issue. He used trips to Caracas in 1987 by both Jeane Kirkpatrick and Vernon Walters to hammer home the issue to government officials. Ambassador Reich gave interviews to local papers and sent copies of Armando Valladares' book, *Against All Hope*, to 20 opinion leaders in Venezuela. He lit a fire in both major political parties about the need for UNHRC action on Cuba. All these steps helped set the environment for Venezuela's dramatic turnaround on this issue in 1988, a change of position that broke the pro-Cuba South American bloc and helped us win.

During this period, the State Department remained in

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close touch with supporters in Congress. As a result of the bill calling for cutbacks in foreign assistance to the countries who had disappointed us in 1987, India lost a grant of $15 million. The Latin American democracies that had voted against us on the procedural motion were informed that the United States viewed their action as hostile to our common values of democracy and respect for human rights. Members of Congress raised the issue with their counterparts in the Latin American democracies and the legislatures in those countries became a positive force in pressuring the foreign ministries to support the U.S. initiative.

Our Trump Card—Valladares

In October 1987, President Reagan appointed Armando Valladares, the renowned former political prisoner, human-rights advocate, and poet, to head the U.S. delegation to the 1988 UNHRC Session. This decision ensured that the U.S. delegation could muster the voluminous and detailed evidence of Castro's human-rights practices possessed by the Cuban exile community. The appointment of a man who bore the physical scars of Castro's torture was a public relations coup that paid large dividends when the UNHRC began its 1988 meeting.

Even before the 1988 session Valladares traveled to Geneva to introduce himself to other delegates based there. He held a well-attended press conference, which set the stage for the opening of the UNHRC. In his preliminary meetings Valladares made clear his interest in the full spectrum of human-rights issues before the UNHRC, including violations in the Middle East, Chile, South Africa, and religious intolerance, which helped deflect the expectation and criticism from some corners that he was a single-issue man, interested only in Cuba.

Of course, Ambassador Valladares gave powerful personal accounts of Castro's abuses of the human rights of his political prisoners:

> I had many friends in prison. One of them, Roberto Lopez Chavez, was practically a child. He went on a hunger strike to protest abuses. The guards denied him water. Roberto, on the floor of his punishment cell, delirious and in agony, asked only for water . . . water. The guards entered his cell and asked: "You want water?" They urinated into his mouth and onto his face. He died the following day.
>
> I remember when they had me in a punishment cell, naked, my leg fractured in several places—fractures that were never treated and eventually fused into a mass of deformed bones. Through the wire mesh that covered the cell, the guards would pour over me buckets of urine and excrement that they had collected earlier.

Castro views Valladares as one of his biggest enemies. Valladares' role as an official representative of the United States proved such a distraction to the Cuban dictator that, in the end, Castro made serious errors of judgment. The Cubans countered the hard evidence of their human-rights abuses with only a personal attack upon Valladares. Most other delegations and observers in Geneva saw through the Cuban campaign to defame Valladares. We believe the Cuban effort was weakened by not trying to refute the evidence itself. It is a common and transparent Communist ploy that when facts are incontrovertible the man presenting them should be impugned.



Wide World Photos

Armando Valladares, who bears the physical scars of Castro's torture, was head of the U.S. delegation.

Valladares was not the only former political prisoner Castro had to contend with. Several prominent Cuban Americans, including ex-Castro prisoner Jorge Mas, traveled to Geneva at private expense in 1986 and again in 1987 to present to the delegates their own stories of the vicious nature of Castro's regime. The involvement of these private individuals and a powerful lobby in Washington helped keep attention focused on the issue. These people who had endured so much under Castro were not to be denied the opportunity to indict him before a court of world public opinion such as the UNHRC.

Congressional Pressure on the Philippines

A bipartisan congressional delegation of House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Dante Fascell, who does not always support the administration, and ranking Republican William Broomfield went to Geneva to lobby other delegations. This impressed other delegations who realized that this was not just a Reagan administration vendetta, but a policy with broad bipartisan support.

Members of both the House and Senate, from both sides of the aisle, sent numerous letters to heads of state and foreign ministers. More than 25 telegrams from the Hill were sent to Philippine President Aquino alone, and the Philippine Embassy in Washington was overwhelmed by phone calls from congressmen on the day the U.S. resolution was to have come up for a vote. Partly as a result, the Philippines, which had abstained on the procedural motion of 1987, was very supportive of American efforts in 1988.

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

Roger Reed

In 1986, members of a Cuban human-rights group headed by Ricardo Bofill were imprisoned after meeting with French journalists.

Maureen Reagan, who has close ties to several African countries because of her work as U.S. representative on the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women, came to Geneva as well. She had recently returned from a visit to Senegal on behalf of President Reagan where she had raised the Cuban issue with Senegalese President Abdou Diouf. Her presence during the crucial last days of the UNHRC session was extremely important. Thanks to her personal intervention, no African country misunderstood that the highest levels of the U.S. government were personally involved in our effort.

In the final days, Ambassador Walters again traveled to Geneva. He movingly addressed the Commission:

> Mr. Chairman, I am old enough to remember those who apologized for Hitler and Stalin; I remember the cries of shock and betrayal when the truth of what those dictators had done filtered out to the world. I think that sooner rather than later the same cries will go up when the world finally acknowledges the horrors of life under Castro. Let us not let this Commission continue to participate in the silence—for silence makes us the accomplices of oppression.

As the showdown vote on the resolution drew near, it was our assessment, and probably Castro's, too, that the United States would prevail. Our diplomatic work after the rebuff in 1987 had clearly paid off. The Latin American group was divided. The Africans had either been driven to sit on the fence or side with us because of their resentment of heavy-handed Cuban attempts to lobby them. Toward the end, large numbers of Cubans could be seen working the corridors in Geneva in a last-ditch attempt to intimidate delegates they could not otherwise persuade. The Cubans resorted to such techniques as spreading defamatory stories in the domestic press of countries whose representatives in Geneva were not cooperative. The representative of one country in Central America was bluntly reminded about his country's vulnerability to a domestic insurgency. These threats and blandishments had no effect. There was no country willing to put forward a procedural motion to deflect consideration of our resolution. Cuba therefore was forced to adopt another ploy.

Castro's Miscalculation

Two days before the expected vote on the U.S. resolution, Castro invited the UNHRC to send an investigative team to visit Cuba, talk to Cuban government officials, and interview prisoners. He even offered to pay for it. Up to this point Castro had consistently refused to consider permitting any kind of international scrutiny of Cuban practices. The International Committee of the Red Cross had experienced repeated rebuffs to its requests to visit Cuban prisons and interview prisoners. Castro had previously referred to a U.N. investigation as an act of war. As recently as February he had told NBC's Maria Shriver that he would never permit a U.N. investigation of Cuba.

Castro and his envoys clearly miscalculated if they hoped their invitation would put the subject to rest and prevent Cuba from being formally placed on the UNHRC agenda. The chairman of the UNHRC, Senegalese diplomat Ambassador Alioune Sene, in consultation with the U.S.; several Latin American delegations who were brokering the invitation for Cuba (Cuba was not then a member of the UNHRC); and other members, crafted a decision that the UNHRC finally adopted by consensus. The decision in effect took Castro's cynical invitation and turned it against him.

Instead of accepting the offer on Cuba's terms, the decision adopted in Geneva called for an investigation of Cuba according to standard U.N. procedures that had been used to investigate and help correct human-rights violations in other countries, including Afghanistan, Iran, and Chile. Rather than being limited to the treatment of political prisoners as Castro intended, the investigation will look into the full range of human rights, including freedom of speech, press, religion, association, and emigration.

The decision reached in Geneva truly outstripped our own modest expectation that Cuba would be placed on the agenda of next year's UNHRC session. Most important, it was a victory for the Cuban people, who may now experience a relaxation of Castro's totalitarian grip on their homeland as he prepares for the U.N. team's visit. For instance, following the decision in Geneva the Cuban government announced that it would for the first time permit the International Red Cross to visit and inspect the prisons. The long-suspended Cuban immigration agreement with the U.S. has been reactivated and more than 200 recently released political prisoners now have been granted permission to depart for the United States.

A Bulgarian in the Chicken Coop

Careful follow-up on our part will be essential. Representatives from Ireland, the Philippines, Bulgaria, Nigeria, and Colombia will serve on the UNHRC investigative

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team. The Bureau of International Organizations has assembled a State Department working group to monitor and to provide information for the investigating team. A week after the decision, I traveled to Geneva and met with UNHRC chairman Sene to discuss the importance of a strong and objective investigative team. I indicated to Ambassador Sene that the U.S. had great faith in his commitment to human rights and looked to him to ensure that the UNHRC lived up to its responsibilities.

Meanwhile, Castro is hastening to improve his image prior to the UNHRC team's visit, which is scheduled for late summer. As many as 300 political prisoners will be released in the near future. And Castro recently allowed Cardinal O'Connor to visit Cuba as a guest of the Roman Catholic Conference of Bishops. These dividends of our success in Geneva confound the argument that the glare of publicity cannot affect Castro's behavior. However, the leopard has not completely changed his spots. Castro's thugs are still trying to intimidate and discredit Ricardo Bofill, the unofficial Cuban human-rights advocate in Havana.

What implications on how to successfully implement multilateral policy may be drawn from our Cuban initiative?

- A firm decision must be made within the U.S. government that the issue has top priority and should engage fully all parts of the government.
- We must begin our effort early and be prepared for a long-haul endeavor.
- The entire spectrum of the U.S. bureaucracy must be used to communicate the importance of the issue to other countries.
- A solid diplomatic base of as many like-minded countries as possible should be established and used to attract more support.
- We must be tenacious and not accept initial rebuffs as final defeats.

The points above should be the rules of the road for U.S. multilateral diplomacy. Other areas that now present themselves as a focus of future multilateral efforts include:

- Overturning the infamous provision that Zionism is racism, which is a smear intended to delegitimitize the state of Israel.
- Promoting the positive linkage between human rights and economic development, for example, the connection between the right to own property and economic growth. The point that economic growth depends upon the enjoyment of fundamental human freedoms is absent from the U.N. debate on economic and human-rights issues. The U.S. needs to take the lead in restoring the appropriate perspective to the U.N.'s treatment of economic development.
- Continuing the budgetary and management reform process at the U.N., which began with the adoption of General Assembly resolution 41/213 in 1986. The United States seeks to ensure that the U.N. remains faithful to the terms of that resolution, which requires that budgetary questions be settled through consensus rather than through the vote of the majority of the General Assembly, who contribute less to the U.N.'s budget than the minority.

More than 25 telegrams from Capitol Hill were sent to Philippine President Aquino and the Philippine Embassy in Washington was overwhelmed by phone calls from congressmen.

As a founding member of the U.N. and its largest financial contributor, we owe it to ourselves and to the U.N. itself to restore the original values and beliefs that its founders had hoped the institution would instill for the world .

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PUTTING OUR HABITAT IN ORDER

Environmental Priorities for the Next Administration

JAMES M. STROCK

When the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency was established in 1970, the nation was scarred by widespread environmental degradation, which in many cases led to health and welfare threats of crisis proportions. In Cleveland, Ohio, the center of our industrial heartland, the Cuyahoga River literally exploded into flames. Vast areas of the Atlantic Coast and the Great Lakes shoreline were closed to swimming and fishing. The shores of the Potomac River near Washington, D.C., were marked by signs warning citizens not to touch the water. Sixty million people across the nation used water treatment systems that discharged raw sewage, including more than two million tons per year of organic waste, into surface waters. Wetlands—which moderate floods and droughts by absorbing peak flows and then releasing waters in subsequent low-flow periods, and protect water quality through silt absorption and removal of pollutants—were being devoured by helter-skelter development. Between 1950 and 1970, Florida lost 169,000 acres, and California nearly 50,000 acres. In 1970 alone, more than 30 million pounds of the pesticide DDT were used, despite the well-known warnings of Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring*, which had dramatically fostered public environmental awareness. Indeed, DDT residues in human tissues were measured as high as eight parts per million, and the pesticide was linked to the imminent extinction of birds of prey, including America's great national symbol, the bald eagle.

Sailboats on the Potomac

In some areas the nation's environmental achievements since 1970 are so visible that they bring to mind the inscription in honor of Sir Christopher Wren in St. Paul's Cathedral, London: "If you seek for a monument, gaze around." Thousands of miles of rivers, lakes, and streams have been restored for human uses. The many sailboats on the Potomac are but one testament to the progress. The air in our cities is much cleaner than it was two decades ago: Lead levels have declined by 87 percent since 1977; sulfur dioxide levels by 37 percent; particulates by 23 percent. Even the ubiquitous pollutants ozone and carbon monoxide, recently in the news because of continuing problems in many areas, are down by 13 percent and 32 percent, respectively, in the same period. Today, 127 million Americans are served by adequate public sewage treatment systems—up from 85 million in 1972. What is more, despite the gloomy prognostications of some environmentalists and industrialists alike, these environmental achievements have taken place in a time of significant economic and population growth. There are 20 percent more people in the United States than there were 20 years ago, and the inflation-adjusted gross national produce has increased by more than 50 percent.

The triumphs of environmental policy, however, are also accompanied by unfulfilled promises and unmet needs. The public is increasingly questioning the effectiveness of the nation's largest environmental program, the Superfund hazardous waste cleanup effort. More generally, EPA itself now stands at a crossroads as its research points to the need to redress problems that do not readily respond to the command-and-control regulation favored in the 1970s. Emerging issues such as radon gas and other indoor air pollution in private homes, and global atmospheric changes are harbingers of a new era. EPA "best available technology" and "zero discharge" policies that have sharply reduced conventional pollutants such as particulates and untreated sewage may be less appropriate for toxic contaminants, which cannot be totally eradicated in the face of unavoidable resource and technological limitations.

Eco-Conservatism

Curiously, as the inadequacy of the existing environmental regulatory framework becomes increasingly apparent, too few conservatives are taking part in the dialogue. Perhaps this is because the term "environmentalism" has for some become a rubric for liberal nostrums in areas ranging from nuclear war (the ultimate "environmental" crisis) to an exhumed Luddism (holding that the activities and desires of modern men and women are inherently destructive

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

Shelly Fischman for *Policy Review*

The most serious environmental problems of the 1990s, such as radon gas and indoor air pollution, do not readily respond to the command-and-control regulation favored in the 1970s.

to the natural environment).

One suspects, however, that relatively few liberals take such positions seriously today, and conservatives should not grant them a respect they do not deserve. Just as the nation's defense debate has been hobbled by the proclivity of prominent liberals to decry the nature of war itself or to oppose every new weapons system as a matter of course, the knee-jerk rejection of environmental concerns by many conservatives has harmed natural resources policy. Such a stance leaves the assumptions underlying the debate unexamined.

For Republicans—whose leaders include the two presidents most responsible for our nation's modern environmental policy, Theodore Roosevelt and Richard Nixon—to retreat from concern for the environment not only avoids facing the future, but also amounts to turning backs on the best of the past. Indeed, the historical antecedent of the current environmental movement is the conservation movement of earlier generations—and the link between conservation and conservatism is manifest in their common derivation.

Ruckelshaus's Good Idea

The American people hold environmental protection to be among the most important of government obligations. For example, a 1986 CBS News-*New York Times* poll found agreement, by a margin of more than 2 to 1, with the statement: "Protecting the environment is so important that requirements and standards cannot be too high, and continuing environmental improvements must be made regardless of cost." Similarly, a 1986 Harris Survey reported even greater opposition to "cutting [federal] funds to be used to clean up the environment and toxic waste dumps" in order to meet the Gramm-Rudman deficit reduction targets.

Nonetheless, for environmental protection—no less than for national defense and other areas of required federal government action—governance implies choice, and we must provide the public with the means to make knowledgeable, voluntary choices in environmental policy. The most promising method, urged with force by William D. Ruckelshaus during his second tenure as EPA administrator, is to institutionalize risk-assessment methodologies—relating risk to health, environment, and public welfare—to determine priorities in environmental protection.

This task is urgent, because our current environmental budgetary priorities are out of sync with the comparative risks presented. For example, the federal government is marshaling far too many budgetary resources for hazardous waste cleanup, despite mounting evidence that the risks presented are of a lesser magnitude than other environmental threats, such as radon gas exposure, stratospheric ozone depletion, global warming, accidental chemical releases, and water pollution from agricultural sources.

As EPA stated in its recent report, *Unfinished Business:*

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A Comparative Assessment of Environmental Problems, there are many reasons why risk assessments may vary from policy priorities. In some situations, factors other than risk (such as the availability of remedial or protective technology) may be important. Calculations of relative risk nationally may not provide accurate indicators of the risks found in local areas, where, for example, a Superfund site is located or wetlands are endangered. Most important, the existing priorities appear to follow public opinion. A detailed, two-year Roper Poll cited by the agency, and consistent with other available data, found the public most concerned about chemical waste disposal, water pollution, chemical plant accidents, and air pollution, in that order. On the other hand, indoor air pollution and global warming, for example, are viewed by the public as relatively low risks, contrary to a growing body of scientific research.

The federal government is marshaling too many budgetary resources for hazardous waste cleanup despite mounting evidence that the risks presented are of a lesser magnitude than other environmental threats.

Outmoded Statutes

Major political questions are at stake in the debate over whether to use risk assessment in environmental decision-making. Most federal environmental statutes do not contemplate a balancing of risks—whether relating to health, welfare, or ecosystem protection—but instead focus on the required, uniform utilization of best technology by producers of specified pollutants. Further, the statutes tend to be medium specific, relating to air and water separately, for example, and there is no explicit notion of comparing risks as they appear in different media. If scientific risk assessment begins to play an important role in setting priorities, then the mechanistic application of uniform, best technology requirements will come under increased scrutiny within the separate statutes. It will also become apparent that the existing divisions between the statutes based upon separate media are largely the result of historical accident, and efforts to integrate the scattered statutory status quo into a unified, organic environmental statutory system will move from the desks of academia to the podiums of workaday politics.

Because it would throw into relief existing divisions of authority between the EPA and other health and safety regulatory bodies, the application of risk principles may also lead to a reconsideration of the proper purview of "environmental" law and regulation generally. Already, the lines are being blurred between the domains of EPA, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Consumer Product Safety Commission, for example. In the face of new analytical tools and knowledge, statutory divisions based solely on place of exposure—such as workplace, products, environment, and diet—rather than the overall risk presented by specific pollutants, are becoming outmoded.

Five-Mile-per-Hour Speed Limit

Predictable criticisms will be raised against the use of risk assessments in environmental policy-making. Some observers express concern that human health effects from low-level toxic exposures cannot be satisfactorily extrapolated from laboratory studies based upon higher level exposures to animals. Others worry that, as a practical matter, risk assessments may include assumptions that lead ostensibly "value-free" mathematical calculations toward politically predetermined positions. More fundamentally, some advocates urge that, as a matter of principle, comparative risk measurements have no proper place in the environmental debate. Indeed, a few explicitly reject the notion of choice itself as a legitimate factor in environmental debate, arguing that all known sources of pollution must be fought equally, toward a goal of zero residual risk, without respect to budgetary limitations.

This view, representing what may be the most widespread and significant criticism of the institutionalization of risk-based decision-making, ignores that the American public has long made sophisticated judgments about relative risk in many settings, including some directly relating to public health and safety (the federal highway speed limit debate is an obvious and oft-cited example; clearly a five mile per hour speed limit on federal highways could cut risk far below the levels presented at 55 or 65 miles per hour limits). Such critics correctly foresee that there may be situations where risk analysis could lead to popular support for a political decision to remove the greater degree of risk in a given situation, while leaving behind residual risk that could be removed only at a very high cost, if at all. The key is to sufficiently inform affected members of the public so that they can judge for themselves, in the context of environmental protection needs generally, whether to assume any such residual risks.

Unless resources are unlimited—which is highly unlikely—then priorities have to be set for environmental protection. As with national defense debates, one need not be uncommitted to the goal of protecting the public to raise questions about where public resources should be targeted; indeed, to do otherwise is, in the words of Churchill, to make "the perfect the enemy of the good." When resources are not utilized in the best conceivable manner in one area they become unavailable for use in other, even more significant areas. Those aspiring to political leadership must recognize that, irrespective of the state of public opinion today, the American people will rightly hold policymakers accountable if current environmental protection strategies ultimately come to be viewed as a modern Maginot line, effective only in the theoretical context of past battles that we will not face in the future. In particular, the massive federal statutory and budgetary commitment to

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hazardous waste regulation, juxtaposed against the paltry attention given to indoor air pollution threats, merits careful public examination.

Superfund, Bonanza for Lawyers

If an American has heard of one environmental statute, it is probably Superfund. Poll after poll has shown that chemical waste disposal tops the public's list of environmental threats. The specter of toxic chemicals leaking into drinking water is too frightening to be ignored. Further, persistent reports of clandestine dumping of such chemicals by treacherous environmental predators, sometimes linked to organized crime, has led to nothing short of terror in victimized communities. To meet the public demand, the Congress dramatically expanded the Superfund statute in 1986, increasing the law from 44 to 132 pages in length and raising federal funding from $1.6 billion to $8.5 billion over five years.

Observers on all sides are concluding that Superfund is simply not working, despite the infusion of resources provided by Congress. Beset by conflicting political crosscurrents, the Superfund program is marked by fissures that, taken together, point toward severe structural distress:

- The EPA has identified nearly 1,000 sites for its National Priorities List (NPL) of the most serious environmental threats that require federal attention—yet by the agency's own reckoning, only 24 sites have been cleaned and only 13 have been removed from the NPL.
- Average cost per cleanup of sites is now expected to be between $20 and $30 million, more than double the figure prior to congressional reauthorization and revision of Superfund in 1986, so that the cost of cleaning the current NPL sites alone will likely exceed $20 billion. In looking at the entire universe of hazardous waste sites, the congressional Office of Technology Assessment has predicted that the combined cost to government and industry could exceed $300 billion—and a respected OTA representative recently allowed that even this figure may prove to be far too low.
- Extravagant "transaction costs," including fees for lawyers and technical consultants, at some sites are almost as expensive as the actual cleanup.
- To meet an ambitious series of congressionally imposed schedules for cleanup progress, EPA has had to resort to short-term, immediately available cleanup methods that do not permanently destroy the hazardous substances. Such an emphasis may lead to only temporary remedies that will themselves become future Superfund problems.

There is no single, simple change of government policy that could meet these challenges. While some industry and environmental advocates have suggested wholesale revision of the Superfund statute, such a course would be politically unrealistic until existing statutory provisions have been more widely used and accompanied by EPA management reforms.

The most immediate need for change is in the enforcement program. Superfund includes some of the most extraordinary enforcement authorities in American law. Liability under the act is "strict, joint and several, and retrospective," broadly meaning that any single disposer of hazardous substances may be held responsible for the cleanup of an entire site, irrespective of fault, causal link to environmental harm in question, or the number of additional parties who also may have contributed to the site in question, or the fact that the disposal at issue occurred prior to the passage of Superfund (perhaps even in compliance with then-existing requirements).

The government has two basic alternatives in enforcing the strictures of Superfund. It may initiate a response at a site itself (probably at an expense far greater than if PRPs—potentially responsible parties—undertook the identical action with private contractors under their own supervision), and subsequently seek to recover those costs (including government legal fees) from the PRPs. Alternatively, and much less commonly in practice, the government may order PRPs themselves to undertake a response action under a sword of potential treble damages for violation. This allows the government to pick small numbers of litigation targets, who would then have the right to seek to recover from PRPs who are "hiding in the weeds" in additional, private suits. Despite the threat inherent in this remarkable legal armory, PRPs are not stepping forward and organizing cleanup efforts to nearly the degree needed. Many environmental group and industry advocates agree that the agency must make the threat of enforcement much more credible to encourage voluntary settlement agreements—which, in the long term, hold the promise of less litigation overall. Today, all too many PRPs appear to calculate that, given the enormous liabilities at stake, they are best off remaining outside settlement efforts, awaiting the outcome of a government suit against named PRPs, gaining time or perhaps less liability exposure while awaiting a subsequent contribution suit from the parties initially sued by the government.

The environmental negligence of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has measurable deleterious effects on nearby countries.

The government should increase settlement incentives on two tracks: More parties should face initial suit by the government, despite the expenses attendant upon such suits; and, at the same time, EPA should continue ongoing efforts to craft positive incentives for settlors, such as insurance mechanisms for future expenses at sites, which would in turn be unavailable to recalcitrant parties.

Observers may differ on whether the existing Superfund regime can be made to work more effectively, but there will be no way for the public to know for sure unless the enforcement authorities are used to the maximum possible extent. An invigorated enforcement program would aid PRPs seeking settlement incentives and would highlight remaining management, technical, technological, and legal issues. Most important, it would finally allow the law to be

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judged on its own merits in achieving environmental goals, providing a basis for subsequent congressional efforts to make the program more effective.

Thinking Globally

There are growing reminders of the interconnections between the actions of individual nations on the global environment as a whole. As the pace of industrial activity and commercial intercourse has continued its ineluctable acceleration, so have the international consequences become more apparent. In North America, there are the well-publicized questions relating to "acid rain" in our relations with Canada, as well as air and water pollution issues with Mexico. Far beyond our borders we have also witnessed the tragedy of the Union Carbide disaster in Bhopal, India, with which we are connected through corporate paternity, as well as the Soviet nuclear disaster at Chernobyl, which some scientists suggest may have morbidity effects as far away as the American Midwest. The so-called greenhouse effect, whereby an accumulation of man-made gases, including carbon dioxide, methanol, and nitrous oxide, could increase the earth's temperature, may affect many nations, including the United States. Coastal areas may be threatened by rising sea levels and climate changes may alter patterns of water availability, particularly in the Midwest. Similarly, there is widespread agreement, reflected in the Montreal Treaty, approved by the Senate on March 14, 1988, that the emission of chlorofluorocarbons and halons has depleted the stratospheric atmosphere, further contributing to global warming trends.

Litigation-related costs at some Superfund sites are almost as expensive as the actual cleanup.

The Montreal Treaty is particularly significant because, as noted by Richard Benedick, the principal U.S. negotiator, it is the first time that nations are attempting to impose emissions controls on a significant industrial sector in anticipation of, rather than in response to, significant damage to human health and the ecosystem. This achievement is particularly striking, because it points toward several factors that should also apply in the future. First, the United States remains indispensable to the resolution of global environmental issues, both because of the relative size of our economy and our unique ability to contribute to necessary research. Second, global environmental policy, like that viewed solely in domestic terms, often requires that decisions be made on the basis of incomplete knowledge, because of the grievous risks posed by lack of action. This suggests that our government must make research of international ecological problems a high priority, particularly where, as suggested in some global warming scenarios, the effects of environmental change may harm American interests while benefiting some other nations.

The United States must also continue to expand ongoing efforts to ensure that the environmental needs of the Third World are not trampled in the midst of development efforts. It is clearly in the American national interest that organizations such as the World Bank, the Agency for International Development, and the Inter-American Development Bank take into account such issues as ecosystem protection in making development recommendations. The destruction of wetlands in South America, for example, not only imperils the agricultural resources of the nations in which they are located, but also adds to global climate concerns.

The United States should also assume a position of leadership in Third World environmental efforts more generally. Given the international interconnections of environmental concerns, and the understandable hesitation of less developed nations to pay heed to environmental concerns in their rush to escape immediate problems of poverty, pestilence, and disease, there is no alternative. In this undertaking, the U.S. must also pressure Communist nations, whose environmental records are generally horrendous. In particular, the environmental negligence of the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites has immediate and measurable deleterious effects on nearby countries.

Bigger Research Budget

Strong leadership is required in the years ahead as the environmental agenda changes rapidly. In order to provide such leadership, we should revive the White House Council on Environmental Quality, or otherwise establish a center for executive branch policy coordination. Responsibility for environmental decision-making is now scattered among a host of executive agencies, each with separate motivating concerns and history. Congressional authority is also diffused—EPA reported in 1986 that 15 House committees and 21 subcommittees, as well as 10 Senate committees and 12 subcommittees exercised jurisdiction over the agency in the 99th Congress. The division of authority between and within the legislative and executive can only be rationalized through presidential initiative.

It is also essential that budgeting for environmental research and data collection and monitoring, both domestic and international, receive greater attention than in the past. Some conservatives, notably David Stockman, have resisted increased funding for environmental research, ostensibly on the grounds that it merely provides new avenues for bureaucratic growth. However, if risk assessment is to become a major factor in environmental decision-making, research and data collection will be matters of the highest priority.

Finally, it is necessary that conservatives wholeheartedly enter the environmental debate of our time. Voices for reasoned choice and democratic accountability are desperately needed in this arena, where, as Theodore Roosevelt so often reminded us, we serve as the stewards of the interests of coming generations presently unable to speak in their own behalf. ☎

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

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MORAL UNEQUIVALENCE

Afghanistan Is Not the Soviets' Vietnam

LEE BRADDOCK

It has become a commonplace to call Afghanistan the Vietnam of the Soviet Union, and if the Soviets carry out their pledge to withdraw from Kabul, there will be some substance to the analogy: In both cases, a superpower will have extricated itself from a lengthy war on the Asian landmass without having fully secured its military and political objectives. The analogy is entirely inappropriate, however, if its purpose is to demonstrate the moral equivalence of the United States and the Soviet Union, for there are three fundamental differences between American conduct in Vietnam and Soviet conduct in Afghanistan.

Losing Hearts and Minds

To begin with, our side won the "hearts and minds" of the South Vietnamese people; the Soviet side has not won the allegiance of Afghans.

When American forces landed in Vietnam in 1965, the authority of the South Vietnamese government was restricted to cities and armed outposts. By the time U.S. troops had left and the Peace Agreement was signed in 1973, the Saigon government enjoyed the political allegiance of the majority of its citizens, and it had built both the administrative capacity and the military strength to govern most of the country and to resist armed incursions by the Communists without American troop support. As American troops withdrew, South Vietnam was enjoying increasing urban and agricultural prosperity, and the population was sufficiently protected that 95 percent of the country's hamlets could hold democratic elections. Had the United States not failed to resupply the South with weapons and ammunition in the face of a massive Soviet-backed conventional invasion by the North Vietnamese in 1975, in total violation of the Paris peace accords, South Vietnam would be an independent and most likely democratic country today.

In sharp contrast, the Communist government in Kabul commands the allegiance of a pitiful minority and is unable either to administer the country or to resist its armed opposition without massive Soviet troop assistance. The guerrillas are stronger and more capable now than they were when the Soviets began military operations a decade ago. It is the Soviet forces and their client troops who are enclaved in cities and armed outposts as the Soviets depart.

The second difference is that America in Vietnam fought a lawful war in accordance with the international rules of civilized nations, whereas Soviet atrocities in Afghanistan rank with those of the Nazis and Japanese during World War II.

In accordance with the laws of war, U.S. forces routinely removed civilians from battle areas. U.S. rules of engagement were designed to keep civilian casualties to a minimum. War crimes such as the My Lai rampage were reported, investigated, and punished through due process of law.

In Vietnam, Americans had compassion for the innocent victims of war and tried to help bind the wounds whenever possible. Those caught in the cross fires of war were provided for. Families were financially compensated for the accidental combat deaths of civilian members regardless of which side was responsible for such deaths. Civilian casualties received the same medical attention that was given to military personnel. The number of civilians killed as a percentage of total war deaths was substantially lower than that in World War II or Korea.

Voting with Their Feet

In Afghanistan, by contrast, the USSR has flaunted its disrespect for the laws of war. Hundreds of thousands of unarmed villagers—including women, children, and the aged—have been destroyed without warning by the weaponry of modern technology, including chemical weapons outlawed by international agreement. Hospitals where civilian war victims might have received treatment have been bombed by Soviet aircraft. The Soviets have refused to recognize the humanity of their opposition: The Communists maintain *no* prisoner of war camps in Afghanistan. Their methods of execution have included drowning in excrement, burying alive, crushing under armored vehicles, and obliterating through explosives, while their methods of torture have included near drowning, sleep deprivation, the pulling out of fingernails, and electric shock.

The third, and probably most revealing, difference is the

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Alexander Hunter for *Policy Review*

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

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One-third of the population of Afghanistan have fled their country, and they have fled *from* the Soviets, not *to* the Soviets.

way civilians voted with their feet. Almost a million Vietnamese fled south in the 1950s as Ho Chi Minh consolidated his power in the north. Since the conquest of the south by Hanoi, over a million have sought refuge in the West, many perishing in rickety boats, and tens of thousands are still fleeing every year. The United States has accepted about a half million Vietnamese refugees, and it was not only the government that met their needs. The heart of America went out to those suffering, with private relief agencies and tens of thousands of sponsoring families giving generous assistance to help the Vietnamese start new lives.

Fully one-third of the population of Afghanistan, by contrast, have fled their country, and they have fled *from* the Soviets, not *to* the Soviets. More than three million fled to Pakistan, another two million to Iran. Should the Soviets complete their pull-out, and the mujahideen take power, there will be no mass flight of Afghans toward the Soviet Union.

Success of Vietnamization

The desired objective in both the American and Soviet cases was the securing of the host government's ability to defend and govern its nation. Early in the Vietnam war we followed a strategy that, while demonstrating the superiority of American to North Vietnamese military forces, was less effective in mobilizing South Vietnam's resources and in countering the Communists' political strategy. But by 1968 we had learned from our experience and were able to press a politico-military offensive with our South Vietnamese allies that would drive the enemy to the periphery of political influence by the time of the Peace Agreement in 1973.

Our successful "Vietnamization" strategy gathered momentum after the shock of the Communists' Tet offensive of 1968, and was formalized in 1969 by newly elected President Richard Nixon. The accelerated struggle for "hearts and minds" had four major components: decentralizing political authority and holding popular elections of local officials empowered to govern; giving the people the weapons, training, and ancillary support they needed to defend themselves; investing in roads, bridges, canals, schools, and hospitals; and broadening economic participation in the market economy through land reform, as well as agricultural credit, research, and technical assistance to the new landowners. At the same time, the Tet offensive proved a military disaster for the Communists, decimating the political strength of the Viet Cong and creating a vacuum into which the newly invigorated pacification forces moved vigorously and successfully.

Democracy and Prosperity in Vietnam

The atrocities committed by the Communist forces in the Tet offensive had helped to galvanize the fighting will of the Vietnamese people. According to James Collins in *The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army,* the Vietnamese armed forces grew dramatically, with the regular military forces increasing from fewer than 350,000 prior to Tet, to more than 500,000 by the time U.S. forces were completing withdrawals in 1972, while territorial forces grew from under 300,000 to over a half million, and armed self-defense forces at the hamlet level rose to another half million. While the regular forces replaced the U.S. troops in restraining incursions from North Vietnam, it was the territorial forces that successfully protected the political integrity of the localities.

By 1972, the South Vietnamese government had gained the political dominance in the countryside that had been enjoyed by the Viet Cong in 1967. Democracy, including a flourishing opposition, was beginning to take root. In 1966 and 1967, only about half of South Vietnam's villages were secure enough to participate in elections for national constituent assembly, president, upper and lower houses of the national assembly, village councils, and hamlet chiefs. By 1970, the countryside was sufficiently pacified, at least in daytime, that 95 percent of the villages and hamlets were able to hold elections, and an opposition party, the "lotus flower" slate, received the largest number of votes in elections for the Senate.

Economic growth also played an invigorating role. In *Vietnamization and the Cease-Fire,* Major General Nguyen Duy Hinh observed, "In 1970 rice production reached a total of 5.5 million tons, surpassing that of 1964 which had been the year of highest production since World War II. In 1971 and 1972 rice production rose again to 6.1 million tons." Green Revolution rice strains developed by American researchers in the Philippines accounted for several crops a year, yielding double the amounts of traditional varieties. By 1971 almost half the 2.6 million hectares devoted to rice were planted with the new breeds. And surplus rice meant more pigs, chickens, and ducks as

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well. Hinh recounts extensive public works in "road building, river and canal dredging, hospital and school building. In 1961 only 61 percent of children attended school. By 1971 this percentage had reached 94 percent. And almost all districts now had a high school." These successful economic programs were carried out by the Vietnamese but, as Generals Cao Van Vien and Dong Van Khuyen conclude in *Reflections on the Vietnam War,* "Without U.S. technological assistance, U.S. funds, and U.S. materials, all these programs could never have brought about such remarkable results in so short a time."

Honda Boom

Sir Robert Thompson in *Peace Is Not at Hand* assessed the significance of these developments:

> The increased prosperity has frequently been referred to as "the Honda boom." Certainly Hondas, television sets, and transistors announced the arrival of the consumer society in South Vietnam's farming community. But there was also considerable investment in water pumps for improved irrigation, in outboard motors for sampans and fishing vessels and, above all, in tractors. By the end of 1971 there were nearly 40,000 tractors in South Vietnam. They were not gifts. They were bought and owned by individual farmers or cooperatives. This was the "revolution" required and it was achieved even in war through the incentive of free enterprise. All this increased production enabled South Vietnam to become almost self-supporting in food by the end of 1971 and to slow down the spiral of inflation. Prosperity was giving the farmer a greater stake not only in the security of his own area but in the defense of the country as a whole.

He went on to note that by 1973 the land reform program, authorized by a 1970 act of the legislature, had made landowners of over 600,000 peasants who had acquired over two million acres of agricultural land whose previous owners were compensated by the same legislative act. That reform gave the small farmer what the Communists only had promised him for a decade.

The armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam also developed the capacity to defend their nation. President Nixon writes in *No More Vietnams,* "Our Vietnamization program had turned South Vietnam's military into a formidable fighting force. Its army had 120 infantry battalions organized into 11 divisions, 58 artillery battalions, and 19 armored units of battalion size. . . . Our pacification program had extended Saigon's control throughout the country down to the hamlet level. . . . Our economic aid had produced unprecedented prosperity for the South Vietnamese people." These striking developments were the fruits of the policy and priority shifts after 1968 that accelerated the equipping of the South Vietnamese for self-government and self-defense.

In effect, it was the South Vietnamese armed forces that protected the withdrawal of U.S. forces, a telling contrast with the situation the Soviets find themselves in today in Afghanistan. Indeed, even in 1975 as South Vietnam exhausted its ammunition against a massive North Vietnamese conventional military offensive and collapsed in the

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Vietnamese campaign workers post party slate. By 1970, 95 percent of Vietnam's villages and hamlets were able to hold elections.

face of U.S. abandonment, it was the proud, die-hard remnants of the South Vietnamese 18th Division that protected the escape of the last Americans and of the mass of Vietnamese who scrambled to evade Communist tyranny.

Soviet Failures in Afghanistan

It is remarkable that, having apparently had no compunctions about using the most inhuman and uncivilized means of crushing their opposition, the Soviets have in fact failed to crush it. As Soviet troops prepared to initiate their retreat, the *New York Times* of May 6, 1988, reported the assessment of the U.S. State Department that the Afghan resistance "controls already the bulk of the countryside." Even when they fought for years with little more than 19th-century small arms and raw courage, the resistance could not be subdued by the Soviets. With the advent of more powerful weapons in late 1986, the resistance forces took to the field and forced the Soviets and their puppet government forces to retreat.

In the January/February 1988 issue of *Free Afghanistan Report,* David Isby reported that the resistance was overrunning Afghan army garrisons and had forced Soviet troops to withdraw from their more isolated outposts. Using its American and British antiaircraft missiles, and its Chinese rocket launchers, the resistance held the military initiative for much of 1987. The Communists lost more than 200 aircraft during 1987. These losses made the Soviets much more chary about striking out against the resistance and the people who support it. Most of the estimated 1.2 million Afghans killed in the war have been

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civilians. Yet the majority of the Afghans continue to sympathize with the resistance, whose forces are virtually in control of three-fourths of the country, and who have access to any part of the country at will.

In late 1987, the Soviets were forced to launch the largest winter offensive of the war in order to relieve the besieged Afghan army base at Khost. Clearly, the Soviet presence has been necessary to sustain the unpopular Afghan Communist regime. Losing on the battlefield, the Soviets tried to force the contest politically in Pakistan where, according to the February 16, 1988, *Christian Science Monitor,* approximately 500 people, both Afghan exiles and Pakistanis, had been killed by KGB-backed terrorists over the past year. These Communist attempts to break the fighting spirit that they had been unable to quell on the battlefield did not succeed.

Rather than risk an inadvertent violation of Hague Convention IV, the U.S. military command suspended use of Agent Orange in 1970.

Estimates of the armed strength of the resistance range from 50,000 to 200,000. Soviet armed forces have averaged about 120,000, backstopped by perhaps another 30,000 support troops across the Soviet border. This strength is striking in comparison with that of the Afghan Communist army, which numbers no more than 40,000. Communist "militia," of little military significance, may total another 30,000. And the Afghan KGB-modeled secret police, the KHAD, is estimated at about the same strength. Thus *all* the Afghan Communist armed forces total less than the Soviet troop presence. The *New York Times* reported on May 5, 1988, the judgment of a top U.S. State Department official that "it's the Russian presence that keeps the current government in power." The Soviets' officially countenanced savagery and scorched earth policies have left the masses of the Afghan peoples disaffected and embittered, without suppressing their will to resist.

America and the Laws of War

It has been said that the whole Vietnam war was illegal insofar as we did not live up to the 1954 Geneva agreement to hold elections in Vietnam in 1956. In his memoirs Eisenhower said, "I have never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable in Indochinese affairs who did not agree that had elections been held as of the time of the fighting, possibly 80 percent of the population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader rather than Bao Dai." Eisenhower's understanding, probably accurate, reflected the nationalistic feelings of the Vietnamese people in 1954 when Bao Dai, the defunct emperor of yore, was seen as a failed tool of French colonialism. But by 1956, Ho Chi Minh had revealed his true colors as a tyrannical Communist, had antagonized nationalist sentiment with the brutal suppression of the nationalist political opposition, and had lost whatever popular support he might have had earlier through the summary execution of 50,000 peasants in an abortive land reform program. In the meantime, Ngo Dinh Diem had supplanted Bao Dai and rallied nationalist sentiment in South Vietnam. By 1956 Diem probably could have won any truly free elections encompassing both North and South Vietnam, but the Communist dictatorship made genuine elections impossible in the North. Since the United States and South Vietnam had refused to sign the declaration that provided for elections in 1956, they had no legal commitment to do so.

In Vietnam, American military forces faced many of the same challenges presented to Soviet forces later in Afghanistan. Some of the more significant of these derived from the nature of fighting against guerrilla-type forces intermingled with the populace. The differences in the Soviet and American responses to these challenges is illuminating.

Before "Vietnamization," the principal American method for dealing with civilians in a combat area was to move them out, in accordance with Article 49 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons. This required setting up refugee camps with food, sanitation, security, medical support, and indeed the full panoply of community services. Related to population relocation was the designation of free-fire zones, areas from which inhabitants were evacuated and people warned not to enter, and within which Free World forces were authorized to engage the enemy without the normal cautions for civilian protection. These cautions were codified in the Rules of Engagement promulgated by the U.S. Military Assistance Command in Vietnam (MACV). Those rules governed the specific use of almost every form of firepower including naval gunfire, air bombardment, infantry small arms fire, artillery, and armor (tank) gunfire. In *The Vietnam War and International Law,* a compendium of expert opinions edited by Richard Falk, Professor Telford Taylor, chief counsel for the prosecution at the Nuremberg war crimes trials, discusses "Vietnam and the Nuremberg Principles," determining that the rules of engagement prepared and promulgated by the MACV were "virtually impeccable."

Napalm and Agent Orange

The United States was criticized not only for its use of force but for the kinds of weapons it used. U.S. forces used tear gas and similar nonlethal riot control agents in Vietnam. Of greater concern in Vietnam was the use of a herbicide, Agent Orange, which contained dioxin. This chemical, an effective weed killer favored by American farmers, was employed to defoliate trees that concealed the movement of enemy troops through the jungle. In 1969, the National Cancer Institute reported that the chemicals in Agent Orange caused cancer and birth defects in certain animals. (It has not yet been determined whether Agent Orange has had harmful effects on humans, though the subject is still under intense study.) Consequently, rather than risk an inadvertent violation of Hague Convention IV (Conduct of War on Land) outlawing the use of

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poisons, the U.S. military command suspended use of Agent Orange in 1970.

During the war, American forces' use of napalm was publicized as a cause of special and unnecessary suffering. MACV Directive 525-18 discouraged the use of any kind of incendiary munitions "unless absolutely necessary in the accomplishment of the commander's mission." Because of napalm's unique effectiveness against the ubiquitous tunnels and caves used by the Communist forces in Vietnam, the necessity for its use was adjudged frequently. It also was relied on in support of U.S. troops engaged so closely with the enemy that fragmentation bombs would have endangered the American forces. Certainly, the use of napalm caused severe injuries to civilians; a well-known photograph, for instance, showed a naked girl running away from the battle area where she had received napalm burns. But in his comprehensive and judicious appraisal, *America in Vietnam,* Guenter Lewy found, "The impression created by critics of the war that many thousands of villagers and children were burnt by napalm is undoubtedly false." Dr. John Knowles, member of a 1967 inspection team commissioned by the U.S. government to investigate this question, remarked in his "Vietnam Diary: Medicine and Politics" that "burns due to napalm are very few and far between." These findings confirmed those of the Committee of Responsibility to Save War-Burnt and War-Injured Vietnamese Children, which, as reported to the Senate Judiciary Committee in May 1967, inspected 75 percent of all South Vietnamese hospitals, finding only 38 civilian burn casualties, of whom 16 were children.

Bombing of North Vietnam

In addition to the ground, air, and naval gunfire employed in South Vietnam, U.S. forces carried out a campaign of aerial bombardment in North Vietnam. The strategic merits of this campaign were much debated by American military analysts, and the bombings also led to an international outcry against the harm inflicted on civilians.

Nevertheless, the kind of damage inflicted by U.S. airpower on Japanese and German civilian populations in World War II was unknown in Vietnam. In *Nuremburg and Vietnam* Taylor writes, "Given the state of aerial warfare to which we were brought by the Second World War, I can see no sufficient basis for war crimes charges based on the bombing of North Vietnam." He concludes that U.S. bombing "fell far short of demonstrating any intent to cause civilian casualties." Even in Nixon's heavy "Christmas bombing" of 1972, the North Vietnamese claimed only 1,500 civilian fatalities. This was low by comparison with the 1945 bombings of Tokyo (80,000 killed) or Dresden (35,000) and was attributable in part to the technological advances that permitted much greater precision and accuracy by bomber pilots.

In *No More Vietnams* Nixon tells how he passed up the option of bombing the extensive dike system in North Vietnam, even though it would have incapacitated the country, precisely because the damage to civilian life and property would have been horrendous. The rules were enforced, as evidenced by the celebrated case of Air Force General John Lavelle, who ordered 28 missions against

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Lt. William Calley. The difference between U.S. war crimes in Vietnam and Soviet crimes in Afghanistan is that the crimes in Vietnam violated U.S. military orders and the perpetrators were brought to trial.

unauthorized military targets: He was relieved of his command, reduced in rank, and placed in retirement. Lewy concludes his review with the finding that "the bombing of North Vietnam conformed to international law, and the application of American air power was probably the most restrained in modern warfare. At all times, target, munitions, and strike tactics were selected to minimize the risk of collateral damage to the civilian population."

Lt. Calley's Court-Martial

By and large, American military commanders and troops did their best to adhere to the rules of engagement despite the frustrations of an unconventional war where traditional rules often seemed misplaced. But there were exceptions. And how they were treated sheds further light on whether the American conduct in Vietnam and the Soviet conduct in Afghanistan are morally equivalent.

Probably the most discussed war crime committed by American soldiers in Vietnam was the My Lai incident in which approximately 190 men, women, and children were massacred by a company of U.S. Army soldiers. MACV Directive 20-4 mandated the reporting of war crimes, whether committed by U.S. or by enemy forces. The My Lai massacre violated the MACV rules of engagement as well as the standard operating procedures of the parent division of the unit involved. Although that unit tried to hide its illegal acts, word eventually got out and the massacre was reported to higher authorities. Twelve U.S. officers and enlisted men were charged with murder. First Lieuten-

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Victim of the Soviet war on Afghanistan

ant William Calley was tried by court-martial, found guilty of premeditated murder, and sentenced to life imprisonment. Although Calley's unprofessional conduct was deplored by the regular officer corps, there was a public outcry in his favor in America. His sentence, upon review, was eventually reduced to 10 years. In *Nuremberg and Vietnam* Telford Taylor remarks that the "reported reaction of some soldiers at [My Lai] strongly indicates that they regarded it as out of the ordinary." Guenter Lewy notes, "The absence of an atrocity of this magnitude from the court-martial record cannot prove that no other such incident took place, yet in view of the openness of the fighting in South Vietnam to journalists and the encouragement which the My Lai affair gave to other servicemen to come forward with reports of atrocities, it is highly unlikely that anything like the My Lai massacre did escape detection."

According to the records of the U.S. Army's Judge Advocate General, in the course of the war a total of 241 war crimes by American military personnel, including murder, rape, mutilation, and mistreatment of prisoners, were alleged. Upon investigation, 36 of these were found to have sufficient evidence to warrant a court-martial. In those 36 cases, a total of 60 soldiers were put on trial, with 29 convictions resulting (4 officers and 25 enlisted men).

Unlawful War as Soviet Policy

The striking difference between these war crimes and those of the Soviets in Afghanistan is that in Vietnam the crimes were contrary to U.S. policy, they contravened specific U.S. military regulations and orders, and their perpetrators were brought to trial in all cases where evidence permitted the convening of a court-martial. In the Soviet case, violations of international conventions and protocols designed to protect civilians and prisoners of war, and to proscribe certain acts such as genocide and the use of poisonous gas and biological weapons, have been sufficiently extensive in space and time to constitute a *policy* of unlawful war—as distinguished from the occasional unlawful but unplanned and unauthorized act whose criminality may be mitigated by the heat and exigency of battle.

The United Nations Human Rights Commission has reported Soviet violations of the laws of war, as have Amnesty International, Helsinki Watch, Medecins sans Frontieres, and other concerned agencies. Barnett Rubin, assistant professor of political science at Yale, has become one of America's experts on the question. In Freedom House's 1987 *Afghanistan, The Great Game Revisited,* Rubin provides evidence of torture of military prisoners and civilians alike by electric shock, beating, pulling out of fingernails, sleep deprivation, strangling, death threats, and near drowning, and he details the accounts of summary execution by wholesale machine gunning, by drowning in excrement, by burying alive with bulldozers, by crushing with armored vehicles, by detonating explosives tied to the body, by throwing off cliffs, by burning with gasoline, by stabbing, and by strangling.

The Soviets have introduced an illegality and gratuitous savagery previously unknown in an Afghanistan that historically has had a reputation for rough and primitive behavior. After the Communist coup of April 1978, but before the intrusion of Soviet combat units, flagrantly illegal acts were carried out with the connivance of Soviet advisors. In the *Christian Science Monitor* of February 4, 1980, Edward Girardet reported an incident where Soviet advisors either ordered or approved the mass slaughter of some 1,200 villagers suspected of supporting the resistance. According to Olivier Roy in *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan,* "in all about 50,000 to 100,000 people disappeared" between 1978 and 1979.

Soviet Bombing of Population

With the arrival of Soviet troops in December 1979, the pattern of authorized illegality was unchanged but the carnage greatly increased. In Rubin's judgment, "Probably the largest single cause of civilian casualties in the war is Soviet bombardment of populated areas under the control or influence of the resistance." Article 49 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War prescribes, "The Occupying Power may undertake total or partial evacuation of a given area if the security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand.... The Occupying Power undertaking such transfers or evacuations shall ensure, to the greatest practicable extent, that proper accommodation is provided to receive the protected persons, that the removals are effected in satisfactory conditions of hygiene, health, safety, and nutrition, and that members of the same family are not separated."

The Soviet forces' total disregard of these provisions, indeed their inverse application of them, has surprised even

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those inured to Communist cynicism and observance of civilized standards only in their breach. In Helsinki Watch's *Tears, Blood, and Cries,* Rubin cited the September 1984 report of the Medicins sans Frontieres doctor Juliette Fournot who had visited many parts of Afghanistan: "Each village in Afghanistan has been bombed at least once in the past four years." The London *Financial Times* quoted a Soviet defector on May 23, 1984, "If the mujahideen set fire to trucks on the road, they [the Soviets] carry out strikes against civilian houses. They don't bomb the mujahideen, they bomb the houses."

The 1907 Hague Convention IV (Conduct of War on Land) specifies: "It is prohibited to attack or bombard undefended villages, dwellings, or buildings" (Article 25); "belligerents have the duty to warn before bombardment occurs" (Article 26); and, "pillage is prohibited" (Article 28).

Mutilation of Children

Reports of violations of the laws of war such as those above, and hundreds of others like them, leave no doubt that the destruction of civilians and their homes is an official Soviet policy calculated to terrorize the populace into submission, force it to abandon areas considered to harbor mujahideen forces, or simply wipe it off the face of the earth in the classical Stalinist mode of problem solving. Rubin concludes that "bombing civilians is clearly intentional, as the Soviets have shown themselves capable of bombing military targets with great precision when they so desire. Furthermore, the bombing is a key part of pacification strategy. . . . Even more clearly aimed at the civilian population, especially children, are mines disguised as toys and everyday objects." The mutilation of children from these fiendish devices has been widely remarked. Protocol II of the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention prohibits "booby-trapping children's toys (or making mines that look like toys)." It's almost as though Soviet munitions planning is inspired by the prohibitions of international agreements (to which the USSR is a solemn signatory).

Arthur Bonner, in a November 1985 report in the *New York Times,* quoted a Soviet defector with the Afghan resistance: "We were ordered by our officers that when we attack a village, not one person must be left alive to tell the tale. If we refuser to carry out these orders, we get it in the neck ourselves." Richard Bernstein documented in the January 28, 1983, *New York Times* the massacre of 105 villagers by Soviet soldiers who poured an explosive material into an underground tunnel where the people were taking shelter, then ignited the explosives.

Officially Sanctioned Sadism

Some of the most damning evidence of law violations has come from Soviet soldiers themselves. Alexander Alexiev of the Rand Corporation conducted a series of in-depth interviews with 35 defectors from the Soviet army in Afghanistan. One soldier testified: "One day we had this punitive operation. The point is that our regiment was being fired upon every day. So one day we were given an order to fire at a certain village and then to comb that village thoroughly, and if we found any people that were still alive to kill all of them." Another soldier commented, "We were struck by our own cruelty in Afghanistan. We executed innocent peasants. If one of ours was killed or wounded, we would kill women, children, and old people as a revenge. We killed everything, even the animals."

Other soldiers recounted atrocities:

> Once they entered a village where only old men and women with children were left, because whenever we went on a search-and-destroy mission all the able-bodied men had left the villages. The lieutenant ordered his platoon to herd all these women, children, and old men together into one room and throw in hand grenades.

The accounts of those interviewed by Alexiev demonstrate that, once illicit behavior is authorized, the worst comes out in human beings, and the worst human beings come out to vent their sadism and deformities on their authorized victims:

> One of the Afghans was a priest with a beard and they spared him. But the next morning the officer ordered one of the soldiers to pour gasoline over him and set him on fire. The soldier couldn't do it and started screaming. The officer got really upset and said, "I've had enough of this. Watch how it's done." And he grabbed the Afghan by the throat and slit it. Then he ordered the soldier to castrate him and make him "clean as a cherub."

Alexiev found that "there is overwhelming evidence, from both the interview information and former Afghan officers, that resistance combatants captured by the Soviets are almost always summarily executed upon interrogation. Torture is said to be frequently used in such interrogations." In a United Nations *Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan,* Felix Ermacora noted that there are no known prisoner of war camps in Afghanistan.

"We were struck by our own cruelty in Afghanistan. We executed innocent peasants. If one of ours was killed or wounded, we would kill women, children, and old people as a revenge. We killed everything, even the animals."

From his extensive interviews Alexiev concluded, "Such activities are generally symptomatic of a Soviet military behavior characterized by unusual brutality and blatant disregard for internationally accepted norms and conventions on the conduct of war. Such misconduct is not only officially tolerated but, in fact, encouraged during the course of authorized operations. . . . "

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As early as 1980, a Dutch journalist, Bernd de Bruin, documented with film and photographs the Soviet use of poisonous gas, which he described in *Nieuwsnet* magazine. Sterling Seagrave's *Yellow Rain* provides eye-witness testimony from a survivor of a gas attack: "Our fighters were throwing up blood as if they had been drinking blood and could not hold any more. There was also blood in their eyes, like tears, and from the nose.... Our fighters died quickly. They were vomiting blood and fouling their clothes and began to act like crazy people, falling down and jerking about."

Poisonous gas is prohibited by the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Even the Nazis respected this prohibition on the battlefield during World War II. The 1972 Biological Warfare Convention bans from warfare all toxins as well as the weapons to deliver them.

By 1982 the U.S. State Department, in its special report on *Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan,* had documented over 3,000 deaths in Afghanistan from attacks with chemicals. That report concluded that "Soviet forces have used a variety of lethal chemical warfare agents, including nerve gases, in Afghanistan since the Soviet invasion of that country in 1979." On June 7, 1982, the *Wall Street Journal* reported the findings of a U.N. group of experts who had interviewed both eye-witnesses and victims of biochemical attacks in Afghanistan. The evidence showed Soviet use of "Yellow Rain," poisoned bullets and darts, "black smoke," chemical bombs, and food crop contaminants.

In the 1987 Freedom House compendium on *Afghanistan,* edited by Rosanne Klass, Yosef Bodansky relates the knowledge gained from Russian chemical corps soldiers captured in Afghanistan: "Since 1980 the Soviets have tested and used in Afghanistan at least two generations of chemical weapons, including all the previously known lethal agents in the Soviet arsenal as well as a family of previously unknown 'super nerve agents' which have become the backbone of the Soviet chemical arsenal."

American Relief of Human Suffering

Armed forces can exacerbate or mitigate the cruel hardships that wars impose. Civilian casualties and population displacement were constant realities throughout the Vietnam war. The U.S. Army's research project on the "Conduct of the War in Vietnam" reported that over a million people were uprooted in 1966 and 1967, while over four million people had been displaced at one time or another by 1970. This was a quarter of the nation's population.

Almost all refugees fled to the U.S. side, in many cases because of fear of Communist forces, but as often because U.S. forces and their allies provided for the shelter, care, and feeding of refugees, whereas the other side did not. Some of those displaced were wounded by combat action in the process. American military hospitals treated those who found their way there. According to the public health records of the U.S. Agency for International Development, Vietnamese hospitals supported by American aid registered almost a half million civilian war-related casualties from 1965 to 1974.

In *America in Vietnam* Lewy calculated that "the number of civilian deaths [North and South] amounted to about 28 percent of the overall casualty toll of 1,313,000, substantially lower than the estimated proportion of 40 percent for civilian deaths in World War II and 70 percent in Korea." In *Nuremberg and Vietnam* Taylor presumed that the American forces' possession of greater firepower meant "that we are responsible for the greater part of the civilian casualties." Lewy noted that "civilian casualties gradually were incorporated into the helicopter evacuation chain and generally received prompt medical attention." He also recorded that, with American assistance, the Vietnamese government's Ministry of Social Welfare "paid a special allowance to the next of kin of civilian war victims killed in the course of military operations, irrespective of which side had started a battle."

Vietnamese Flee Toward U.S.

Most American military units conducted their own "civic action" programs to assist the Vietnamese with whom they came in contact. These activities included medical attention, sanitation, construction of schools and other public facilities, and simple charity for the very poor. Prior to 1968, U.S. strategy had encouraged people to move to areas secured by U.S. and Vietnamese government forces. Thereafter, with the growing success of the newly stressed pacification programs, the revised policies encouraged extension of security to the people where they lived. This reduced the number of refugees generated. At the same time many refugees were resettled. Lewy, noting that "a substantial number of refugees had been resettled in new villages and hamlets," estimated that "during the years 1969-71, more than one million refugees had returned to their original homes."

But, according to Hinh in *Vietnamization and the Cease-Fire,* the North Vietnamese invasion of 1972 uprooted another 1.2 million people. Even most of these were to be resettled with governmental assistance after the invasion had been beaten back. But this attempt to resume normal life would be destroyed by the North Vietnamese invasion in 1975 when South Vietnamese by the millions would "vote with their feet" to flee the advancing army, many of them eventually becoming the boat people who would search for sanctuary across treacherous waters. The image of these desperate millions fleeing toward the U.S. forces, where charity and succor could be expected, contrasts starkly with the sad plight of the millions of Afghans fleeing away from the merciless heel of the Soviet boot. Since the fall of Vietnam, over 1.7 million people have fled Communist rule in Indochina, not counting the unknown hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese boat people who have perished on the high seas.

Afghans Flee from Soviets

The war in Afghanistan has displaced people by the millions. As of August 1987 the Pakistani government had registered 3.2 million Afghan refugees, according to Amnesty International's May 1988 report on *Afghanistan: Unlawful Killings and Torture.* The UNHRC estimated that there are another 2.2 million Afghan refugees in Iran. These figures exclude the hordes that have been driven from the Afghan countryside into the Soviet-controlled cities within Afghanistan.

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Amnesty International reported that "clearly helpless civilians identified as belonging to certain groups—notably those traveling as refugees—are routinely seized and summarily executed or otherwise attacked and deliberately killed in violation of national and international law."

In Helsinki Watch's 1984 report, executive director Jeri Laber and Professor Rubin noted that the "strategy of the Soviets and the Afghan government has been to spread terror in the countryside so that villagers will either be afraid to assist the resistance fighters who depend on them for food and shelter or will be forced to leave. The hundreds of refugee families crossing the border daily are fleeing from this terror—from wanton slayings, reprisal killings, and the indiscriminate destruction of their homes, crops, and possessions."

Refugees have had to leave the country even to find rudimentary medical attention. In 1983, the French doctor Philippe Augoyard was quoted by *Les Nouvelles d'Afghanistan:*

> In June 1981 the Soviets began a systematic effort to bomb hospitals operated by the French medical organizations. Three small hospitals operated by Medecins du Monde were bombed early in the year. On November 4, MIG-27s and armored helicopters bombed the hospital of Aide Medicale Internationale in the Panjsher Valley, razing the stone building to the ground. On November 5 at 7 AM, 3 MI-24 helicopters razed the hospital of Medecins sans Frontieres in Jaghori, Ghazni, in the southern part of Hazarajat. On November 6, three other helicopters destroyed a dispensary of Aide Medical Internationale in Ningrahar Province. Later in November the dispensary of Medecins sans Frontieres in Waras was attacked. On March 14,1982, the new hospital established by Medecins sans Frontieres in Jaghori was bombed.

Dr. Laurence Laumonier of Aide Medicale Internationale told Laber and Rubin, "After the first time they bombed our hospital in Panjsher, I went to see [Resistance Commander] Massoud. I told him we were going to make another hospital and put a red cross on the roof, so they would be sure to know it was a hospital. He told me I was crazy, it would just make it easier for the Russians to bomb it. But I did it anyway, and then the helicopters came and bombed it."

Open vs. Slave Society

In comparing the Soviet and American experiences in Afghanistan and Vietnam, one is struck by the sparseness of information on Afghanistan in comparison with the avalanche of detailed records available on Vietnam. This reflects the freedom of the international press in Vietnam, the freedom of speech in America that has assured the uninterrupted production of books and articles on the subject, and the open nature of a free society whose government is a servant of the public. During the war in Vietnam, a steady stream of congressional reviewers kept the American people, through their elected representatives, in close touch with war issues, and insured the congressional oversight that routinely disciplines the executive branch within the American constitutional framework.

UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos

Since the fall of Vietnam, over 1.7 million people have fled Communist rule in Indochina, not counting the unknown hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese boat people who have perished on the high seas.

All these factors have been absent in Afghanistan. There, a government accustomed to brutalizing its own citizens, and keeping them in the dark, has conducted its war in seclusion from public scrutiny lest its similarly brutal and unlawful war conduct receive the public review it deserves.

In *Tears, Blood, and Cries* Rubin quotes Vitaly Smirnov, the Soviet Ambassador to Islamabad in 1984 (addressing Olivier Warin, the Agence France Presse correspondent), "I warn you, and through you, all of your journalist colleagues: stop trying to penetrate Afghanistan with the so-called mujahideen. From now on, the bandits and the so-called journalists—French, American, British, and others—accompanying them will be killed. And our units in Afghanistan will help the Afghan forces to do it."

Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Convention, Article 79, prescribes, "Journalists engaged in dangerous professional missions in areas of armed conflict shall be considered as civilians."

The Soviets have made no pretense of feeling bound by the laws of war in Afghanistan. They openly disdain any suggestion that such rules of civilized behavior should be applied to them. Their attitude raises a fundamental question about the significance of agreements with the Soviets. That is, in a quite literal sense, signed agreements don't seem to have any meaning for the Soviets. When it comes to regulating or predicting behavior, it's as though such agreements aren't there.

There is little sense in equating the Soviet war in Afghanistan with the American war in Vietnam. Only at the most superficial levels are there any correspondences. At any level of substance, of purpose, of policy, of performance, there are the stark contrasts between a war conducted by a free and open society governed under law with the consent of the governed, and one prosecuted by a closed slave society governed by men who flaunt their disdain for law and who deny that human beings are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights. ☎

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Responsibility, Love, And Privatization

A Businessman's Guide to Criminal Rehabilitation

Jack Eckerd

America's prison population is increasing at an alarming rate, rising 15 times faster than the national population and more than doubling since 1974. In many states the prisons are operating under emergency conditions, with twice as many inmates as they were designed for; a growing number of prison systems are under court order to curtail overcrowding, even if that means early release of violent offenders. Citizens protest such releases loudly: they understandably do not want serious felons on the streets. At the same time they frequently balk at expenditures for new prisons, not to mention the $20,000 annual cost of keeping an inmate in prison, twice the cost of keeping a student at a state university.

It's hard to think of an American social program with a worse track record than our prisons. Some 70 to 75 percent of former convicts return to lives of crime. The United States has one of the highest numbers of prisoners per capita in the non-Communist world. But it also has one of the highest crime rates of any advanced economy. Though the doubling of the prison population since the mid-1970s has been accompanied by an almost 25 percent decrease in the percentage of households victimized by crime, millions of Americans are still terrorized by criminals, and large sections of every American city are unsafe.

The biggest single reason for the explosion of crime is the deterioration and breakdown of the family, not only in the inner cities, but also among the ever-growing number of middle-class families where both parents work and children run loose without supervision. Child abuse, drug abuse, family violence are both symptoms and causes of a self-feeding cycle of despair. The growing materialism of our civilization has also contributed to an ethical decline, including a serious erosion of respect for the lives and property of other people.

But in the midst of this breakdown of family and community morality, it is also clear that prisons aren't doing their job. They are neither deterring crime nor rehabilitating criminals. Nor are they providing sufficient restitution to the victims who have suffered from crime. The taxpayers cannot afford the route we have been taking—of simply building new prisons in response to astronomic rates of murder, assault, robbery, burglary, and drug-related crimes. The time has come to rethink some of the principles of criminal justice.

The Torture of Idleness

Punishment of criminals is important, but it's inhumane and counterproductive to use prisons purely for punishment. The average inmate leaves prison more bitter than when he entered. He is no better educated. He has gained no experience holding a meaningful job where he has to show up on time, report to a boss, and learn responsibility by getting his work done. He has spent two, five, ten years in prison living mostly in idleness—one of the worst forms of torture you can give a man. The typical convict is given $100 when he leaves and told to fend for himself. Then we wonder why we see recidivism rates of 70 to 75 percent.

Although I am not a criminal justice expert nor have I had training in correctional work, for more than 20 years I have worked with troubled youth through Eckerd Family Youth Alternatives, a private foundation that currently operates 14 year-round wilderness camps in five states, as well as two correctional facilities for serious juvenile offenders that we took over from the states of Florida in 1982 and Maryland in 1988. Since 1983, I have chaired the board of PRIDE, a state-sponsored private corporation that runs all of Florida's 46 prison industries, from furniture making to optical glass grinding—incidentally, at a $4 million profit to state taxpayers last year. I serve on the national board of Charles Colson's Prison Fellowship Ministries. In addition, when I was chief executive of Jack Eckerd Corp., I encouraged our drugstore managers to hire former prisoners. I have, therefore, had the opportunity to observe firsthand how prisons and juvenile justice systems actually work, as well as the role that the private sector (nonprofit as well as

Jack Eckerd, *founder and former chairman of the drugstore chain that bears his name, is chairman of Eckerd Family Youth Alternatives and chairman of PRIDE, Florida's prison industry program.*

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profit-making) can play in improving criminal justice.

My impression—and this is a guess, not a scientific calculation—is that it is impossible to rehabilitate about a third of the adults currently in prison. These are incorrigible repeat offenders whose characters are not going to change, and who will return to crime, in frequent cases to violent crime, whenever they are given the opportunity. For such criminals, particularly the violent ones, the primary obligation of society is simply to put them away so they cannot harm their fellow citizens. For the other two thirds, serious rehabilitation efforts are likely to be more cost-effective than lengthy and repeated stays in prison.

Putting all offenders behind bars, regardless of their crimes, is as senseless and expensive as putting a patient with a common cold in an intensive care unit. It is doubly foolish—bad for the offender and wasteful for the state. For about half of the current prison population—mostly nonviolent offenders, petty drug pushers, even some first-time violent offenders—supervised home detention would be preferable to prison, provided the average caseloads of parole officers were limited to 20 instead of the present 100. These detainees would receive some sentence. They would live under curfew and they would be unable to leave the county without permission. On weekends they would perform community service. When they got a job, some small part of their income would go to restitution. If they violated the terms of agreement, they would go to prison.

With a caseload of 20 convicts per parole officer, community-based punishment costs about $2,500 per year per detainee, one-eighth the cost of prison. The release of nonviolent offenders would also free up prison capacity for the most dangerous criminals, some of whom are now being let go to relieve overcrowding. But perhaps most important, a shoplifter or petty drug pusher has a better chance of starting life over in these circumstances than in prison. He is more likely to get a meaningful job, to keep his family together and off welfare, if he is at home than if he is in prison.

A certain amount of rehabilitation is possible within prisons as well. Prisoners could keep in better touch with their families—an essential part of rehabilitation—if prisons were built in the cities, where most inmates come from, instead of out-of-the-way rural areas. Of course, that means maximum security against prison escapes, but most prisons have that already. I am also a strong supporter of prison industries as a way of preventing idleness, giving inmates vocational skills and working habits, and enabling them to pay some restitution to their victims while making a little money for themselves as well as for the taxpayers. Unfortunately, most prison industry programs amount to little more than punishment detail for unruly inmates. By contrast, PRIDE gives jobs as rewards to those with good behavior, and fires the prison employees who aren't productive workers.

Confidence and Love

It's much easier to turn around a child than an adult, of course; a 16-year-old is much more open than his 25-year-old brother to education and training, to learning reading, writing, and arithmetic. The best facilities for juvenile offenders have recidivism rates of only 25 percent, while the best adult facilities are happy with 60 percent. It is therefore cost-effective for proportionally more resources to go into juvenile programs, hopefully to reach children before they get caught up in the criminal system.



Eckerd: It's hard to think of an American social program with a worse track record than our prisons.

At the Eckerd camps, we provide yearlong therapy in a wilderness environment for emotionally troubled youngsters. Many of these kids have been in trouble with the law; most will get trapped in the criminal justice system if they aren't reached quickly. They've been abused by stepparents, kicked out of school, told they were never going to be any good. When we get them, they're at the bottom in the way they feel about themselves. We try to get them to do things they never thought they were capable of: build their own tents, cut their own firewood, cook for each other, prepare menus within a budget, write articles about trips they take. We want to give them some sense of control over their lives, some problem-solving ability, some responsibility, some self-confidence.

For two-thirds of offenders, serious rehabilitation efforts are likely to be more cost-effective than lengthy and repeated stays in prison.

We also shower these kids with love, which probably does as much to give them a sense of values as anything we do. Our counselors have a tough job, but this kind of work attracts a peculiar breed of young men and women who want to do something for kids, who don't mind throwing their arms around a kid and telling him he did a great job. Often the kids have never been complimented before. The kids also learn to trust their counselors, which in turn leads

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Prison industries give convicts skills and enable them to pay some restitution to their victims.

to their own recognition that they have to be trustworthy themselves. This trust cannot be built on a shift basis; it requires round-the-clock continuity that cannot be achieved in public systems with eight-hour-a-day contracts.

The same 24-hour-a-day approach characterizes our work at the training school for juvenile offenders, where our goal is to develop vocational skills as well as independent living skills like cooking, or working with a budget, waking up in the morning. The philosophy of Ron Stepanik, director of the school, is to bombard the troubled teen-ager with a host of services—we raise his reading level, teach math by computers, give drug rehabilitation treatment, teach golf course landscaping and other vocational skills—and hope that maybe we'll hook him onto something other than a life of crime. The training school makes two promises to entering juveniles: that it will guarantee their safety, and that it will trust them until they betray that trust. We find both promises to have a strong effect in building the offenders' self-confidence.

The Importance of After-Care

At both the wilderness camps and the training school, we have found follow-up after-care to be almost as important as what happens within the facility itself. We have one counselor for every 10 kids who leave the training school; and the first month out, the counselor sees the child every day. Following up intensively for six months, the counselor is supposed to be a resource to the juvenile, to help him get a job he likes, help him get started in an environment less supportive than the training school.

One of the top priorities here is to make sure the teenagers and their parents talk with one another; since family breakdown is one of the major reasons the kids got involved in crime in the first place, improving family communications is one of the best ways to keep them out after their treatment. Our wilderness camps have a similar approach: Kids are sent home for short stays with their families every six weeks while in the camps, and after they leave, family case workers monitor the relationship between kids and their families for 18 months.

The adult criminal justice system should also focus proportionally more resources on parole and fewer on incarceration. By parole, I mean genuine follow-up attention, in which parole officers not only make sure the releasees stay away from crime, but also that they readjust to society. Companies can help by hiring ex-convicts, especially those who have shown their reliability in prison industries programs. At Eckerd drugstores, we found that ex-prisoners frequently made excellent employees; either they busted out within six months and were never heard from again, or they stayed a long time and did their jobs diligently.

Benefits of Privatization

I have long believed that 90 percent of the social services currently provided by government could be provided more effectively by the private sector. Private institutions have a flexibility public ones simply don't have; you can transfer funds easily from one program to another, and, if, for example, a building needs painting, you don't have to go to the legislature for approval. We helped get rid of drug-trafficking by guards at our training school by posting a $10,000 reward for any information leading to the conviction of someone selling drugs on school grounds; a public institution wouldn't have the flexibility to make that offer.

Privatization also enables social service institutions to take some risks they would never take in the cautious political atmosphere of public funding. Our training school, for instance, allows 40 to 50 felons to work unsupervised in the community outside its electric-wire fence; the program has turned out to be a tremendous success both for the community, which needs laborers, and for the kids, who need work experience. But we didn't know how well it would work when we started it, and there was a

One of the benefits of privatization at the training school was that we could get rid of staff members who physically abused kids.

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high down-side risk of escapes and crimes in the community. It would be hard to imagine a public institution embarking on such an experiment with a serious potential for failure.

Perhaps the greatest advantage is that private organizations can purge people and programs that don't work more easily than government can. At PRIDE we have closed prison industries that were not meeting market needs; this is consistent with our philosophy that prisoners should do meaningful work that will help them integrate better into society, but it is hard to imagine government closing a particular workplace. One of the benefits of privatization at the training school was that we could get rid of staff members who physically abused kids. When the school was state-run, civil service grievance procedures made it nearly impossible to fire anyone, and sometimes abusers of kids were reinstated with back pay. When we took over the school, we wanted to make sure that no staff member ever hit or slapped a student; privatization gave us the flexibility to enforce and dramatize this message by firing those who did.

Whether a criminal can be rehabilitated depends above all on his own character. What a convict most needs when he gets out of prison is an anchor to windward, a standard for right and wrong, a set of values that will give him stability through difficult times. He is more likely to find this stability through religion, or through some other kind of organization that teaches morals and ethics, such as Alcoholics Anonymous. The Prison Fellowship Ministries estimates that recidivism rates for those who have enjoyed a spiritual awakening decline from 70 percent to 5-7 percent. Only when we have more spiritual, more family-centered people will crime rates truly fall.

Whether a criminal can be rehabilitated depends above all on his own character.



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THE CONTRAS' VALLEY FORGE

How I View the Nicaragua Crisis

ENRIQUE BERMUDEZ

I watched the Sandinista revolution of 1979 from the sidelines in Washington, D.C., where I was President Anastasio Somoza's military attache. Though I was proud to be an officer with 27 years' service in the National Guard, I can't say I was sorry to see President Somoza step down. In fact, his departure was at least a year overdue. There was too much political favoritism and corruption within the Somoza dynasty, and I thought Nicaragua could do better.

But though I wanted Somoza to leave, my major concern in the late 1970s was that Somoza's departure might pave the way for a Communist victory, which neither the moderate opposition nor the United States were determined or strong enough to prevent. Many good people in Nicaragua were taken in by the Sandinista front, seemingly pluralistic with its many political factions. It was clear to me, though, that the leadership of the three main factions, the Prolonged War group, the *terceristas*, and the Proletarians, were all solidly in the Marxist-Leninist camp, aligned with Fidel Castro, and likely to turn toward totalitarianism when they achieved victory. Most of the Sandinista leaders were trained in Cuba or the Communist bloc and almost every published document of the Sandinista front throughout the 1960s and 1970s demonstrated its Marxist-Leninist inclinations.

By 1978, as Sandinista gangs were using intimidation tactics to confiscate arms and collect money in the countryside, I was convinced that Somoza's departure was inevitable, and the Communists were likely to steal the revolution. President Somoza simply did not have the resources to combat an insurgency liberally funded from Havana, and both his domestic and international support was dwindling quickly. In fact, many of the weapons sent to Somoza in his final year of power were sent with restrictions that they not be used domestically. As a result, thousands of M-16s were left idle as the Sandinistas rampaged through the country. When the depots in which these weapons were stored were overrun, the Sandinistas sent most of the weapons to the Communist insurgency in El Salvador.

Looking back on the Sandinista revolution, it is clear that the Carter administration holds an immense responsibility for the current predicament in Nicaragua. The zealotry demonstrated by the Carter administration and its ambassador to Nicaragua, Lawrence Pezzullo, in bringing down the Somoza government was never reapplied to ensuring that democracy prevailed after President Somoza fled the country. With Somoza out of the way, the Carter administration placed blind faith in a group of well-known Marxist-Leninists when other options were readily available.

Carter's Biggest Mistake

The biggest mistake the Carter administration made in Somoza's final days was allowing the Nicaraguan National Guard to fall apart. Though the National Guard was never a very large force (in 1979 there were only 7,000 members), it was a professional force not subject to Sandinista party control, and was thus the only force capable of ensuring that the Sandinistas abided by the promises of democracy and political pluralism they made to the Organization of American States (OAS). Instead, the Sandinistas created their own party-controlled militia and monopolized the force of arms. Had the National Guard stayed intact, the Sandinistas could never have achieved their totalitarian ambitions.

In 1950, I joined the National Guard as a 17-year-old just out of high school. The National Guard offered me opportunity to develop leadership and military skills, and to this day I am proud to have been a member. It was among the best opportunities a young Nicaraguan could hope for. However, some members of the National Guard were very close to President Somoza, and some used their position of influence to get special business privileges. During Somoza's last year, the National Guard also carried out indiscriminate bombings of urban areas under his orders. These bombings, which I strongly opposed, resulted in many civilian fatalities.

History has not recorded the Nicaraguan National Guard accurately, though. The National Guard that I knew was an institution composed of some of the best and the brightest Nicaragua had to offer. Episodes of corruption were generally individual, not institutional, abuses,

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and the National Guard served a benevolent role in Nicaragua as a police, traffic, and military force.

Approximately 10 days before the fall of Somoza, my concern about the potential demise of the National Guard, and the ramifications this would have, prompted me to fly to Managua, where I discussed the future of my country with many Nicaraguans and Ambassador Pezzullo. I found an overwhelming consensus among Nicaraguans—even those involved in the anti-Somoza campaign—that the National Guard should remain after President Somoza's departure to protect against Sandinista intimidation.

In Managua, I warned Ambassador Pezzullo that unless the Carter administration sent a signal that the United States wanted the National Guard to remain, most guardsmen would flee the country, giving the Sandinistas a blank check of power. Though Pezzullo and other U.S. officials promised to support the National Guard after Somoza's departure, this support never materialized. As a result, most of the National Guard fled Nicaragua following the Sandinista triumph, and the Sandinistas took total control of the nation's political and military apparatuses. Today, the Sandinista military, the EPS, is a party-loyal militia that has drafted more than 90,000 young Nicaraguans—many as young as 12 years old—into its ranks. This militia, which is used frequently to support the Sandinista party, remains the most significant obstacle to establishing democracy in Nicaragua. The demise of the National Guard and the transfer of military authority to the Sandinistas was the ultimate triumph of Communism in Nicaragua.

OAS Inaction

Neither the Inter-American Defense Board nor the OAS could enforce the Sandinistas to abide by the promises they made following the revolution. And neither of these bodies could prevent Cuba and the Soviet Union from exerting their influence in Nicaragua, even though both the OAS and the Inter-American Defense Board had issued declarations opposing such intervention. One of the main lessons I learned from my time in Washington was never to rely on multinational bodies to act in the interest of freedom and democracy. These organizations had many good things to say about nonintervention and political pluralism, but they never acted on their rhetoric when threats materialized. During the Sandinista revolution, for instance, it was well established that the Cubans were resupplying the anti-Somoza insurgents through Costa Rica, but the OAS never spoke against such external intervention in Nicaraguan affairs. Nor has the OAS nor the Inter-American Defense Board done anything since the revolution to prevent Soviet and Cuban involvement in the affairs of Nicaragua. The United States was—and is—the only hope for the majority of Nicaraguans who oppose Soviet and Cuban involvement in their country.

The 15 September Legion

Public sentiment toward the Somozas had fluctuated greatly over the decades they ruled Nicaragua. But in the final months of the Somoza dynasty, the president's popularity had plummeted. When the Sandinistas came to power in July 1979, there was enormous enthusiasm among Nicaraguans and the world community. This excitement, however, was mixed with concern and doubt about the country's future.

By the summer of 1980, many Nicaraguans were seriously worried. The governing junta was making frequent trips to Moscow and Havana, purging non-Marxists from the government, and beginning to clamp down on domestic opposition. An internal security apparatus unprecedented in our nation's history was being implemented with the advice and support of East Germany.

In 1979, when the word "Sandinista" was used to define those who opposed the Somoza dynasty and favored Nicaraguan independence and democracy, most Nicaraguans considered themselves Sandinistas. However, by 1980, when the government began redefining Sandinistas as Marxist-Leninists with "internationalist duties" to spread

Since Congress has cut off military assistance to our cause, the Sandinistas have been less sincere in their negotiations and have returned to their totalitarian ways.

Soviet and Cuban influence in our hemisphere, most Nicaraguans began to shy away from calling themselves Sandinistas. It was under these circumstances that I began to actively oppose the Sandinista dictators.

I was still living in the Washington, D.C., area at the time, but a group of exiled Nicaraguans in Miami were beginning to organize an opposition movement that would combine both military and political forces against the Communist government. Some friends of mine, including Carlos García, a president of Nicaragua's National Baseball Association who had been imprisoned in Nicaragua because of his relationship with me, asked if I would serve as coordinator of the group. I knew at the time that organizing an opposition movement would be extremely difficult because there was still a lot of sympathy with what the Sandinista revolution was supposed to have accomplished, but I also knew that recent Sandinista actions had confirmed my earlier suspicions that the Sandinistas were not interested in democratizing our nation. I decided that action had to be taken.

In August 1980, I moved to Miami to be closer to the Nicaraguan exile community. There I established contact with prominent opponents of the Sandinista regime including Jorge Salazar, a well known agricultural leader from Matagalpa province, and Jose Francisco Cardenal, the former president of the Chamber of Construction. We founded the Fifteenth of September Legion, an anti-Sandinista military and political group, which we named for the date of Central America's independence from Spain. By May our movement was taking hold, as many Nicaraguans were becoming disgruntled with the Sandinista government. Many were expressing their desire to pick up arms.

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"We are neither going to Miami, nor are we going to submit."

Even in the early days of our movement, there were different opinions within our ranks regarding political philosophy and strategy for combating the Sandinista tyranny. I insisted that our movement had to be a pluralistic one. In pursuit of this objective, I recruited Adolfo Calero, the Conservative Party secretary, and other political figures to participate in our battle against the Sandinistas.

Today, the Nicaraguan resistance is still a most diversified and flexible organization. I have learned to live with many individuals who have differing viewpoints on many issues. We share a common objective though—the liberation of our homeland from a totalitarian government and foreign powers.

Salazar's Murder

In November 1980, Jorge Salazar, whom I considered the Thomas Jefferson of our movement, was brutally gunned down by the Sandinistas at a gas station outside Managua. Though Salazar had not been involved in military actions against the Sandinistas, the Communist government had long been concerned about his immense popularity in the rural areas and they considered him a threat to their totalitarian power. Of all the brave Nicaraguans I have dealt with over the past nine years, I have met few individuals as dynamic and courageous as Jorge Salazar. When he spoke he gave Nicaraguans enthusiasm and power to embrace the cause of freedom. His killing brought many Nicaraguans into the anti-Sandinista movement and inspired those already in the movement, like myself, to intensify their efforts. Following Salazar's murder, Nicaraguans displayed posters with a picture of him and a quotation from a speech he gave in the presence of Daniel Ortega that began: "We are neither going to Miami, nor are we going to submit." To this day, I consider that a motto for our efforts.

In late 1980, after President Somoza was assassinated in Asunción, the Fifteenth of September Legion received support from the government of Argentina, which had become concerned about developments in Nicaragua when the Argentinian Communist insurgency, the Montoneros, began using Managua as their headquarters. Though it has become "conventional wisdom" that our movement was initially aided by the U.S. government, it was the Argentinians who supplied us with the support we needed to commence our military struggle against the Sandinistas. We did not begin receiving aid from the United States until 1982, and, in the entire history of our movement, we have received less than $110 million in military assistance from the United States. This figure compares with the $118 million the Congress sent the Sandinistas after the revolution.

In August 1981, in conjunction with two Nicaraguan exiles, Raul Arana and Orlando Bolanos, we transformed the Fifteenth of September Legion into the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), and our organization, which had been involved in limited, and occasionally disorganized, combat in Nicaragua, made a concerted effort to present a political front in the United States. We organized political commissions in Miami, Washington, Los Angeles, and other American cities. We also began organizing and training our forces in guerrilla warfare in preparation for our first major offensive inside Nicaragua.

Campesino Fighters

On March 14, 1982, the Nicaraguan resistance fired its equivalent of the American minutemen's "shot heard around the world." Our attacks in Nueva Segovia were largely successful, destroying bridges over both the Negro and Coco rivers, and served as an official declaration of war against a government that was increasingly recognized as illegitimate and brutal. The Sandinistas immediately issued a state of emergency, demonstrating to many Nicaraguans that they were not invulnerable. After this attack, Nicaraguans and the world community began to take seriously our movement, and we gained a new name from the Communist government—*Contras.*

Since 1982 our movement has been revolutionary, not counterrevolutionary, in nature. Our forces are composed mostly of *campesinos* who picked up arms after experiencing extensive religious, economic, and political persecution at the hands of an illegitimate, repressive government. The reasons we are fighting are not unlike some of the reasons why the American minutemen picked up arms against the British, though the persecution we have faced in Nicaragua

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"One is hard pressed to find a Nicaraguan anywhere in the countryside who supports the Sandinista dictatorship."

is far worse than anything that existed in the American colonies in the 1770s. For instance, many Nicaraguans who have been imprisoned for their political or religious beliefs have remarked that the prison conditions are even worse than those Armando Valladares has described in Cuba. Over 400,000 Nicaraguans have fled the Sandinista tyranny.

Our fighters believe in freedom, and, in almost every case, they have concluded that military confrontation was the only recourse left. They represent the very best of the Nicaraguan people. They are religious, and have a good system of values. They care greatly about their country, and are respectful toward the people of our land. They are fighting because the Sandinista regime, a totalitarian regime, has forced them to fight.

It is ironic that our forces are composed primarily of the people that were supposed to have benefited most from the revolution. However, the life of the typical Nicaraguan *campesino* is far worse today than under Somoza. Under the Sandinistas, many *campesinos* have been forced into cooperatives, and they must hand their produce to the state in exchange for ration coupons worth far less than the market value. In thousands of cases, property has been confiscated from small land owners. But most important, the *campesino* faces a totalitarian climate that restricts almost all individual initiative and persecutes him for his religious values. He is always within reach of the Sandinistas' ultimate enforcement tool, the local block commanders, who serve as gestapo-like thought police. As a result, the *campesinos* despise the Sandinista government, and thousands have joined our cause.

American Unreliability

As Soviet military support to the Sandinista government increased dramatically in the early 1980s—today it stands at over $1 billion a year—it became clear to me that our movement would need the support of the United States if we hoped to achieve victory. Though we were receiving support from private individuals who cared about the cause of freedom in Nicaragua, and from the government of Argentina, it was not enough to carry out a war against the Sandinista militia—the largest in the history of Central America—with its liberal support from Moscow and Havana.

I have often wished we did not have to rely on Washington for our support. I have a lot of respect for the United States, but it has fumbled its role as a reliable ally of freedom. Had the United States consistently supported our movement since the beginning, I have little doubt that Nicaragua would be free today.

Our forces love the democratic system of the United States, and seek to emulate it when they eventually achieve victory over the Sandinistas. However, for the past few decades all of Latin America has watched the United States

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"During Somoza's last year, the National Guard carried out indiscriminate bombings of urban areas under Somoza's orders. These bombings, which I strongly opposed, resulted in many civilian fatalities."

turn its back on its immense obligation to ensure that free people remain free, and that those fighting to be free achieve victory. Only the United States can fulfill such an immense responsibility, and when it does not assert itself, the Soviets and their client states do.

Our forces are well acquainted with the Bay of Pigs, for instance, where President Kennedy betrayed the promises his administration had made to provide American air cover to the Cuban freedom fighters. As a result of Kennedy's betrayal, thousands of Cuban patriots died defenseless in the Cuban swamps fighting Castro's artillery with almost nothing but guts and determination. Histories of the Bay of Pigs now reveal that President Kennedy was golfing as the Brigade 2506 was being annihilated at the hands of the Soviet-supported Cuban militia. The Cubans, Angolans, and we Nicaraguans are still paying a heavy price for that betrayal.

We have all seen the U.S. track record thus far on Nicaragua, where the Soviet Union has come half-way around the world to outspend the United States 30-to-1 in military assistance. Those are enormous odds to beat, and I am consistently puzzled at why the United States allows this situation to exist in its hemisphere. Even following Ronald Reagan's landslide victory in 1984 and the powerful testimony of Colonel North, the White House did not launch an aggressive campaign of the magnitude necessary to ensure that the truth about Nicaragua was heard in the Congress. With consistent support from the United States, the Soviets and Cubans could be sent packing from the North American mainland, and freedom could be restored to Nicaragua. Without that assistance, Central American democracy will be facing its final days, and the United States will very soon be looking at the greatest national security threat in its history.

U.S. Micromanagement

Apart from its unreliability, one of the other major problems in dealing with the United States has been the extensive control it has sought to exert over our efforts. This has been no way to run a war. Though many of the security personnel I have dealt with from the United States have had significant military experience in Korea or Vietnam, the battle we are engaged in inside Nicaragua is extremely different from those conflicts. Furthermore, many of these advisors have not been very receptive to our needs and requests. As a commander, I have seldom been allowed to make a military decision I consider in the best interests of our forces.

One example of such control might seem trivial, but it demonstrates a much larger problem. When our forces are inside Nicaragua, we almost never resupply them with food except in emergencies. Such resupply efforts are too dangerous and expensive. Consequently, we have found that one of the best ways to feed our forces is to give them cattle they can bring with them inside Nicaragua. They kill the cattle, cut the meat, and can feed more than 100 fighters at a time. When I told an administrative representative from the United States that we would need money to buy these cattle, he was shocked. "What," he said, "you need live cattle for a guerrilla force during a march?" "Yes," I told him, "we do that."

Such control over our operations has been most damaging when Washington bureaucrats have actually attempted to choose our leadership. Our movement's leaders would

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naturally emerge if given the opportunity, as they did, for instance, in the field, where many of our commanders demonstrated skill and bravery, and were subsequently promoted to leadership positions. There was no reason to believe this would not also have been the case with our directorate.

The U.S. government, however, wishing to market our cause in Washington and to exert influence over our organization, recruited individuals with limited, often zero, experience in our movement for positions with overwhelming levels of responsibility. Edgar Chamorro was chosen because of what his family name meant inside Nicaragua; Alfonso Robelo was chosen largely because of his past association with the Sandinistas; and Arturo Cruz was chosen because of his name recognition in Washington. In fact, the entire leadership of the United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO), with few exceptions, was chosen by the United States.

When many of these Washington-appointed individuals realized that running a war was a 24-hour, seven day-a-week commitment, they left our movement, causing us negative publicity, damaging the morale of our forces, and leaving leadership gaps in our directorate. These individuals were all genuinely opposed to the Sandinista dictatorship, but none of them were prepared to engage in the day-to-day process of a war against a foreign-supported enemy. Each left after short periods of service for lucrative private sector positions, long forgetting the cause of a free Nicaragua in the process.

Piricuacos on the Run

In 1986, the Congress appropriated $100 million to our cause, and our forces reached the pinnacle of their fighting capability. Though we were still substantially outgunned by the Soviet-supported *piricuacos* (a term we use to describe the Sandinistas, meaning "rabid dogs"), the determination of our forces, combined with the immense support we received from the Nicaraguan people, turned the war in our favor. Within months, our forces overran Sandinista military bases and destroyed many military-related government facilities. In 1987, we carried out more than one resupply operation a day to our forces. In the first six months of 1987 alone, we engaged the Sandinistas in combat 1,360 times, destroying 55 military posts and temporary bases of the Sandinista army, 15 bridges, and 83 military trucks, and shooting down five Soviet helicopters.

One of our biggest victories occurred on October 15, 1987, when we launched an offensive along Rama Road. We coordinated the Jorge Salazar No. 1 and Jorge Salazar No. 3 brigades in the attack and destroyed several Sandinista garrisons. We also attacked the towns of San Tomas and San Pedro in Sontales, blew up the Muelle Bridge, and shot down a Soviet attack helicopter.

In December 1987, we carried out another immensely successful assault at the gold mines of Zelaya in central Nicaragua. During this offensive, we overran several military installations, captured approximately 27 SA-7s, and destroyed several trucks, bridges, and helicopters.

Our success on the battlefield, combined with the Sandinistas' deteriorating domestic support, placed the government in an extremely vulnerable position. I have little



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"Our fighters believe in freedom, and, in almost every case, they have concluded that military confrontation was the only recourse left."

doubt that this is what forced them to the negotiating table for the first time in the history of our movement. Since the beginning, we have stated that we would sit down with the Sandinistas to negotiate the freedom of Nicaragua in exchange for a cease-fire once those freedoms were implemented, but until 1987 the Sandinistas never took our proposal very seriously.

It is unfortunate that the U.S. Congress could not understand that the assistance given our forces in 1986 prompted the Sandinistas to begin discussing democratization, and that further assistance might have brought substantial developments. Since Congress has cut off military assistance to our cause, the Sandinistas have been less sincere in their negotiations and have returned to their totalitarian ways.

It is also unfortunate that many members of Congress have not fully understood the nature of our conflict. Many congressmen claimed that we were not succeeding because we could not hold land inside Nicaragua or because we were so reliant on outside funding. Our strategy has never been to hold land. With the Sandinistas possessing Soviet Mi-24 assault helicopters, such an effort would be disastrous for a guerrilla army. Furthermore, our forces are extremely reliant on outside assistance because it is almost impossible to buy the supplies we need inside Nicaragua. The government controls all supplies, so boots, uniforms, food, and medicine must be acquired outside the country.

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This is very different from the favorable circumstances under which the Salvadoran Communist insurgency operates. In El Salvador, such supplies are not only readily available throughout the country, but the insurgency can usually obtain volume discounts when it purchases mass quantities.

Reagan-Wright Si, Arias-Wright No

In 1987, when Ronald Reagan and Jim Wright announced the Reagan-Wright plan for Nicaragua, I was extremely pleased. The plan put the necessary pressure on the Sandinistas to begin the process of democratization. It spelled out very clearly what the Sandinistas had to do—mainly abide by the promises they made to the OAS in 1979—and described in no uncertain terms what would happen if they did not comply with the democratization provisions of the agreement. The Reagan-Wright plan scared the Sandinistas, whose objective has always been to disarm our movement in exchange for promises they could later break. But the Sandinistas could never accept an agreement like the Reagan-Wright plan, which required them first to dismantle their illegitimate, totalitarian system, and they consequently responded with a plan that was more to their liking.

We will never put down our weapons until Nicaragua is free.

Days after the Reagan-Wright plan, following high-level discussions between the Sandinistas, Central American presidents, and various members of Congress, Speaker Wright withdrew his support for the plan, and threw his endorsement behind a new plan introduced by Oscar Arias, president of Costa Rica. Allowing the Reagan-Wright plan to fall apart, I believe, was one of the greatest diplomatic mistakes the United States has made in Nicaragua since 1979. The Arias plan was much less forceful than the Reagan-Wright plan, and placed as much pressure on Washington and Tegucigalpa as it did on Managua. Essentially, it asked for our immediate surrender in exchange for promises of future democratization of Nicaragua. The plan drew widespread approval in Washington and around the world because it was billed as a multinational solution to the problems of Central America. But it was based on seriously flawed logic: that the Sandinistas, having achieved their objective of disarming and defunding our movement, would then turn around and pursue democratization in Nicaragua.

Today, I have no reason to believe that the Sandinistas will ever negotiate and then abide by an agreement that will bring peace and freedom to our country. However, I am convinced the Sandinistas acknowledge the important role negotiations can play in consolidating their power, and in destroying the lives of the thousands of Nicaraguans who have picked up weapons against them. The Congress has allowed us no other option but to play this dangerous game with the Sandinistas, but I have vowed that we will never put down our weapons until Nicaragua is free. We might negotiate further short-term cease-fires and may make other concessions, but we will not disarm ourselves in exchange for promises. The Sandinista track record simply does not allow us to take such an action based entirely on trust. To disarm ourselves now, with Nicaragua more totalitarian than ever, would betray the many Nicaraguans who have already fought and died for a free Nicaragua.

As I suspected, the Arias plan of 1987 was never implemented by the Sandinistas. In January of this year after Sandinista noncompliance was clear, the plan was declared dead by the Central American presidents. This year brought direct negotiations in both Sapoa and Managua between our forces and representatives of the governing Sandinista junta. Unlike 1987, however, the Congress has now placed us in an extremely vulnerable position, causing us to accept a cease-fire. The Sandinistas have used the cease-fire to rebuild their military infrastructure while launching an unprecedented propaganda campaign to break the morale of our forces. Since Congress has terminated aid to us, the Sandinistas have become very aggressive and cocky, as was recently demonstrated when the Sandinistas fired Archbishop Obando y Bravo as mediator when the talks were not going as they wanted. They have clamped down on the domestic opposition, curbed press freedoms, and tortured political and religious prisoners.

And meanwhile, as the United States smiles, thinking—as Jim Wright likes to say—that it is "giving peace a chance," the Sandinistas are receiving unprecedented levels of Soviet military assistance that is enabling them to consolidate their reign over the Nicaraguan people and to begin their plans for domination over Central America. The Sandinistas have played the United States for a fool. Without doubt, Nicaragua's freedom movement is today in the most dangerous position since its founding, and the United States—part-time ally of freedom—can take most of the blame. As a result of Washington's appeasement, the Nicaraguan people are forced to live under a totalitarian regime that Jim Wright and his liberal congressional colleagues would not tolerate for five minutes if it were inflicted on them.

Yet, despite the current predicament, I am convinced that our movement is far from finished. The majority of the Nicaraguan people support our cause. When we go through the rural areas, the people tell us to carry on. One is hard pressed to find a Nicaraguan anywhere in the countryside who supports the Sandinista dictatorship, and many are hoping that the United States will take decisive military action against the government. When members of our directorate were in Managua recently, they were approached by some mothers of political prisoners who said: "Please don't surrender your weapons. Never do that, because if you do that, we are lost."

Our forces are not going to surrender. Today, we are three times the size of the so-called people's army that toppled Anastasio Somoza in 1979. We represent the largest armed insurrection in Latin America since the Mexican Revolution. We are facing seemingly insurmountable odds, but the lessons of David are not lost on us, and the determination demonstrated by men like Jorge Salazar is increasingly manifest in the people of Nicaragua. ☎

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

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LITTLE POLICY SHOP OF HORRORS

Jesse Jackson's Brain Trust

SCOTT STEVEN POWELL

National security would take on an entirely new meaning in any administration where the Reverend Jesse Jackson played an important role. For Jackson would bring to the federal government more than his charisma, his political acumen, and his inspirational rhetorical skills. He would also bring his close ties to a radical-left think tank, the Institute for Policy Studies, which is committed to socialism in America and sides with the Soviet Union on almost every important foreign policy issue.

IPS director Robert Borosage stated in 1983 that one of the principal missions of the institute was to "move the Democratic Party's debate internally to the left by creating an invisible presence in the party." In recent years that invisible presence has become ever more visible. The impact of IPS on the Democratic Party reveals the extent to which contemporary liberalism is in crisis, unable to differentiate its friends from its enemies.

Already IPS has made important inroads in local and state governments. Lee Webb, a former SDS national chairman, founded the Conference on Alternative State and Local Policies (CASLP) at IPS to create model left-wing legislative proposals and bills to be promoted on the state and local level. Spun off from IPS, CASLP has continued to work within the Democratic Party and has provided much of the groundwork—issues, interest groups, and linkages—for Jackson's Rainbow Coalition.

On the national level IPS was instrumental in forming the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy and the Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus, which now has a membership of 144 congressmen and 41 senators. Representatives Ed Markey (D-MA), Don Edwards (D-CA), and Ted Weiss (D-NY) have sent "Dear Colleague" letters inviting their fellow congressmen and their staffs to attend IPS seminars and classes. Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) has endorsed and promoted the latest IPS publication, *In Contempt of Congress*. Today, many liberal congressmen express sympathies characteristic of the political posture of IPS: They "blame America first" for problems in other countries, see few significant moral differences between the U.S. and the USSR, oppose defense modernization, have more faith in arms control than deterrence irrespective of Soviet behavior, express more concern about the redistribution than the production of wealth, and embrace special interest groups that are openly hostile to traditional values.

Cosmetic Socialism

Now, with the possibility that Jesse Jackson will have a major influence on the policies and appointments of a Dukakis presidency, there is a danger that IPS will become institutionalized in the federal government. Roger Wilkins, an IPS senior fellow, wrote Jackson's speech announcing his candidacy in 1984, and IPS director Robert Borosage has been Jackson's senior foreign policy advisor in both the 1984 and 1988 campaigns. Sidney Blumenthal of the *Washington Post* describes IPS as Jackson's "brain trust."

IPS was founded in 1963 by Richard Barnet and Marcus Raskin, two members of the Kennedy administration who had become disillusioned with traditional anti-Communist liberalism. The seed money primarily came from the Stern Family Fund and the Samuel Rubin Foundation. Samuel Rubin, a member of the Communist Party, made his fortune in the cosmetic business of Faberge, Inc., which he founded in 1936, and sold for some $25 million in 1963. The Rubin Foundation has provided the bulk of the institute's budget, which is currently reported to be about $2.3 million annually.

Unlike traditional socialists, IPS does not advocate nationalization of all industries. Its domestic agenda calls for public ownership or vastly expanded control over major corporations; restrictions on private capital and government allocation of credit; wage and price controls to contain inflation; economic planning; and extensive redistribution of wealth. On foreign policy, IPS has consistently opposed strong U.S. defense policies, while supporting and assisting adversaries of the United States—from Hanoi and the PLO to Latin American Marxist regimes and guerrilla movements. IPS would cripple our intelligence agencies by limiting their work to technical means of collection, would withdraw America's commitment to allies in Europe and Asia, and would shelve all new weapon systems.

SCOTT STEVEN POWELL, *a political analyst at the National Forum Foundation, is the author of* Covert Cadre: Inside the Institute for Policy Studies, *published this year by Green Hill Publishers.*

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Gramsci's Long March

The inspiration and direction for IPS largely comes from Antonio Gramsci, an Italian Communist theoretician who stood Marx on his head, arguing that the cultural superstructure determines the political and economic base. Like Gramsci, IPS recognizes the imperative of "the long march through the institutions"—the media, the universities, public interest, religious, and cultural institutions. By working through such institutions, cultural values can be changed and morals softened, setting the stage for political and economic power to fall into the hands of the radical Left.

IPS publications, films, and works address issues of humanistic appeal, but frame those issues with creative semantics that bias the perception of reality. The fact that IPS is regularly referred to as a "liberal" organization indicates that either IPS has successfully masked its radical character in the eyes of traditional liberals, or that the meaning of liberalism has radically changed. In either case, the institute's efforts have sown seeds of doubt, confusion, and guilt among constituencies that identify with liberalism. And by focusing blame on the full range of American institutions, IPS perspectives weaken faith in the system while at the same time promoting a subliminal means for inducing behavior modification.

Onyx

IPS director Robert Borosage is Jackson's senior foreign policy adviser.

Masters of Propaganda

IPS is not interested in producing studies that collect dust on shelves; all its works are directed at fostering political activism. Each fear (*e.g.*, nuclear war, hazardous waste), each discontent (*e.g.*, pollution, unequal income distribution), and each complaint (*e.g.*, minority discrimination, homelessness) is represented as merely one aspect of a general rejection of the entire society. Harold Lasswell's thesis in *World Politics and Personal Insecurity* that the breakdown of political authority in the Third World often resulted from revolutionary propaganda seems equally applicable to the decline of authority in the United States. His statement that "revolutionary propaganda selects symbols which are calculated to detach the affection of the masses from the existing symbols of authority and to attach affections to challenging symbols and to direct hostilities toward existing symbols of authority" accurately describes much of IPS's work. IPS senior fellow Saul Landau said he was dedicated to narrow pursuits, "namely making propaganda for American socialism."

IPS has cultivated good relations with the mainstream media over the years. The *Boston Globe*'s chief defense reporter, Fred Kaplan, wrote *Dubious Specter*, a 1980 IPS book that takes a skeptical look at the Soviet military buildup. IPS senior fellow Roger Wilkins was previously an editorial board member of both the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times*. The *Washington Post* refers to IPS as "the first respectable offspring of the New Left." *Washington Post* staff writer Sidney Blumenthal actually began his journalistic career as the Boston correspondent for an "independent socialist newspaper," then published by IPS, *In These Times*. Other *Washington Post* reporters who have taught at the IPS Washington School include Karen DeYoung, Robert Kaiser, Joanne Omang, Les Whitten, Pat Tyler, Dusko Doder, and Peter Osnos. Seymour Hersh, a frequent contributor to the *New York Times*, regularly participates in IPS programs. Leslie Gelb, *New York Times* national security correspondent, described the institute as "one of three preeminent centers for foreign policy perspectives." In 1985, Gelb published on the front page of the *New York Times* classified Department of Defense information on nuclear war contingency plans that he had obtained from IPS fellow William Arkin. National Public Radio often airs IPS fellows' commentaries; John Dinges, a former IPS associate fellow, is now foreign affairs editor at NPR.

The key to success in political propaganda is to lend legitimacy and importance to particular themes by having them repeated over and over again by different sources, which the media then pick up. IPS public policy positions are reinforced by ostensibly separate organizations, many of which are actually spinoffs of other groups in its network of affiliates. In addition to its good relations with NPR, the *Washington Post*, and the *New York Times*, IPS has created media outlets of its own, such as *Mother Jones; Working Papers;* Pacific News Service, now carried by over 200 newspapers; the Fund for Investigative Journalism; and the Center for Investigative Reporting, which has supplied segments to ABC's "20/20" and CBS's "60 Minutes."

Crippling the FBI and the CIA

From the inception of IPS, cofounders Richard Barnet and Marcus Raskin have repeatedly stated that their institute's primary goal is to "dismantle the national security state." Recent scandals such as the FBI's investigation of the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES) and the Christic Institute's "Contragate" lawsuit illustrate how groups, seemingly unrelated, work together to achieve this goal.

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The Christic Institute was founded in 1980 with seed money from the Rubin Foundation and the Fund for Tomorrow, the Bydale Foundation, and the Youth Project, among others. The Bydale Foundation typically gives its largest annual grant to IPS, and the Youth Project was for many years housed in the IPS headquarters building. The Christic Institute's leader, Daniel Sheehan, previously cooperated with IPS's Government Accountability Project in the lawsuit against the General Public Utilities Corporation in the name of "the People of Three Mile Island." In spring 1986, at about the time Christic Institute's research director, Andy Lang, was participating in a class at IPS on strategies to counter the anti-Communist American Right, Sheehan was filing a lawsuit in Miami against the Contras' private support network—an alleged "secret team" of retired generals John Singlaub and Richard Secord, Robert Owen, Albert Hakim, Aldolfo Calero, and 24 others. The charges—which include "patterns of racketeering activity," including "acts or threats of murder, kidnaping, bribery, and the felonious manufacture, importation, selling, and otherwise dealing in cocaine and proscribed drugs"—are as yet unproven.

There is no party line at IPS. Yet everyone there shares the view that America is the enemy of progress and that Soviet expansionism should not be resisted.

Despite the dearth of evidence, Senator John Kerry latched on to the Christic conspiracy/drug trafficking story as a hot political issue for his public posturing as head of the Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations. At the time, Gareth Porter, a former IPS fellow, was an aide to Kerry. The previous year IPS staffer Peter Kornbluh arranged the senator's celebrated meetings with the Sandinista officials on the eve of a Contra aid vote. Former IPS staffers Jody McClees and Daniel Siegel now work full-time at Christic, the latter serving as director of public education.

In all likelihood, the case will be dropped or the defendants acquitted because of the lack of witnesses and substantial evidence. Nevertheless, for IPS and Christic the lawsuit has immense propaganda value even if they do not prevail in the courtroom. PBS has devoted two one-hour *Frontline* investigative news documentaries to the Christic charges. The primary purpose of the ordeal—to generate publicity against the CIA and the Contras, to diminish congressional support for the covert operations as a tool of foreign policy and to discourage further private sector support for anti-Communism—has been largely achieved.

IPS has been involved with CISPES from the beginning. In 1980, according to State Department documents recovered from a guerrilla safe house in El Salvador, senior fellow Isabel Letelier hosted El Salvadoran Communist Party functionary Farid Handal at IPS at the time he was networking to form CISPES, a U.S. solidarity group for Communist guerrillas in El Salvador. IPS has continued to work with CISPES ever since. Today CISPES is America's largest support group for the Salvadoran guerrillas, and has some 550 nationwide chapters, many on U.S. college campuses.

The scandal over FBI misconduct broke in February 1988 when the Rubin Foundation-backed Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) called a press conference, and charged the FBI with violating the civil liberties of CISPES volunteers, who were allegedly doing nothing more than exercising their right of political expression. The purpose of the investigation according to FBI director William Sessions was to "ascertain if they [CISPES] were involved in the illegal support of the FMLN [El Salvador's Marxist-Leninist insurgency] through such criminal violations of the Foreign Agents Registration Act, Neutrality Act, Arms Export Control Act, Immigration Laws, and Seditious Conspiracy."

The ensuing media coverage, highly critical of the FBI, offered little or no analysis of the close relationship of CISPES and the Marxist FMLN, and no mention of CCR's long history of legal work on behalf of Communist causes. The *New York Times* editorial used the occasion to recommend a legislative charter for the FBI, the long-time goal of an IPS spinoff, the Center for National Security Studies (CNSS), which has a charter waiting in the wings. CNSS began as a project within IPS in 1974 and was spun off under the direction of Robert Borosage, who would return to IPS four years later as its new director. CNSS has long sought to go beyond existing Justice Department intelligence guidelines and establish a legal charter banning intelligence gathering on domestic organizations irrespective of their ties with foreign powers.

Defending Baader-Meinhof

Sharing an office with the ACLU in Stewart Mott's penthouse at 122 Maryland Avenue, Washington, D.C., CNSS lobbied against the Intelligence Agents Identities Protection Act, bipartisan legislation designed to protect the covers of intelligence agents and operations. In 1977, Morton Halperin, then assistant director of CNSS, went to London to help the defense of CIA defector Philip Agee when he was being deported from Great Britain as a security risk for collaborating with Cuban and Soviet intelligence. Recently, Christic Institute senior investigator David MacMichael announced that he was joining forces with Philip Agee, to form yet another group, the Center for the Study of Covert Action, "to expose covert operations and encourage public debate." Agee explains just what kinds of covert operations concern him: "The CIA is plainly on the wrong side, that is, the capitalistic side. I approve KGB activities, Communist activities in general, when they are to the advantage of the oppressed."

IPS senior board member Peter Weiss, also a vice president of CCR, has given legal counsel to those pressing suit against the CIA, the president, and the attorney general for U.S. policies in Central America. In April 1987, at IPS he presented a paper, "Legal Breach for Impeachment," argu-

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ing for the ouster of President Reagan. A decade earlier Weiss and the CCR petitioned the West German government to help defend the Baader-Meinhof Gang on trial for bombing, murder, and kidnaping. CCR is providing legal defense for Victor Manuel Gerena, a member of the terrorist Puerto Rican Popular Army, who in 1983 robbed Wells Fargo in Hartford, Connecticut, of $7 million. More recently CCR has been involved in defending Clayton Lonetree, a Marine guard responsible for a security crisis at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow involving a series of unauthorized visits with a KGB Mata Hari.

IPS cofounder Richard Barnet collaborated with the Communist government in Hanoi in 1969, discussing strategy for the antiwar movement back in the United States. Being "absolutely certain that [his] speech would be used, be broadcast," Barnet told the North Vietnamese that they were fighting "against the same aggressors that we will continue to fight in our country." After the war, when Joan Baez and Susan Sontag expressed dismay at Vietnamese Communist repression and escalating numbers of boat people, Barnet joined with Rubin Foundation director Cora Weiss in signing a *New York Times* advertisement stating: "The present government of Vietnam should be hailed for its moderation and for its extraordinary efforts to achieve reconciliation among all its people."

IPS senior fellow Saul Landau went to Cuba in 1969 on the first Venceremos Brigade, ostensibly to help harvest sugar cane. However, according to a 1982 report issued by the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, the Venceremos Brigade was formed by the Castro regime to recruit Americans for intelligence purposes. Years later after joining IPS, Landau would make documentary films lionizing Fidel Castro and other films castigating the CIA and FBI. In 1983, Landau produced a film attacking the Contras that incorporated film footage supplied by Lenin Cerna, the head of Sandinista secret police.

IPS and the East Bloc

There is no party line at IPS. Yet everyone there shares the view that America is the enemy of progress and that Soviet expansionism should not be resisted. Although sometimes critical of the internal policies of the Soviet Union, IPS fellows often provide elaborate apologies for Soviet external behavior.

With regard to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, where there is unequivocal bipartisan congressional support for the mujahideen freedom fighters, no one from IPS has expressed any support of the U.S. position. In 1980, Richard Barnet justified the invasion of Afghanistan arguing that the Soviet Union sensed "its own security slipping away." IPS fellow Eqbal Ahmad said that the Soviets invaded because "the U.S. had been unfaithful to detente," and had left the Soviets "defenseless" and in a "nightmare." In an April 1988 article in the *New Yorker,* Barnet and Ahmad wrote, "Eight years later, however, it seems clear that the Soviet goals in Afghanistan have always been limited." Those limited policies included the payment of $10,000 bounty for Western journalists captured inside Afghanistan, while inviting IPS fellow Fred Halliday to Kabul to report on the war.

The physical appearance of IPS, located off Dupont

Scott Steven Powell

Alger Hiss speaks at IPS March 23, 1984.

Circle in Washington, D.C., is disarming. For years its dilapidated and peculiar-looking exterior with portholes for windows has been complemented by a shabby interior reminiscent of Third World chaos and inefficiency. As one frequent IPS attendee, Soviet third secretary Vladimir Strokin put it: "You'll generally find those fellows over at IPS wandering around in sneakers and blue jeans, except when they have to make public appearances."

Orlando Letelier, who directed the international operations of IPS prior to his murder in 1976, described his work in a letter to Beatriz Allende, daughter of the late Chilean president. "The object," he told Ms. Allende, was "to mobilize the 'liberals' and other people who, even if they don't identify with us from an ideological view, are with us at least in matters relating to human rights." Later, it was found that Letelier had been receiving payments from Ms. Allende in Cuba, who was herself married to Luis Fernandez Ona, the number two man in the Cuban DGI intelligence service. The media showed little interest in the story although Saul Landau said he cleaned out Letelier's files at IPS, "to ensure that material that could compromise the Chilean resistance inside Chile or in exile [in East Germany] would not fall into the hands of the FBI." Nor was there any media coverage of IPS's multimillion-dollar fund-raising campaign for the Sandinistas conducted in Europe during the 1980s. This is quite a contrast to Oliver North's fund-raising and paper shredding, which got wide media exposure and precipitated lawsuits and criminal indictments.

On another occasion Letelier wrote Ms. Allende in

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Scott Steven Powell

Stewart Mott, flanked by Sen. Alan Cranston and Rep. Edward Markey, presides at a "Monday Group" meeting.

Cuba about Chilean socialist solidarity work at IPS: "I think that given the nature of its 'sponsors' and of the front which this Committee is serving in the United States, it is preferable that information on it not be broadcast from Havana, because you know how these 'liberals' are—it is possible that some of our congressional patrons might be afraid of being linked with Cuba."

From 1982 to 1986, IPS engaged in a series of conferences with Communist Party officials from the Soviet Union with the purpose of making arms control agreements more likely. IPS director Borosage explained the worth of the "alternative arms control dialogue" to an IPS gathering in 1984:

> It's clear that one official benefit [the Soviets] see in these exchanges is to at least get the message to American liberals . . . that they [the Soviets] have all these good lines on traditional arms control. . . . The Reagan administration dominates the way Americans think about arms control. So clearly, they [the Soviets] have a very large stake in having people [IPS] who are important in reminding others of all the important things to do, so that we can come back and repeat that.

The heroes of Jesse Jackson's brain trust are not Washington, Madison, Jefferson, Lincoln, or King, but rather those who used popular fronts to seize power and rule by force.

Jackson's Political Machinery

Borosage has called for the appointment of the nuclear freeze activist Randall Forsberg as head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and IPS trustee Paul Warnke as Secretary of State. A year ago Borosage met with Alejandro Bendana, general secretary of the Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry, in the congenial atmosphere of the Intercontinental Hotel's lounge in Managua. Borosage was seen discussing a file of news clips from the American media, apparently to coach Bendana and his comrades on how to pursue favorable coverage from the American media and how to avoid alienating the U.S. Congress.

Jeff Faux, president of the Economic Policy Institute, a subsidiary of IPS, calls for central planning in the energy, food, housing, and health programs in *Rebuilding America,* the book Jackson calls "the economic handbook for the Rainbow Coalition." Derek Shearer, an associate fellow of IPS who offers Jackson his services, expresses his vision of a just political economy: "Government and political participation would have different meanings than they do now. First, the separation between economy and politics would no longer exist, even in theory." "Socialism has a bad name in America, and no amount of wishful thinking on the part of the Left is going to change that in our lifetimes," Shearer admits. "Thus, the words economic democracy are an adequate and effective replacement."

Raskin's advice to Jackson might be a little more frank. He writes in the introduction to *Being and Doing,* which is hailed by IPS as "the philosophy that has most strongly shaped the Institute for Policy Studies": "Such positive social philosophies as Marxism are beginning to have a larger following in an underground way. We are all Marxists—either by using that analysis or playing out, as actors, the tragic role Marx foresaw."

To see Jackson in action with his mesmerizing appeals to the masses—playing on the substantive and latent discontent of various groups who sincerely yearn for a moral agenda, a program of change, and a more just future—one cannot help but remember that this is also the stuff of Third World dictators shouting in the plazas flanked by now-familiar painted-poster backdrops of Marx, Lenin, Sandino, Guevara, and Castro. Let there be no mistake: The heroes of Jackson's brain trust are not Washington, Madison, Jefferson, Lincoln, or King, but rather those who used popular fronts to seize power and rule by force. ☎

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A New Deal for America's Poor

Abolish Welfare, Guarantee Jobs

Kevin R. Hopkins

The modern American welfare state was intended to make poor people more self-sufficient and less dependent on government help. "We want to offer the forgotten fifth of our population opportunity and not doles," President Johnson proclaimed when inaugurating the Great Society. "The days of the dole are numbered." Unfortunately, President Johnson was wrong. As Charles Murray and others have noted, the poverty rate and welfare caseload are higher today than they were at the end of the 1960s, when the Great Society programs were just reaching full swing.

Indeed, the once temporary phenomenon of welfare dependency now has become a more or less permanent way of life for a large share of America's poor. Today, nearly three-fourths of all unmarried women who first join welfare rolls below age 25 spend at least five years on the rolls, with an *average* total stay of more than nine years. Their difficulty of escaping the welfare rolls highlights the fact that nothing either conservatives or liberals have tried over the last quarter century has done much to reduce dependency.

The new-style workfare, the focus of both the administration and many state governments, is the latest such failure. A review of workfare programs with strong job-search components conducted by the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC) found employment gains among welfare participants generally no better than 10 percent. Even the administrators of Massachusetts' celebrated ET-Choices program could claim a net drop in the welfare rolls of only 4.5 percent from 1983 to 1986, a time of vigorous statewide economic growth. Similarly in New York, another state with extensive and highly touted job training and employment programs, the welfare caseload has fallen by a mere 4.5 percent over the same period.

Despite this lack of success, most welfare reform efforts continue to be governed by the same conventional thinking about dependency. Yet a year-long study just completed by the Hudson Institute suggests that some decidedly *unconventional* thinking may be required. Put simply, most of the causes of welfare dependency are beyond the reach of public policy. Only a very few policies have even a theoretical chance of sharply cutting dependency, and none of these is at the head of the current welfare debate.

It is time for conservatives and liberals alike to face the facts. In order to have any realistic hope of promoting self-sufficiency among America's poor, welfare must be fundamentally revised. We need to replace the idea of public support payments with something new: the offer of a job to any and all who would request it. We need, in short, to turn the "welfare state" into a "work force state."

The Causes of Welfare Dependency

Both the job training movement of the 1980s and the anti-poverty efforts of the 1960s and 1970s assumed that the causes of poverty and, hence, welfare dependency were rooted in circumstances outside poor people's control. Whether because of defects in their environment (lack of jobs, low wages, racism) or in their capabilities (no job skills), poor people were presumed to be unable to alter their condition on their own. Recent research now suggests otherwise. Four specific behaviors—illegitimate childbearing, nonmarriage, nonwork, and low educational attainment—have been closely linked to long-term welfare receipt. As Harvard's Glenn Loury puts it, the dependency of most recipients no longer appears to be "a short-term circumstance engendered by fortuitous events beyond their control, but rather is a long-term condition arising from behaviors for which they might appropriately be held accountable."

Of these behaviors, illegitimate childbearing is by far the most common cause of long-term dependency; having a child out of wedlock makes it more difficult for a woman to marry, work, or finish her schooling—all potential routes off welfare. Nonmarriage is critical because having a two-earner household greatly reduces the chances of poverty, and thus welfare dependency. Poor work effort greatly prolongs welfare spells; more than half of female-headed families in which the mother does not work are poor and have to rely on welfare. Finally, women with low educational attainment and aspirations have less reason to avoid an out-of-wedlock birth and less ability to work their way off welfare.

By contrast, if these women finished school, married or

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stayed married, worked consistently even at low wages, and avoided having illegitimate children, very few would ever be forced to rely on welfare, and even fewer would become dependent for long periods of time. Unfortunately, these women's backgrounds and experiences make it unlikely that most, on their own, would choose those behaviors that would allow them to become self-sufficient. It is not that they do not wish to support themselves. Rather, their upbringing and experiences all too often teach them that relatively little is to be gained by marrying, working, getting an education, and avoiding illegitimacy, and that relatively little is lost by acting otherwise.

Illegitimate childbearing best illustrates this phenomenon. Those couples most likely to produce an illegitimate child see very little relative risk in bearing or fathering a child out of wedlock. Neither father nor mother in many low-income cultures feels much of a stigma attached to illegitimacy. In fact, an illegitimate birth may be seen as a mark of maturity; at a minimum, the peer pressure to have sex at an early age is intense. Further, in an environment where their experiences suggest that the prospects for a good job, a good education, or high social standing are minimal, sex and childbirth may be the main ways in which low-income youth can establish some sense of self-worth. And should a pregnancy occur, the relative financial costs may be seen as small. For the woman, not only would her observations indicate she would suffer little by quitting school, but AFDC always exists as a financial backstop to provide a means to care for her child—and might even allow her to set up her own household. For the young man, the lack of any moral or legal obligation to support his children makes unwed fatherhood essentially costless.

Much of the same occurs in decisions about marriage. Women of low socioeconomic status commonly observe marriage to be more trouble than it is worth. Many of these women find that the men they could marry display poor labor market traits—they work infrequently, earn low wages, and often are unable to hold a job. In addition, many of these men are socially unreliable, engaging in street activities destructive to their relationships and failing to remain sexually faithful. By contrast, AFDC benefits are comparable to the earnings of many lower-status men who work—and their receipt, unlike the man's earnings, is assured—making a husband often economically unnecessary.

With respect to work effort—fewer than one in 10 welfare recipients work—a lack of jobs, poor job skills, racial or sex discrimination, and a lack of child-care often are cited as key factors. Yet, while these play some role, other factors are far more important: Women who have dropped out of school or have worked little exhibit the weakest work patterns, especially in neighborhoods where few of their peers or other adults work. Relatively high AFDC benefits and the existence of the AFDC program itself clearly permit low-income women to choose not to work if they are otherwise so disposed. And because the AFDC program is the principal means through which many low-income women perceive societal norms and values, the degree of work obligation attached to AFDC benefits significantly influences recipients' attitudes toward work.

Finally, students' educational aspirations, and hence their likelihood of finishing school, are mainly products of the educational values and expectations transmitted to them by their parents, peers, and schools' administrators and teachers. One of the major reasons why the educational aspirations and attitudes of low socioeconomic status (SES) students are lower than those of higher-SES students is that their values tend to reflect these others' unfavorable perceptions of life and work opportunities. However, the "effective schools" research does demonstrate that school environments characterized by firm discipline, a clear definition of goals, and a commitment to learning often can overcome many of these negative cultural and peer influences on educational effort.

If a government can pay millions of people each year *not* to work, it can find ways to pay these same millions *to* work.

The Failure of Conventional Policies

A truly successful anti-dependency policy would have to reverse these women's perceptions about their life chances or in some way compel them to adopt more self-sufficient behaviors—specifically, marrying, working, completing school, and avoiding illegitimacy. Yet few proposed or existing welfare policies would do this in any meaningful way.

With regard to illegitimacy, sex education and contraceptive services have had only small effects on illegitimacy rates among youths for whom sex is a critical means of establishing self-worth. And the mandatory child-support provisions of the Moynihan bill, now before the U.S. Senate, would pose a minimal threat to the many unwed fathers who have little "on the books" income that could be attached. The only proposed change that would affect marriage is the extension of AFDC to all two-parent families, but this would do nothing to raise the "marriageworthiness" of the low-SES men now rejected as marriage partners because of poor work or social records, and thus would not greatly increase marriage rates. And with respect to education, no proposals being discussed in Washington except Chapter I vouchers have even a chance of increasing schools' stress on goals, discipline, and achievement—and hence students' educational aspirations and attainment.

All that is left, then, are attempts to increase work effort, and here the greatest attention has been focused. But workfare is typically so riddled with loopholes that practically no welfare recipient is required actually to work. Job training, job search assistance, and remedial education—the centerpiece of federal and state efforts—certainly help those persons already committed to working their way to independence, but do almost nothing to change the beliefs of the great majority of recipients who apparently see little to be gained (and perhaps much to be lost) by persistent

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work. And as the CETA program demonstrated, the traditional liberal response of offering public jobs to those who also have access to AFDC persuades few to choose work over welfare.

Thus, the new welfare reform debate is dominated by "solutions" that would leave largely untouched the four behaviors that cause welfare dependency. Even if every proposed welfare change before the states and the Congress were adopted, there would still be a serious welfare dependency problem in the United States—because illegitimacy, nonmarriage, marital dissolution, nonwork, and dropping out of school would persist, essentially unabated. Even after a quarter century of policy failures, welfare policymaking continues to be governed by the assumption that all poor persons would choose—and act—to become self-sufficient if only they were given the chance. Unfortunately, this is simply not the case:

There would be no demeaning "working off" of welfare benefits. There would be only work.

- As long as the social and psychological benefits of sexual activity and illegitimacy exceed their costs, there will continue to be a serious illegitimacy problem among low-income youth.
- As long as a sizable share of low-SES men are financially and socially unreliable, marriage rates and marital stability will continue to be low, especially among low-status blacks.
- As long as work is seen as one of a number of options for self-support rather than as a social and economic necessity, welfare recipients will continue to work at far lower rates than necessary to provide for their families' needs.
- As long as low-income youth see little to be gained from schooling, they will continue to drop out at high rates.
- Finally, and perhaps most important, as long as AFDC exists and provides at least marginally adequate benefits, it will continue to serve as an alternative means of support for women who otherwise would have to meet their needs themselves through either marriage or work, and will continue to serve as a means by which young, low-SES women can bear a child outside of marriage without great fear of financial risk. There is no way around this point. As long as society provides for the poor simply by giving money to those otherwise predisposed against marriage, work, and deferral of childbearing, it will continue to underwrite those behaviors that lead to poverty and dependency in the first place.

"Mainstreaming" the Poor

Overcoming these barriers to self-sufficiency requires an entirely new approach to anti-poverty policy, one largely absent from the current welfare reform debate. Specifically, if society desires that lower status people behave like "mainstream" individuals—by undertaking self-supportive behaviors and avoiding behaviors that promote dependency—then it must create a situation in which, as far as possible, lower-SES persons confront the same experiences and alternatives that mainstream Americans face, and thus adopt the same general social attitudes, motivations, and assessments of the risks, costs, and benefits of their actions.

The most direct and important step the government could take would be to eliminate the nonwork alternative, the key distinguishing feature of the low-SES environment. There is only one means of doing this: eliminating welfare for the able-bodied and replacing it with work. If an individual needs income to meet her family's expenses, she should work to earn the money—just as all other people typically have to do. Poverty, broken family structure, or the presence of children would no longer be an entitlement to a government hand-out, only spurs to self-support.

Of course, finding a job may not be easy, especially for unskilled single mothers with young children. Thus, the government should do four things. First, it should continue its job search and job training programs, to the extent they are cost-effective; but job training should be only a supplement to work, not a substitute for it, as it typically is today. Second, for those (men and women alike) who cannot find work in the private sector, the federal government should offer jobs at the local level at 90 percent of the minimum wage—jobs that would include worker's compensation, participation in Social Security, health insurance, and maternity leave, just like private sector jobs. Still, the fact that the jobs paid less than the minimum wage should encourage workers to move to better-paying nonguaranteed positions.

A job at 90 percent of the current minimum wage would pay only $6,240 per year—well below the poverty level for a mother with two or three children. Recognizing this, the government should expand the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), with credits for low-income persons based on earnings and family size. Finally, in cases where the mother is not able to arrange child-care, the government should offer care at market rates in conjunction with the provided job.

The administrative hurdles in replacing welfare with work would be immense, but they can be overcome. If a government can pay millions of people each year *not* to work, it can find ways to pay these same millions *to* work. While there would be at least short-term cost increases, the result would be worth it: in the long run the government would have effectively eliminated dependency. In this "New Deal" for America's poor, there would no longer be a class of "Dependent Americans," as Martin Anderson dubbed them nearly a decade ago, for even those employed by the government would be working and earning a paycheck. Yet no one would be *required* to work; work would become an opportunity for the poor, not a "punishment," as it is in workfare. Nor would there be any demeaning "working off" of welfare benefits, because there would be no welfare benefits. There would be only work.

Some conservatives might bridle at this suggestion, of course, because government would become the "employer of last resort," as liberals have long urged. But there is no other choice. Politically, the only way Congress could

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eliminate welfare would be to guarantee backup jobs. Besides, forcing all welfare recipients immediately onto their own would be cruel; government should make sure—as it does now—that those unable to support themselves could meet their basic needs. The major difference from the current system would be that all persons would earn their money, rather than having it given to them. They would be productive members of society, just like everyone else.

Finally, providing a backup job almost surely is needed for "mainstreaming" the poor. Most Americans, if fired tomorrow, probably would be able to find at least some job within a very short period; by their social status, contacts, experience, and skills, most are effectively "guaranteed" a job. If we expect the poor to behave as mainstream citizens, then they, too, must have the assured opportunity as well as the social and economic necessity to work.

Eliminating Functional Dependency

This one step alone would end dependency in the strictest sense by eliminating the payments that permit able-bodied persons to become dependent. Yet replacing welfare with work removes only one of the four major dependency-inducing behaviors. The others—illegitimacy, nonmarriage, and quitting school—would remain, and with them the resulting "functional dependency," or at least lingering impoverishment, of those who practiced them.

A key means of dealing with the first, illegitimacy, is well-known, if rarely placed in the proper context. As Stuart Butler wrote in the Spring 1987 *Policy Review*, "[w]hen a teen-aged boy fathers a child and then refuses to provide for it, or is unable to do so for lack of a job, he should not be able to expect society to take care of his child.... If the father is employed, tough child support laws should extract payment. If he has no job, then he should be required to perform public-sector work in return for aid to his children. If he refuses to do that, he should be jailed."

Proposals such as Butler's and the Moynihan child support provisions are intended primarily to ensure adequate support for the mothers and to reduce welfare costs. Yet probably the most valuable impact of tough child support would be to discourage (perhaps dramatically) young, low-SES men from freely engaging in unmarried sex and consequently fathering children out of wedlock. Of course, the father would have to face a much greater risk of being identified as the parent than he is now, possibly by requiring a low-income single mother to identify the father of her children as a precondition, say, for receiving her full EITC. In any case, it is hard to believe that once word passed on the streets that young men were paying heavily for unwed fatherhood the problem of teen illegitimacy would not diminish significantly.

The other two behaviors, nonmarriage and dropping out of school, would be far more difficult to curtail. Beyond improving young men's attitudes toward work through stricter child support enforcement (and closing down the illegal street income system), probably the only way the government could motivate young men to work more persistently (and thus become better marriage partners) would be to raise their level of educational attainment—a necessary step for improving young women's work efforts as well. How to do this? The research indicates the only realistic possibility is to increase these students' educational aspirations and efforts through substantial improvements in their schools' commitment to learning.

This, however, is something state governments, much less Washington, are finding extremely difficult to achieve. Vouchers, merit testing of teachers, and higher state standards all might help, but they are at best partial answers. Aside from a few exceptional instances resulting from unique dedication and commitment at the local level (Joe Clark comes to mind), we simply do not know how to improve the educational "ethos" of our nation's public schools. But given the overriding importance of educational attitudes and effort to the problems of dependency, poverty, and nonwork—not to mention larger scale matters such as the international competitiveness of the U.S. economy—conservatives would do well to make widespread improvements in educational ethos one of the top items on the domestic policy agenda for the 1990s.

Four specific behaviors—illegitimate childbearing, nonmarriage, nonwork, and low educational attainment—are closely linked to welfare dependency.

The Need for Radical Reform

The typically asserted solutions to dependency—job training, benefit level and eligibility changes, even economic growth and workfare—can solve only a small part of the welfare problem. These policies generally will most help those already intent on achieving self-sufficiency, leaving far, far too many others poor and dependent.

We can bring these others fully into society's mainstream only if we radically revise our concept of aid to the needy by replacing welfare with work, enforcing parental responsibility, and inculcating a "culture of learning" among all youth at the earliest possible age. To be sure, some of these broad principles will be difficult to design as policies, and others even more difficult to implement as law. But those interested in promoting financial independence for America's poorest no longer can escape the fact that the past quarter century's great social experiments at the edges of a fundamentally flawed system have left poverty and dependency worse than before. More administrative and tactical variations on these themes, however well thought out, hold little promise for the poor. The time has arrived to pursue more basic—and bold—changes in strategy.

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GORBACHEV'S HOLOCAUST

Soviet Complicity in Ethiopia's Famine

MICHAEL JOHNS

Mikhail Gorbachev is an accomplice in one of the most appalling holocausts of the 20th century. He is massively arming a Communist government in Ethiopia whose man-made famine tactics took one million lives in 1984-85, and threaten three million more in 1988.

Mikhail Gorbachev took power in the Soviet Union in March 1985 just as the famine of 1984-85 was coming to a close. During that famine, almost $2 billion in food, medicine, and other aid from the West helped save hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians' lives. The Soviets' famine relief efforts were limited to sending 3,500 tons of rice (a rather thoughtless grant in the midst of a drought since each cup of rice requires approximately two cups of water to cook). Meanwhile, the Kremlin poured $800 million in military hardware into Ethiopia in 1985 alone.

In 1988 three million lives are at stake as the result of the decision by Lt. Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam to expel international relief workers and prevent Western aid from reaching the famine-stricken provinces in the north. But Gorbachev's military aid to Ethiopia has not been shaken. Already this year, an estimated $800 million worth of Soviet military equipment has been sent to Mengistu, and an estimated $5.8 billion worth of such Soviet equipment has arrived since 1977. "It is clear the Soviets have no concern for the starving," says Haile Tassew, a high level defector from Mengistu's diplomatic corps. "They are exclusively concerned with achieving their military and strategic objectives in Ethiopia."

Everything to the War Front

Under world pressure, Gorbachev did recently agree to send 252 million tons of grain to the Ethiopian government's Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, 50 million of which had actually arrived by early June. Even this gesture shows a callousness to human life. Aid distributed by the government relief organization is extremely unlikely to be distributed in Eritrea or Tigre, where rebels are operating and famine is most severe. Furthermore, government-distributed aid is frequently used by Mengistu to draw Ethiopians to areas where they can be forcibly boarded on Soviet transport vehicles, split with their families, and resettled to the south and the west.

Much of the military hardware received from Moscow has been used in carrying out indiscriminate bombings, shellings, and scorched earth tactics against civilian targets in Eritrea and Tigre, contributing greatly to the current famine situation in the north. Soviet military equipment has also been used to bomb and burn famine relief centers in the north and along the Sudan border. These attacks, along with sporadic rebel assaults on relief transport vehicles, have greatly complicated Western relief efforts. "Food convoys must come at night, because they know the government will attack," says anthropologist Jason Clay of Cultural Survival, a U.S.-based organization that tries to protect tribal cultures.

In April, after Eritrean separatist rebels killed or captured 18,000 Ethiopian soldiers, including three Soviet advisors, in the northern garrison town of Afabet, Gorbachev immediately resupplied Mengistu with $500 million worth of Soviet military hardware, allowing Mengistu to carry on the war against the Eritreans. In the face of another famine, Mengistu has launched a massive Soviet-supported military campaign, "everything to the war front," in which he has asked all Ethiopians to forfeit one month's pay for the war effort and has doubled the size of the Ethiopian army in the north, often with conscripts as young as 12 years old. "After that attack at Afabet," says an Ethiopian government defector, Dr. Aradom Tedla, "new Soviet cargo planes arrived in Eritrea, and literally for hours they unloaded equipment and troops."

Mass Resettlement, A Soviet Idea

Soviet transport trucks and planes have played an important role in Mengistu's hated villagization and resettlement programs, which have forceably relocated over five million Ethiopians. According to the French medical group Medecins sans Frontieres, Mengistu's resettlement programs have resulted in the deaths of some 100,000 Ethiopians, often from cholera and other diseases. The villagization program uproots peasants from their rural hamlets—many unthreatened by famine—and marches them into squalid government collectives where food is often less plentiful, and where they are usually separated from their immediate family.

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

Sovphoto

Mengistu with his arms supplier, 1987

As part of the villagization program, which serves the purpose of breaking down traditional power bases that are perceived threatening to Mengistu, the government orders the peasants to carry all their belongings and the roofs of their houses to the new sites. Once in the cooperative, the peasants are forced to walk as far as five miles to and from the fields every day at gunpoint, to turn all their produce over to the state, and to attend indoctrination seminars that laud the Mengistu government. Ethiopians in the cooperatives are given food to inform on one another, and peasants are frequently tortured for any slight deviation from the cooperative's strict rules. Dr. Tedla, who now heads an African human-rights group, says, "The mass resettlement program was initially proposed by Soviet advisors." Mariam-Kidane Betrou, who was Mengistu's ambassador to Cairo before his defection to the West, actually participated in meetings with Soviet officials in which villagization was discussed, and contends today that "they are behind it; they made the plans; they urged it on."

Official visits between Mengistu and Soviet officials have never been followed with much Soviet criticism of Mengistu's Stalinist policies. When Mengistu visited Moscow in April 1987, Gorbachev was quoted as merely warning him to "proceed from realities and not outrun stages of development." When Politburo member Lev Zaikov visited Addis Ababa in September 1987, he was reported to have been somewhat blunter with Mengistu, but nothing was said publicly. Betrou claims Ethiopia has and continues to be "completely in the Soviets' hands. Mengistu's arms supply comes from there, and he is in massive debt to them." He says Soviet and Ethiopian officials in Addis Ababa were "just implementing what came from Moscow. . . . Gorbachev has his priorities, and famine relief is not one of them."

Mengistu's Gala Celebration

Had Gorbachev cooperated in famine relief efforts in 1985, Betrou claims, Ethiopian fatalities "would have been greatly minimized." Frank Carlin, who assisted in relief efforts inside Ethiopia as an employee of Catholic Relief Services, says one of the main questions that continually puzzled Western relief workers was: "Why is it that this 'ally' is not providing the aid that is needed? That was one of our grave concerns."

But if the Soviets were doing little to save lives, they were doing plenty to wage war. Dr. Tedla recalls that the Eritrean rebels proposed a cease-fire during the 1985 famine, but, as a million died of hunger, the government instead launched an offensive against the rebels. Tedla says there is "no doubt that that offensive was Gorbachev's idea . . . it included 200,000 government troops, the largest offensive ever, and Mr. Gorbachev gave the green light to go ahead."

The Mengistu government has even given greater priority to Leninist celebrations than to his starving countrymen. In 1984, for instance, as famine was commencing, Mengistu turned his back on the starving, spending $200 million on a gala celebration for the 10th anniversary of Communist rule in Ethiopia. As Communist celebrities such as the Soviet Union's Grigory Romanov, Cuba's Fidel Castro, and East Germany's Erich Honecker arrived in Addis Ababa for the lavish celebration, the starving were conveniently removed from the streets so that Soviet tanks, missiles, and rockets could be displayed in a parade.

Furthermore, Soviet and East European ships carrying military supplies have consistently been given unloading priority over Western ships carrying food. The Mengistu government has also assessed each Western ship carrying food a $50-per-ton fee to unload the food, which is used to subsidize the militia, turning away ships when they have been unable to pay the fee. Food intended for civilians has frequently been diverted to the militia, and often it has been allowed to simply rot on the docks. On these problems, too, Moscow has been hauntingly silent.

Ethiopia is blessed with fertile land and a hard-working population, and was once an agricultural exporter, but today the country is plagued with man-made famine propped up by massive Soviet military hardware. Mikhail Gorbachev wants the world to believe that glasnost is real, and that he is sincere about distancing himself from the Stalinist atrocities of the past. The world has a right to ask: Why doesn't he put an end to his Ethiopian holocaust?

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The Reagan Revolution and Its Limits

Revolution, *by Martin Anderson (San Diego/New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, $19.95).*

Reaganomics: An Insider's Account of the Policies and the People, *by William A. Niskanen (New York: Oxford University Press, $22.95).*

Reviewed by Tim W. Ferguson

This has been a year for recriminations and score settling by alumni of the Reagan White House. Now two insiders have written instead to examine the meat of policy and the future of whatever kind of revolution unfolded these past eight years.

Martin Anderson headed the Office of Policy Development through the first 14 months of Reagan's presidency and kept ties to the administration for more than three years thereafter. William Niskanen was a member and then acting chairman of the Council for Economic Advisers (CEA) through 1985. Both are libertarians. But those who've followed the fractious economic debate within the Reagan camp (for instance, the contrasting insider accounts by Paul Craig Roberts and David Stockman, also libertarians in their economic views) will not be surprised to find that Anderson and Niskanen also present very different accounts.

Anderson, now senior fellow of the Hoover Institution, was an adviser to Ronald Reagan during his 1976 and 1980 bids for the White House. He has written a personal and largely enthusiastic appraisal of the man and his record. Niskanen, the economist fired from Ford Motor Company for his fealty to free trade, also dates his acquaintance with Reagan to the California days, but he was never as close. Told with detachment, his is a sober and mostly sad tale of opportunity lost.

Perils of Pollyanna

Revolution paints Reagan in broad brush strokes as a masterful shaper of tax-cutting prosperity and missile-negating security. Anderson pays little attention in his nearly 500-page book to the crude compromises and confounding acts of Reagan's presidency—the abandonment of heralded cuts in spending and bureaucracy, the creeping protectionism evident as early as the 1980 campaign, the remarkable tolerance of underlings who opposed Reagan's expressed positions, the troubling about-face on the Soviet Union. Anderson has tried to emerge as *the* sympathetic political chronicler of the Reagan years. But his reverence for the man he served, his tendency to see the glass not just as half-full but as *nearly* full, undermines his attempt.

Not until his discussion of the Iran/Contra affair, and then for a special reason that becomes clear, does Anderson's tone change. In a surprisingly strong section that takes up more than a quarter of the book, he holds Reagan accountable overall, but emphasizes the perfidy of subordinates and their overreach for executive-branch power.

Elsewhere, *Revolution* provides a picture of a decisive and wily president, not the dim bulb sketched in other accounts. Anderson calls Reagan a "closet workaholic" who "rations himself carefully because even the caffeine in a half cup of coffee will make him acutely alert." He exposes Reagan's speechmaking magic—including, in the pre-presidential years, the candidate's painstaking, shorthand-style lettering of the famous index cards. And he remembers how the Reagan espousal of Kemp-Roth tax cuts grew out of a deal in fall 1979 to keep Jack Kemp from running for president the following year. But Anderson omits some of his political mentor's missteps that still beg for explanation, such as the bizarre overture to Gerald Ford at the 1980 convention.

Deaver Saves Reagan's Life

Anecdotal glimpses of others in the Reagan entourage contribute to an understanding of events. For instance, Anderson depicts Michael Deaver as a selfless aide to Reagan for 12 years until the candidate allowed John Sears and other campaign officials to "gang up" on him on Thanksgiving 1979. They accused Deaver of ripping off the campaign. He quit and, although he returned after Sears was fired a few months later (and after Deaver saved Reagan's life in a choking incident, Anderson recounts), "Deaver stopped looking out for Reagan's interests first and instead began looking out for his own." Reagan, for his part, is socially distanced from his staff and not prone to say thanks.

Many conservatives, including some with a libertarian prefix, will swallow hard when Anderson puts a favorable spin on the arms talks with the Soviets. An eclectic and long list of administration acquaintances draws kind reviews, including ones of James Baker (Anderson is not the only one to forget too soon the first term's frustrations) and George Shultz (why is there no discussion of the socialist or price-distorting practices perpetuated by the foreign-aid bureaucracy?).

Instead of a comprehensive review of administration

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policies, which the Niskanen work provides, Anderson highlights broad themes and stresses the structure of policy making in President Reagan's first term, for which he can take some personal credit. He does not discuss the staff pains that reportedly prompted his exit from the White House, attributing it instead to his wish not to work long in government.

Anderson stayed plugged in as an informal adviser and through a seat on the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, a little-discussed body of outsiders that, as Anderson relates, has extraordinary access to U.S. secrets. This is what leads to the extended examination of Iran/Contra, otherwise unexpected from someone identified with domestic issues since his book on urban renewal, *The Federal Bulldozer,* brought him, at age 32, into the Nixon administration. (A member of the Committee on the Present Danger, he's had a long interest in foreign policy and has long supported strategic defense. He's also written against the military draft, though, curiously, this book sidesteps Reagan's early failure to end registration.)

Anne Armstrong's Celebrities

Anderson still burns over the November 1985 dismissal of 11 members of the intelligence board, including himself, a "purge" engineered by its chairman, Anne Armstrong. As he tells it, Armstrong and William Casey shared an interest in a more quiescent and distracted "celebrity" board. He suggests that had the old inquisitive members been kept on the job, the abuses of Iran/Contra could not have escaped notice for so long and at such cost to the Reagan White House. This is debatable: The opening to Iran had begun at least four months before Anderson and the others were fired, and no one smelled a rat. (Of course, the enterprise later changed form.) But the indictment of Armstrong, perhaps the toughest of the few in the book, raises questions about why someone who's never been elected to office periodically shows up on consideration lists for vice president. Part of the answer is that she is chummy with the GOP establishment, including George Bush.

Anderson's analysis of Iran/Contra poses a challenge to those conservatives who either endorse the operation generally or sympathize with the aim of cutting a hostile Congress out of sensitive foreign-policy decisions. Anderson is evidently a Madisonian believer in checks and balances and will have none of this. He lambastes all the players, from the late William Casey on down, for an unconstitutional exercise of power.

Anderson punts on the most controversial debates over the Reagan domestic policies: whether taxes should have been cut if spending couldn't be restrained; whether the military budget should have been reined in earlier to win other expenditure curbs; whether tightening by the Federal Reserve caused a needlessly huge multiyear deficit problem, or was necessary for disinflation and should have been anticipated by the Reaganites in plotting revenues. Anderson will only say that fiscal discipline is the "unfinished business" of the revolution.

He admits Ronald Reagan likes to spend in certain areas that his fellow revolutionaries don't appreciate, but suggests Congress basically is to blame for the mess. He puts great stock in the White House's 1987 revival of the "Economic Bill of Rights" that he had put together years before, which includes some constitutional limits on spending. Here, Anderson seems naive: that promotion lasted only a few weeks, a diversionary stunt during Iran/Contra. He likely is correct about needing a constitutional fix—Niskanen comes to the same conclusion—but that doesn't absolve Reagan's crew of what has gone on.

Lost War Against Spending

The truth may simply be that Ronald Reagan isn't one to fight the public sentiment for bigger government. That was David Stockman's conclusion (he gave up on the idea that anyone could do it) and William Niskanen's as well. Niskanen's book offers a spare analysis by one who claims no special proximity to the Oval Office. Other insiders have larded their accounts with quotations reconstructed years after the fact from peculiarly thorough notes or extraordinary memories. Niskanen concentrates more on what people did than on what they said. Indeed, his work reads like a good encyclopedia, spiced with dry barbs (Arthur Laffer is "best known for his conjecture about the relation between tax rates and revenues.").

Unlike Paul Craig Roberts, Niskanen does not blame the budget deficit of today on the "Volcker recession." He writes that the costs of the tight money policy of 1981-82, "in terms of the loss of output . . . are now behind us." Indeed, Niskanen pins the blame squarely on failure to limit spending and he points to repeated skirmishes in this lost war.

In contrast to some supply-siders who dismiss the dangers of a large budget deficit, Niskanen sees an immoral intergenerational transfer. The cost of not cutting spending today, he suggests, is that taxes will have to rise in the future.

Niskanen, like Roberts, blames David Stockman (and Martin Anderson) for an ill-conceived strike at Social Security in 1981 that poisoned the well for a Council of Economic Advisers-Treasury Department gradual approach to getting those benefits under control. The Social Security political fiasco, some argue, marked a watershed defeat for Reagan budget cutters. Except for a futile exercise after the 1984 election, the budget cutters' strength diminished as the Reagan years wore on; eventually Senator Phil Gramm contrived a mechanism for dealing with the spending problem, but the White House was barely a factor in budget politics by then.

The 1984 Reagan campaign, often criticized as issueless, was a portent of the torpor that was to follow. But, as Niskanen points out, the 1980 race brought no mandate

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for specific spending cuts. Stockman and colleagues got some in the first wave, though Anderson and Niskanen remark that the budget director based his early deficit calculations on cuts to come that by fall 1981 weren't obtainable. With Stockman, Niskanen laments how few real fiscal conservatives are among the officeholders in either party. (Colorado Senator William Armstrong emerges as an exception; Senator Al Gore, browbeating Niskanen in 1982 on behalf of federal power subsidies for his Tennessee constituents, does not.)

Moynihan's Canard

The author rejects one of Senator Daniel Moynihan's favorite canards, that the administration deliberately created a deficit in order to check the future spending impulse of congressional Democrats. Senator Moynihan has said he heard this from David Stockman, who mysteriously did not include it in his tell-all book or his confessions to William Greider. Says Niskanen: "The administration did not have a deficit policy. It had a spending policy and a tax policy, and the deficit was an outcome rather than a target of these policies."

Alan Greenspan, who comes off as a comrade-in-arms in Anderson's account, does not fare so well with Niskanen. *Reaganomics* criticizes Greenspan (who endorsed an expensive indexing formula for Social Security while he was President Ford's economic adviser) for selecting a bureaucratic defender of the program as staff director for the 1982 Social Security commission.

Anderson provides a picture of a decisive and wily president, a "closet workaholic."

Unbridled Pentagon spending is a primary focus of Niskanen's plaint. He shows how Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger's refusal to countenance any curbs in budgeted increases for the Pentagon finished off the spending-cut consensus by fall 1981—though he isn't very specific about how defense spending should have been cut. Niskanen shows how the horse-trading to get congressional votes for guns required the administration to butter up various legislators. (Witness the recent demand by Representative Roy Dyson of Maryland for some jobs in his district if he was to vote for Contra aid.) The real cost of American might is even greater than what appears in the military budget, Niskanen observes.

In contrast to some supply-siders who dismiss the dangers of a large budget deficit (Alan Reynolds argues, for example, that much of the public and private spending binge of the 1980s has gone into investments that will so enlarge future GNP that carrying charges won't be painful), Niskanen sees an immoral intergenerational transfer. The cost of not cutting spending today, he suggests, is that taxes will likely rise in the future.

Charles River Hypochondria

That's a familiar stance. But Niskanen hasn't bought into the economic hypochondria that has spread from the Charles River intelligentsia across the country during our persistent prosperity. The deficit was not and is not, he argues, responsible for what Stockman and Martin Feldstein sought at various times to blame it: inflation, high interest rates, and the trade deficit. (Feldstein was for nearly two years Niskanen's chairman at the CEA but kept his own counsel; in that time, 10 minutes was the longest they and the third CEA member discussed a professional topic, according to Niskanen.)

Although he, too, watched with deepening concern as the red ink poured out, Niskanen is too careful an economist to engage in hyperbole. Stockman and Feldstein are to blame for crying wolf about short-run dangers of big budget deficits, he writes, because the case for fiscal responsibility was weakened when the apocalypse failed to occur.

Why the Dollar Dove

The 1981 tax cuts *did* cause the great dislocation in world capital markets of the 1980s, he finds, but not because of a fiscal deficit. Rather, they so increased rates of return in the United States that they drove up the U.S. dollar's value. It was the prospect and later reality of those business tax cuts being undone in 1986, he argues, that drove down the dollar—not the Plaza Accord or anything else particularly that Treasury Secretary James Baker did.

Baker is one of Niskanen's most frequent targets for criticism. The author, an opponent of managed exchange rates, faults Baker for an unstudied approach to international currency matters—just as he zings him for lack of substance and policy skittishness as chief of staff in the first Reagan term. And the Baker Plan for poor-country debt relief through more loans and free-market reforms, he writes, ought to be called the Baker Hope—a vain one.

A horse-before-the-cart Thatcherite in his approach to spending and taxes, Niskanen partially agrees with Stockman that Americans must pony up more if they're to have the rather militarized welfare state to which they've grown accustomed. He also thinks that constitutional fiscal checks would shrink the demand for government by requiring that it be paid for by the generation that benefits.

No Illusions About Tax Cuts

Niskanen has no illusions that taxes have been cut appreciably under President Reagan. He recalls fondly the business tax breaks passed in 1981—and improved, he maintains, by the 1982 TEFRA pullbacks—and he laments the higher burden the 1986 revision laid on the corporate sector. But, he constructs tables showing that many middle-income families were subject to higher effective rates as a result of the federal tax changes of the 1980s, confirming what a lot of us have found to be our personal experience. Reagan's core constituency may determine this outcome, after all the publicity to the contrary, to be the most disappointing facet of the "revolution."

The disparate conclusions of Anderson and Niskanen, and the earlier split between Roberts and Stockman, do more than cross-light the portraiture of the Reagan presidency. Coming from men of such similar political outlook,

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they remind us that an administration, including this one, despite all the caricatures, is more than the ideology of those who serve. It is a product of their temperaments, disciplines, ambitions, and expectations—and of schools within schools of thought. Some come away angry or disillusioned, others proud or hopeful.

Perhaps Anderson has a sufficiently long view to see continents move. It is harder for some of us, our eyes fixed on measures such as government as a percentage of GNP that have not moved as we might have wished under Ronald Reagan, to be so sanguine about succeeding under present conditions. Niskanen, without the bitterness of Stockman but with a similar sense of limits, concludes, "Policy advisers, either inside or outside the government, can make a contribution only around the edges of the prevailing perception. The Reagan economic program did not prove to be a revolution primarily because there has not yet been a substantial change in perceptions about what the federal government should do or, more importantly, should not do."

Robert Woodson is developing a positive conservative program to overcome racial inequality.

What to Read on Civil Rights

An annotated bibliography by Murray Friedman

The emergence of Jesse Jackson as a major political force while a huge black underclass remains mired in poverty indicates how far blacks have come and how far they need to travel to become full and equal partners in American life.

Washington vs. Du Bois

From its inception at the turn of this century, the civil-rights movement has been divided by two fundamental issues that have never been fully resolved: whether to focus on measures to attain social and political equality—that is, on integration—or to emphasize some degree of separation coupled with building economic and group communal strength. **Booker T. Washington** was one of the earliest exemplars of the latter position. In his autobiography, *Up From Slavery,* rather than challenging patterns of segregation and subordination that spread in the wake of the Civil War and Reconstruction, he called for hard work and "cast[ing] down your bucket where you are." In *The Souls of Black Folk,* which rapidly became the bible of the movement, **W. E. B. Du Bois,** Washington's chief critic, urged a frontal attack on all forms of segregation and discrimination, and the attainment of full political rights. Du Bois joined with a group of white progressives to form the NAACP in 1909. Ultimately unhappy with the pace of integration, he turned to the left, moved to Africa, and ended his long life as a Communist.

In *The Black Jews of Harlem,* **Howard Brotz** argues that Washington was not the Uncle Tom his critics made him out to be, and that Du Bois understood the importance of group solidarity even as he joined the integrationist thrust that became the primary strategy of civil-rights groups until the race revolution of the second half of the 1960s. **E. David Cronon** suggests in *Black Moses: The Story of Marcus Garvey and the Universal Improvement Association,* however, that groups such as the NAACP and Urban League, which were launched by liberal whites and Du Bois' "talented tenth" blacks, remained elitist in social composition. They were unable to stir the great masses of blacks who, after World War I, were leaving the farms of the South and taking up residence in the big cities of America as Garvey did in the 1920s. Until Garvey's arrest on a relatively minor charge, imprisonment, and deportation, this brilliant but flawed black nationalist created a mass movement of blacks that was never again attained.

Simple Justice

Not until after World War II did the civil-rights movement collect a large national following of whites and blacks. This resulted from a confluence of events that included a fresh spirit of idealism following the victory over Nazi Germany, the emergence of blacks as a major political force in the northern cities, and liberal reform efforts of organized labor, church groups, civic agencies, and Jewish organizations working closely with the NAACP and other black groups. The late '40s and '50s saw the enactment of an important body of civil-rights legislation on city and state levels, and judicial decisions, climaxed by the Supreme Court's landmark decision in *Brown* v. *Board of Education* in 1954. In his exhaustive study, *Simple Justice,* **Richard Kluger** describes the personalities, strategies, and conflicts of the various parties involved. He makes it clear that the political skills of Chief Justice Earl Warren produced a unanimous court and that Justice Felix Frankfurter devised the ambiguous formula "with all deliberate speed" in the implementing decision a

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

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Malcolm X justified violence as an appropriate response to the injustices experienced by blacks.

year later to provide breathing space for the South to adjust to the historically momentous changes involved. By relying, however, on highly questionable psychological and sociological data rather than resting its decision only on the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court created new difficulties. **Gunnar Myrdal's** *An American Dilemma* greatly influenced Americans to move away from widely held racist views, although it was flawed by its assimilationist assumptions and the simplistic view that the solution to the race problem in America lay only in modifying the behavior of white Americans.

King's Inspirational Leadership

The massive resistance of Southern whites to Court decisions that invalidated their segregationist way of life led to a countermovement by blacks and sympathetic whites. Their new, direct action methods, under the inspirational leadership of Martin Luther King, Jr., sharply contrasted with the legalistic approach of the older civil-rights partnership. *King, A Critical Biography* by **David Levering Lewis** and **David J. Garrow's** Pulitzer-prize winning *Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr., and The Southern Christian Leadership Conference* are the two best books about his life and career.

Lewis finds King to be too much the liberal compromiser when, in the author's view, he should have challenged the economic and social system itself. Garrow, on the other hand, in a point that has been seldom noted, found King (especially after the failure of his organizing efforts in Chicago and the violence resulting from the Nashville trash-collectors strike shortly before his death) to be moving sharply to the left. This change in position is reflected not only in his opposition to our involvement in the Vietnam war but in his increasingly open attack on capitalism as an unjust arrangement of society. From Garrow one gets the sense that King was setting the stage for (or responding to) forces that were moving the civil-rights movement in new and more radical directions.

Misreading the Roots

Until the mid-1960s, the civil-rights struggle was mainly led by middle-class whites and blacks united in resisting injustice. However, from 1964 to 1968, riots rocked black slums in many of the nation's major cities. The rioters were an increasingly disaffected black underclass that remained relatively untouched by the civil-rights gains. Their living environment has been described most movingly by **James Baldwin's** *The Fire Next Time* and the *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders*—the report of the Kerner Commission, which was appointed by President Johnson to study and make recommendations for dealing with civil strife. These two books focused on the existence of widespread white racism in the society. Neither understood that the undifferentiated characterization of whites as favored and bigoted regardless of class, social experience, or ethnic background was too sweeping and highly divisive in itself. The Kerner Commission report also fell back on the full range of older, liberal social formulas specifically aimed at relieving the plight of blacks rather than of the disadvantaged more generally. When partially implemented in the Johnson years, the "war on poverty" aroused broad opposition as both too costly and largely ineffective. This "white backlash" has been explored by **Michael Novak's** *The Rise of the Unmeltable White Ethnics,* **Nathan Glazer's** *Affirmative Discrimination, Ethnic Inequality and Public Policy,* and **Jonathan Rieder's** *Canarsie: The Jews and Italians of Brooklyn Against Liberalism.*

Increasingly, the leadership of the civil-rights movement shifted to a group of radical street activists and para-intellectuals who justified violence and social dislocation as appropriate responses to the injustices experienced by blacks. **Malcolm X's** *Autobiography* and **Eldridge Cleaver's** *Soul on Ice* capture this mood.

Integrationist efforts of older, less militant bodies like the NAACP and even King, personally, were criticized as being too moderate and unresponsive to the needs of slum-shocked blacks. The Washington-Garvey tradition was reactivated by **Stokely Carmichael** and **Charles V. Hamilton, Jr.,** in *Black Power, The Politics of Liberation in America.* Their emphasis, however, came to be seen as less an appeal to building internal communal strength than an attack on the structure of society itself. This thrust coincided with the emergence of the Black Panthers and other extremist, Left-oriented elements who espoused insurrection in the struggle of colored peoples against colonialism. A favorite book among the new, black activists and their supporters was *The Wretched of the Earth* by **Franz Fanon,** which explicitly justified violence as a purifying force in "liberation" struggles. By backing more radical movements to overthrow apartheid in South Africa and support for the Palestine Liberation Organization in the

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Middle East in later years, Fanon's admirers deflected to international concerns some of the energy and leadership once directed to liberal reform. Anti-Semitic attacks on Jews and criticism of Israel as an outpost of Western imperialism in the Middle East and "ally" of South Africa became standard charges of these new activists and intellectual leaders.

The New Anti-Semitism

Although the special relationship of Jews and blacks had been a major component of the civil-rights movement from its early beginnings, comprehensive studies of that alliance are surprisingly few. Mounting tensions between the two groups as the civil-rights revolution turned into a race revolution are described by **Robert G. Weisbord** and **Arthur Stein** in *Bittersweet Encounter: The Afro-American and the American Jew.* In *Israel in the Black American Perspective,* Weisbord and **Richard Kazarian, Jr.,** analyze these frictions and the leftward turn of moderate black leadership following the resignation of Andrew Young as ambassador to the United Nations after his meeting with a PLO representative in 1979. A revisionist history of the black-Jewish alliance has also begun to take shape among a small group of black scholars who argue that there never was a real alliance and to the degree there was cooperation, it was largely dysfunctional for blacks. The chief proponent of this view is **Harold Cruse** in *The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual* and *Plural but Equal.* As more and more black students entered colleges and universities in the '70s and '80s and were exposed to these scholars as well as to street activists, a number were radicalized, weakening further what was once a fundamental underpinning of the old liberal coalition.

Changing racial and ethnic currents have always affected the politics of the nation. **Kevin P. Phillips** in *The Emerging Republican Majority* may have exaggerated the ultimate triumph of the GOP, but his book remains useful in understanding the collisions on the American political scene of Roman Catholics and white Southerners with blacks.

Books on Jesse Jackson have been tumbling forth in a steady stream since his rise as the unquestioned spokesman of black America. Although written before his two races for the presidency, **Barbara Reynolds'** *Jesse Jackson: The Man, The Movement, The Myth* remains the best and captures his gift for self-promotion and his enormous appeal for blacks as well as a small number of whites. Neither Reynolds nor the other writers on Jackson, however, recognize that his Third World sympathies and associations are pulling the Democratic Party to the left, threating to alienate it and his primary constituency from broader groupings of Americans.

Class Not Race

The civil-rights revolution overturned almost all forms of institutionalized segregation and created a sea change in public attitudes on race. In its wake, however, there has been a sharp growth of a black underclass trapped in a setting of drugs, family breakup, crime, violence, and poverty, as Senator **Daniel Patrick Moynihan** foresaw in *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action.* The issue of

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As Garrow shows, Martin Luther King, Jr., moved sharply to the left before his assassination.

the black underclass has been discussed more fully by the sociologist **William Julius Wilson** in *The Declining Significance of Race* and *The Truly Disadvantaged,* which provide a starting point for a new discussion of racial inequality in the United States. They discount the importance of racism today as the primary force in the continued plight of so many blacks. Wilson focuses on structural changes in the economy and the effects of past discrimination and disadvantage in preventing minorities from availing themselves of opportunities opened by civil-rights successes.

Wilson's solutions, however, hew closely to the old liberal Left's social welfare formulas even though he is critical of racial preferences, which he says have benefited mainly the rising black middle class. On the other hand, a number of black conservatives, including **Walter E. Williams** in *The State Against Blacks* and **Thomas Sowell** in *Race and Economics,* argue that the welfare state has contributed to difficulties minority underclasses face by making them dependent on government intervention and largesse.

Positive Conservative Programs

More recently, several conservative critics of welfare state solutions, including **Robert Woodson** in *On the Road to Economic Freedom* and **Clint Bolick** in *Civil Rights at the Crossroads,* have attempted to develop a positive conservative program to overcome racial inequality. They identify and encourage neighborhood self-help programs that have created small businesses, built low-cost housing, and battled crime. They also urge the elimination of bureaucratic impediments such as certain governmental licensing requirements and restrictions by organized labor that have interfered with these efforts. Transfixed on white racism as the most enduring aspect of the problem of racial inequality and by its overreliance on government solutions, as the civil-rights movement has been for much of its history, it has been difficult for newer, more conservative voices to gain a hearing for what may be the next stage of the civil-rights revolution.

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Tail Gunner Pat

Right from the Beginning, *by Patrick J. Buchanan (Boston: Little, Brown, $18.95).*

Reviewed by John Chamberlain

Even Bill Buckley, one of a numerous Catholic family, felt compelled to entitle one of his books *Up From Liberalism.* Pat Buchanan differs from practically every other conservative in that he never had to come up from anywhere—he was, as he says, possessed of settled conservative convictions from earliest childhood. And so he calls his nostalgic book about growing up during the '50s in Washington, D.C., *Right From the Beginning.*

Buchanan came from a family of seven boys and two girls, and it was "Pop"—or William B. Buchanan, the head of a prosperous Washington accounting firm, who held them all together by drilling into them team respect for country, family, and faith. These, says Buchanan, are the things worth fighting for and living for. Pop's own father, a red-headed Scotch-Irish drinker and brawler who had grown up in Mississippi with an abiding contempt for Yankees, had deserted his family with no particular explanation. This left a permanent scar on Pop, who determined to be there every day when his own family was growing up. His watchfulness might have been suffocating, but Pop had his breezy side and took the mischievous doings of seven boys as something to be expected. He taught the boys to use their fists, and for the most part let them settle their own squabbles. When the occasion really called for it, however, he used corporal punishment on the unlucky miscreant.

Buchanan's memoir is a fascinating, if frequently bewildering, mixture. Serious political analysis alternates with discursive anecdotal reminiscences of harum-scarum doings in Washington hot shoppes and bars. There were always six-packs to be drunk and cars to be smashed. Pat's brother Hank was a particular sinner. When Hank saw a pile of pornographic magazines in a bookstore, he thought nothing of putting a match to it that risked burning down the shop.

Buchanan's stories of youthful escapades are often hilarious, but the more important parts of the book are the analytical. Buchanan went to Jesuit schools—Gonzaga High and Georgetown University, before doing postgraduate work at the Columbia School of Journalism. He majored in English at Georgetown, for he knew that if he were to specialize in history, his favorite subject, he would never get around to the literary classics. He now makes common cause with Bill Bennett in advocating the Gonzaga basics for all our high schools.

After his year at Columbia, where he had many a spirited argument with the liberal faculty members, Buchanan signed on to work for the *St. Louis Globe Democrat,* the conservative second paper in a town dominated by the Pulitzer-owned liberal *Post-Dispatch.* He caught Richard Nixon's eye as an editorial "generalist," and was forthwith hired to help Nixon get to the White House. A more complete account of working for Nixon and Ronald Reagan will be coming in the sequel that Buchanan will someday be writing.

Pop Buchanan's Generation

The best thing in the present book is Buchanan's analysis of the beliefs of his father's generation. Pop Buchanan disliked Harry Truman because the "little-son-of-a-buck" had fired Douglas MacArthur, the "greatest general since Julius Caesar." When MacArthur faded away, Pop's new hero was Joe McCarthy, the Wisconsin junior senator who called himself Tail Gunner Joe. Buchanan notes that today men who would smilingly pardon Harry Truman for calling Stalin "good old Joe" would not be so forgiving of an American president who referred to McCarthy as "good old Joe."

Buchanan is entirely willing to back his father's feelings about McCarthy. "If McCarthy was so great a menace," he writes, "if this was a time of national 'hysteria,' why does not a single Gallup poll of that era show even 1 percent of Americans viewing McCarthyism . . . as a significant national problem?" After all, the Kennedy girls dated Joe, and Bobby Kennedy worked for him and invited him to Hyannisport to play touch football.

Four years after the first contentious McCarthy speech at Wheeling, West Virginia, McCarthy had a Gallup rating of 50 percent positive as against 29 percent negative. The loyalty McCarthy held for four years "had little to do with whether Owen Lattimore was a gullible fool, or a sympathizer of Stalin." Americans in the '50s had learned about the details of the Hiss case and had watched while a Soviet coup took over Czechoslovakia and the East Germans built the Berlin Wall. They knew all about the Rosenbergs and other convicted spies. It was far from being stupid to ask who was responsible for this state of affairs. But McCarthy then made the tactical mistake of taking on the army. That was too much. The public could not believe that the promotion of the Red dentist Peres was anything more than a minor bureaucratic blunder.

Pat Buchanan says that "whatever Joe McCarthy's sins, he did not deliver whole countries in eastern Europe to a Communist system . . . nor did he forcibly 'repatriate' . . . two million Russian and Ukrainian POWs to be executed at the railhead on their return to the 'embrace of the Motherland.' "

What worries Buchanan now is that the liberals who refused to understand Pop Buchanan's generation are still with us. "As the Soviet bloc rolls up Central America," he writes, "the envenomed political battlegrounds . . . of the McCarthy era and of the Vietnam era, are going to be revisited once again. Because nothing has been settled; the chasm has never been closed."

Pat Buchanan pays a superlative tribute to Bill Buckley, "Before I read *National Review,*" he writes, " . . . we young conservatives were truly wandering around in a political wilderness." It did not matter to Pat Buchanan that

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many of Buckley's writers had had to learn the hard way as Trotskyites that collectivism was a delusion. Though he had been way ahead of them as an anti-collectivist, the *National Review* writers inspired Pat to speak out, and he has been doing just that ever since.

We look forward to a sequel by Pat Buchanan called *Right to the End.*

The Man with a Hoe

The Peasant Betrayed: Agriculture and Land Reform in the Third World, *by John P. Powelson and Richard Stock, with contributions by Grace Goodell, Susan Gunn, Bettina Herr, and Charles Howe (Boston: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, $40).*

Reviewed by Russell Kirk

For the past seven decades, the militant cry "Land reform now!" has been heard in most of the countries of the world. In consequence, a great part of the arable land has been snatched away from its previous possessors and transferred to other hands; the United States is one of the few countries where nothing of the sort has occurred. Have these compulsory transfers of real property made tillers of the soil prosperous and content?

In this big book, prepared with much care and earnestness, "development" experts describe in impressive detail what has happened in Third World nations: chapters on the Philippines, Mexico, Tanzania, Iran, Egypt, Bolivia, Somalia, Algeria, India, Pakistan, South Korea, Taiwan, Peru, Indonesia, El Salvador, Nicaragua; and shorter sections on Turkey, Zambia, Sri Lanka, Venezuela, Paraguay, Subsaharan Africa, Honduras, Chile, Cuba, and China. "Disheartening" is too mild a word to describe the results (with few exceptions) of these grandiose programs that were expected to benefit and satisfy the small farmers and the peasants of the Third World.

Professor Powelson (of the University of Colorado) and his associates do not take up the grim consequences of the earlier "land reform" in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Anyone who has read Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag Archipelago* does not have to be instructed in the fate of the peasantry under Communist domination. Within the Soviet system it has been the story of Orwell's parable *Animal Farm.* At the Manor Farm, Farmer Jones is thrust out by the animals; but the succeeding domination of the Pigs is worse than Jones's misrule. There prevails the single commandment, "All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others." And in the end, the more things have changed at the Manor Farm, the more they remain the same.

But is it not otherwise in the Third World, emergent from colonialism, exploitation, and all that? No, it is not otherwise. Except for South Korea, to a lesser extent Taiwan, and anomalous situations in Bolivia and the Indian state of Kerala, land reform has made the peasants' lot harsher economically and more hopeless politically. In several countries the peasants have become serfs of the state, deprived of any power to make their own decisions, let alone to improve their material condition.

As Powelson summarizes this Third World inhumanity toward the small cultivators, "Instead of benefiting the peasants—as they promised to do—many states undertaking land reform have enriched themselves. Thus land reform has become another policy instrument to skim off the 'agricultural surplus.' It has also enhanced the power of government officials, particularly at high levels, increasing their ability to demand patronage. Reserving for themselves decisions on agricultural inputs, outputs, and timing, they are usually not as good farmers as the farmers. Both because of this and because peasant initiative has been reduced, agriculture itself has suffered."

How has this degradation been accomplished? Sometimes it has been done with malice aforethought, a stern way with peasants being advocated by Marx; but often the cultivators have suffered no less from the meddling presumption of humanitarian reformers. The process has varied from country to country, but in general it has the following characteristics.

A central government effaces the class of landed proprietors, sometimes through outright confiscation, sometimes with partial compensation. The arable land then either becomes the property of the state, with the peasantry as tenants; or else it is parceled out to the small farmers and peasants on the basis of a formula.

In either of the above methods of land reform, soon there grows up a body of bureaucrats and managers (some of them actually the very people who managed the arable land before the reform) who take direction of the new agricultural system, whether for the fiscal advantage of the state or with the intention of guiding and protecting the peasants—who are assumed to be incapable of managing their own concerns.

The government establishes a monopoly of purchasing: that is, the peasants are required to sell most or all of their crops to a governmental agency, at fixed prices ordinarily well below what would be the prices in a free market.

The government establishes a monopoly of distribution: that is, only from a governmental agency are the peasants permitted to purchase seeds, fertilizer, and other essential wants. That is another device for diverting from the peasants the "surplus" or "rent" produced by their labor.

The government establishes a monopoly of credit: that is, only from a governmental agency may the peasants obtain the loans necessary to sustain their families during an unproductive season, or to purchase tools and the like. "Middlemen" are eliminated—to the peasants' disadvantage.

The government deprives the peasant communities of whatever autonomy they once possessed: it regulates all their ways of life, and sometimes compels them to shift into state-built and state-directed villages, impersonal and boring.

Not all the Third World regimes devise so systematic an exploitation of the peasant. Land reform in Bolivia has been relatively harmless because of the feeble govern-

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ment's inability to enforce its plans, for one instance. And yet only in two of the Third World countries—and those two, virtual dependencies of the United States—have the peasants gained something substantial by the land-reform programs, over the years.

In both South Korea and Taiwan the peasants purchased the land taken from its previous possessors, rather than receiving it "by grace"—that is, as a condescending gift from the state. The very act of purchase helped to make the purchasers more independent and responsible. And in both countries, the peasants retain some power to influence the government by certain pressures: if a government meddles too much with them, it meddles at its risk.

The authors of this convincing book are themselves advocates of extensive land reform, despite their dismay at what has occurred in most such programs ever since World War II. They believe that peasant culture ought to endure, though it must be integrated slowly with modern culture; and they have confidence that peasant communities are competent to manage their own intricate concerns—far more competent than are bureaucrats at a national capital. Powelson and his colleagues argue in favor of a free-market economy for the cultivators of the land; the present directed agricultural economies of the Third World, generally speaking, are ruinous in the long run both to the peasant and to the regime that bullies him.

As for American governmental policy concerning land reforms, Powelson and his colleagues deny the Marxist allegations. Rather, "In Latin America, the 'backyard' of the United States, U.S. government goals are twofold: to prevent international communism and to keep the country 'quiet' (subdue guerrilla warfare). If land reform is convenient to those goals, the United States will promote it; if not, it will not. Consistent with this hypothesis, the United States will promote only land reforms that do not lead to communist-style state farms."

Yet the American government has ignored, as has Soviet government, the need for peasant control over agricultural decisions, and has supported central governments indifferent, at best, to peasant cultures. The authors hope that some friends to the free peasant may be found, and offer those "external advocates" this advice:

> Instead of supplanting those cultures; instead of destroying their methods of coping through outside "assistance"; instead of incorporating peasants into "integrated economic plans"; instead of imposing modern institutions created in capital cities or abroad, external advocates might help peasants integrate their own cultures into modern society.

Historically considered, the Man with a Hoe rarely has burst into fierce rebellion; he has endured much from city folk, over the centuries. Nowadays his systematic exploiters commonly pretend to be his humanitarian benefactors. The time may come, even in China or the Soviet empire, when in a quite different land reform the peasants demand, like Carlyle's Sans-Culotte, many-headed, fire-breathing, "What think ye of *me*?"

A Second Emancipation Proclamation

Changing Course: Civil Rights at the Crossroads, *by Clint Bolick (New Brunswick: Transaction Press, $21.95).*

Reviewed by Clarence Thomas

Clint Bolick, a civil rights attorney who worked in the Reagan administration and is now director of Landmark Legal Foundation's Center for Civil Rights, seeks to steal civil rights as an issue from political and racial collectivists, and to reorient it on libertarian and conservative terms. He writes, "The essence of civil rights is that every individual possesses the authority to control his or her own destiny."

Although Bolick is no friend of goals and timetables, or other statistical remedies for discrimination, his book is not just another legalistic anti-affirmative action diatribe. Rather, it possesses the requisite spirit and policies regarding civil rights that can preserve freedom for all Americans and thus make racial preference schemes irrelevant.

In the first part of *Changing Course,* Bolick reflects on the foundations and course of civil rights in America, and he reminds us that economic liberties are among those fundamental rights. By noting the influence of the natural rights thinking of John Locke and Thomas Paine, Bolick

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makes a powerful "original intent" argument for civil rights, which discusses the Founders' intent in terms of the higher law background of the Constitution.

Fundamental rights, individualism, and equality before the law, says Bolick, characterized the American political tradition. Equal opportunity—with all the inequalities of result this necessarily produces—was the goal, and the Declaration of Independence was the guide. Though the nation's history has been marred by deviations from its founding ideal, the American proposition of human equality has always been the guiding light for both statesmen and agitators.

According to Bolick, the battle for equality culminated in the triumph of color-blind principles in *Brown* v. *Board of Education*, the inspiring leadership of Martin Luther King, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (he does not mention the Voting Rights Act of 1965). But *Brown* is not the clean break with *Plessy* v. *Ferguson* that Bolick maintains; pure libertarians may cavil at his firm endorsement of the 1964 Act, with its expansion of national power; and Bolick's King is certainly not the complex figure of David Garrow's *Bearing the Cross*. Nonetheless, his summary is essentially correct.

Bolick concludes that at the zenith of its success the revolution was betrayed. Not content with justice for individuals, the civil rights movement sought power for itself, and became the Civil Rights Establishment. Claimants, quotas, and collectivism replaced opportunity and individualism. Examining both popular writing and legal opinions, Bolick describes how, step by step, race consciousness prevailed over color-blindness and produced an array of government-mandated, race-oriented programs, from busing to set-asides.

Concrete Reforms

The book's second half contains Bolick's libertarian prescriptions for reviving the civil rights revolution. Drawn from sources such as Walter Williams and Thomas Sowell, many of these proposals will be familiar to conservatives: education vouchers, enterprise zones, and elimination of anti-entrepreneurial laws such as the minimum wage and licensing requirements. Bolick synthesizes arguments for these proposals and bases them on a coherent philosophy of individual rights. When he calls for a "second Emancipation Proclamation" from "authoritarian" bureaucracy and regulation, he earnestly desires a revival of individualism, among Americans of all races. Bolick's treatment of specific reforms such as tuition vouchers illuminates the extent to which membership in an organized interest group gives one rights. Racial (and gender) preferences are simply manifestations of a widespread denigration of individual rights and recognition of only groups.

Amid much rhetoric about the virtues of being color-blind, Bolick supplies concrete reforms that deal with real minority problems and are neither paternalistic nor race-conscious. The liberating measures he endorses use the strengths of ingenuity, persistence, and character that black people have always relied on for survival.

At times Bolick's libertarianism goes too far. He decries statutes against "victimless crimes" such as anti-drug laws (which encourage crime, in his view). He even endorses an activist judiciary that would strike laws regulating the economy. (But he may well be correct in seeking revitalization of the privileges or immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, trivialized by the *Slaughter-House cases* of 1873.) He reaches such conclusions because he sees the American notion of rights as "negative," that is, independent of a notion of what is truly good for men and women. In properly denying to government the power to establish that good, Bolick appears to make such a good a matter of individual taste or whim—an indifference tantamount to nihilism. At this point Bolick appears to have lost sight of the higher law background of the rights he zealously seeks to defend. To be free from slavery is not the same as exercising freedom.

Racial (and gender) preferences are simply manifestations of widespread denigration of individual rights and recognition of only groups.

My differences with Bolick are academic, given the power of his book and the immense contribution it must make to the ongoing debate over civil rights. If America is ever to change its course on civil rights and reject the claimant, interest-group mentality that now dominates our politics generally, it will be through the efforts of spirited, thoughtful individuals such as Clint Bolick.

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LETTERS

Richard Pipes, John B. Dunlop, James George Jatras, Zenon E. Kohut, Natalie Mason Gawdiak, M. Petro, Larissa M. Fontana, Nicolai N. Petro, Nicholas Davidson, William R. Mattox, Jr., Bryce J. Christensen, Michael Levin, Sandra Gellert, Burton L. White, Wendy Dreskin, Ann L. Walicke, Penelope Leach

Moro's Misconceptions

Dear Sir:

David Moro's enthusiasm for Russian nationalism ("The National Liberation of Russia," Winter 1988) rests on two misconceptions.

The first assumes that Communism is somehow antithetical to Russia's national spirit and traditions. Indeed, Communism has inflicted untold damage on Russia and Russians: The human costs of the revolution and the civil war alone are now estimated by Soviet demographers to have been over 10 million people, which equals the casualties suffered by all the belligerents in the First World War. The Communist regime has never received anything close to a majority of popular support. But its main base of support in 1917-20 were areas populated by Great Russians, and the Communists managed early to adapt themselves to Russian political culture, with its stress on autocracy, politicized justice, and socioeconomic leveling. For many decades now the Kremlin has extolled Russia's past, imposed the Russian language on the rest of the population, and insisted on Russian ethnic preponderance in the party, security, and military establishments.

By controlling the destinies of its subjects, Moscow becomes *ipso facto* the protector of their interests. Except for a small minority of intellectuals who are able to place the interests of the nation above their own, Russians of necessity identify with their government and hope for its success at home and abroad. It is quite impossible for foreign powers to drive a wedge between the Kremlin and the Russian people for the simple reason that foreigners cannot significantly influence their lives, whereas the Kremlin can.

Second, Moro idealizes beyond recognition the spirit of Russian nationalism. Born in the Middle Ages of a sense of religious exclusiveness, it has always been driven by xenophobia. Patriotism, defined as a love of one's country that does not disparage other nations, is confined in the Soviet Union to the Westernizing intelligentsia, who are constantly attacked by the "Russianists." The Soviet government tolerates conservative-nationalist associations and publications while it persecutes those of a pro-Western and democratic orientation precisely because the former present no threat. In his *Letter to the Soviet Leaders,* to which Moro refers, Solzhenitsyn, a leading spokesman of the "Russianists," was quite willing to have the Communist Party stay in power in Russia.

I am far less prepared to welcome the "benign, authoritarian government with a nationalist orientation" that Moro sees as an acceptable alternative to Communism. As Andrei Sakharov has pointed out, in response to Solzhenitsyn, "ideologues have always been gentler than the practical politicians who follow them." Like Sakharov, I fear that such regimes have a habit of quickly shedding their "benign" qualities and adopting a dangerous, aggressive nationalism.

Richard Pipes
Harvard University
Cambridge, MA

Varieties of Russian Nationalism

Dear Sir:

I concur with David Moro's thesis that Russian nationalism is a major policy issue with which Western statesmen will have to deal in coming decades. Under Mikhail Gorbachev, Russian nationalism has grown noticeably stronger, though this does not mean that Gorbachev is himself a sympathizer; he demonstrably is not. My most serious quarrel with Moro is that his essay does not adequately treat developments that have occurred in the Gorbachev period.

The present political situation in the Soviet Union is unusually fluid, but one can nevertheless delineate three preponderant groups or clusters among Soviet elites. The future of the Soviet Union and, to an extent, of the United States will depend on the outcome of the shifting struggles and interactions among these three groups.

The first group is, of course, the "Gorbachevites," the political sup-

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porters and allies of the general secretary and of his close associate, full Politburo member Aleksandr Yakovlev. This group is dominated by an amalgam of neo-Leninists (and I would categorize both Gorbachev and Yakovlev as neo-Leninists), liberal Marxists, and Western-leaning liberals, but it also includes "liberal Russian nationalists," such as Academician Dimitri Likhachev, chairman of the presidium of the Soviet Cultural Foundation; Sergei Zalygin, editor of *Novy Mir;* Elem Klimov, first secretary of the Union of Soviet Filmmakers; and novelist Boris Mozhaev. Essentially, these individuals are what Moro calls "Russites," and their views are similar to those of exiled novelist and Nobel prize-winner Alexander Solzhenitsyn. They have allied themselves with the Gorbachevites because they agree with such initiatives as *glasnost,* de-Stalinization, and the loosening of the shackles on the Russian Orthodox Church.

Suspicious of U.S.

The second group, which is much larger than the "Russites," and which enjoys a mass base, consists of centrists and right-wing Russian nationalists. This group includes many of the USSR's leading writers, such as Valentin Rasputin, Viktor Astafyev, Vasily Belov, Yuri Bondarev, and Mikhail Alekseev, editor of the journal *Moskva.* They share with the liberal nationalists a fervent concern, even an obsession, with the demographic, social, and spiritual decline of contemporary ethnic Russians. Rasputin's tale *The Fire* and Astafyev's short novel *The Sad Detective* encapsulate many of the concerns of this group. Like the liberal nationalists, they focus on the fate of the Russian environment and of the Russian cultural monuments, particularly ancient churches. Again like the liberals, many of them are Russian Orthodox.

What separates this group from the liberal nationalists is their deep suspicion of the West, especially the United States, and their strong anti-Semitism. They see the United States as a land of rampant decay, characterized by such plagues as drugs, crime, and "mass culture." Many adherents also believe in a "Jewish-Masonic conspiracy," which allegedly controls both the United States and much of the West. Dominated in its foreign policy toward the Soviet Union by Russophobic Jews, the U.S., in their view, seeks to use all means at its disposal, including foreign radio broadcasts, to bring about the demise of Russia as a unique national entity. Most notably, this inward-looking group holds a primarily defensive, not offensive, stance toward the West.

Neo-Stalinism

This second group of Russian nationalists will undoubtedly impress many readers as extreme and repugnant. There is, however, a third group among Soviet elites who should not be considered Russian nationalists—no Russian nationalist would, for example, defend the forced collectivization of agriculture—but who are prepared to manipulate certain nationalist concerns, such as hostility to "mass culture" and pro-environmentalism. Faced with the growing specter of this group, the Gorbachevites have recently been attempting to build bridges to the centrist and right-wing nationalists, including the adherents of the much-maligned informal organization Pamyat (Memory). Formerly, the Gorbachevites had attacked many of these nationalist spokesmen without mercy.

A major, unsigned Gorbachevite editorial that was published in the April 5th issue of *Pravda* represents this new tack. So does a pathbreaking article entitled "Pamyat and 'Pamyat'," which appeared in the 1988, No. 1 issue of *Znamya,* an important journal dominated by Gorbachevites and edited by Grigory Baklanov, a Soviet Jew.

The threatening third group quite accurately may be termed neo-Stalinist. Among other things, they call for a refurbishing of Stalin's image, which has been badly tarnished by the Gorbachevites. The "platform" of this group is a full-page essay, ostensibly written by a chemistry instructor from Leningrad, Nina Andreeva, which appeared in the March 13, 1988 issue of *Sovetskaya Rossiya,* the daily newspaper of the Russian Republic. Soviet intellectuals were reportedly so shocked by this essay that they thought that a coup had occurred and that Gorbachev had been ousted.

Andreeva writes that Marx and Engels held that, at various points in their history, whole nations can be "counterrevolutionary." The Jews, she suggests, constitute such a nation today.

—John B. Dunlop

Andreeva, who clearly is fronting for powerful patrons, relies on a model provided by Soviet writer Aleksandr Prokhanov, an outspoken neo-Stalinist with close ties to the military. The article assails the "neo-liberal" Gorbachevites for their infatuation with contemporary capitalism and for their attempted revisions of party history, *i.e.,* of Marxist-Leninist ideology. Andreeva, however, also attacks liberals, centrists, and right-wing Russian nationalists for their reservations about forced collectivization, for their interest in religion, and for their historical curiosity about pre-revolutionary Russia.

Aggressive Anti-Semitism

The most lurid aspect of Andreeva's vehement manifesto is its aggressive anti-Semitism, which is employed as a prop for the declining official ideology. Ominously, Andreeva writes that Marx and Engels held that, at various points in

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their history, whole nations can be "counterrevolutionary." The Jews, she suggests, constitute such a nation today. Andreeva is also violently anti-Western and anti-Christian.

This third group enjoys the support of powerful Soviet leaders: "second party secretary" Egor Ligachev, KGB chairman Viktor Chebrikov, Defense Minister Dimitri Yazov, and other Politburo members. If this group were to come to power—and it is a possibility—then we could face a period of growing tension in East-West relations. The group could be expansionist in its foreign policy, though it might choose, at least at first, to concentrate on domestic affairs. (Gorbachev launched a strong counter-offensive against this group in April 1988.)

I agree with Moro concerning the importance of Russian nationalism as an issue for American policymakers. And I concur with Professor George Gibian of Cornell who recently argued in an editorial in the *Wall Street Journal* that the United States should do all that it can to encourage and educate moderate elements among the nationalists. We also must correctly distinguish among the various groups existing among the Russian nationalists. There continue to be influential spokesmen in the United States who appear unable to differentiate between an Alexander Solzhenitsyn and a Nina Andreeva. Such a failure of reasoning could lead to irreversible consequences.

John B. Dunlop
Hoover Institution
Stanford, CA

Post-Soviet World

Dear Sir:

David Moro's "The National Rebirth of Russia" is a bold departure from the usual, tired analysis of the Soviet problem.

Mr. Moro proceeds from what one would assume would be an elementary premise of any discussion of the Russian problem: that the Soviet regime is an aberration in the progress of both Russian and world history. A narrowly based, ideological "vanguard party," drawing its claimed legitimacy from an economic model considered laughable even before the end of the 19th century, now manages to hang on to power principally through the cynical exploitation of its subjects' security concerns and national loyalties. The continued retention of power by that party ensures the perpetuation of the atmosphere of insecurity and disorder that has plagued the world community since the last stable international system collapsed in 1914. Thus, for both Russia and the world, a return to some sort of normalcy requires the replacement of the totalitarian Soviet regime with a normal government.

So accustomed are we to the abnormality of the last seven decades that too many of us are incapable of understanding how much more relaxed and nonthreatening would be international life in a post-Soviet age. Clearly, as critics of Mr. Moro will suggest, the emergence of a non-Communist, nationally oriented Russian government will not be without its difficulties—especially with respect to the many non-Russian nationalities of the Soviet Union. But it must be emphasized that these difficulties (which are only suppressed and festering for the moment, not absent) are of a secondary order of magnitude; they are on a par with the Falklands/Malvinas and Cyprus disputes (today) or the Alsace-Lorraine and Schleswig-Holstein questions (yesterday). These issues pale in comparison with the Soviet regime's unwavering pursuit of world domination and "the triumph of socialism on a world scale." The Soviet Union of necessity must seek power in Central America, in Africa, throughout Asia; a nationally minded Russian government, even more than the former Russian empire, would care less about these places. Even on a regional basis, in the unlikely event that the Russian successor government had the slightest imperial aspirations, it would be forced to come to terms with its neighbors, as have the other former imperialists of Britain, France, and Germany.

The uncertainties of a post-Soviet world appear so daunting because they are unknown, precisely because our leading analysts have been far more interested in the impossible task of trying to find a way to a *modus vivendi* with militant Communism than a way to supersede it. We imagine that fascism, national socialism, apartheid, and a host of petty tyrannies are all mortal—but Communism is forever.

James George Jatras
Alexandria, VA

Russian Imperialism

Dear Sir:

Mr. Moro states that only a bare majority of the Soviet population is Russian and that Russian nationalism has been coopted in the service of the empire. He then comes to the bizarre conclusion that the Russian "people and culture have endured persecutions far greater than those inflicted on minority nationalities." This is simply false. No matter how much Russian culture has been impoverished by Marxist ideology, it exists and is very much Russian. Some non-Russians are persecuted simply for using their native language. For them any kind of cultural activities, even within narrow ideological constraints, have been made difficult and at times impossible.

Russians can certainly have a Russian national state. But would the "Russianists" forgo their empire (Soviet or Russian nationalist) for even the most pristine flowering of Russian culture? With the exception of Solzhenitsyn, the Russianists Moro lists are silent on this critical issue. Moro's fantasies notwithstanding, Russian nationalism continues to be tied to imperialism.

Zenon E. Kohut
Arlington, VA

Dear Sir:

David Moro must have lived in shining isolation during the year he spent in the Soviet Union or else he would not have arrived at such an incredibly naive assessment.

How much more Russian could the Soviet regime get? And the idea that the Soviet regime has persecuted its own people more than any other

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(even if this is true—which I highly doubt) means nothing. Did not the Communists purge their own loyal party members? Did that make the Soviet regime anti-Communist? No! It is an age-old tendency of the Russian mentality. Czars killed their own families, their own retinues, their allies, and the Soviets are merely an extension of Russian imperialism and nothing less.

Natalie Mason Gawdiak
Ukrainian-American
Community Network
Silver Spring, MD

Dear Sir:

As far as freedom, human rights, democracy, and aggressive expansion is concerned, the Russian empire was not much less evil than the Soviet is. The world, including the United States, will not feel safe in the presence of either. The only rational and moral policy for the U.S. to pursue would be for decolonization of the Soviet/Russian empire.

M. Petro
Rockville, MD

Dear Sir:

It is absolutely unbelievable that 70 years after the revolution, Mr. Moro would propose that we return to pre-1917 Russia and a "benign authoritarian" rule. That pre-1917 Russia was forcibly composed of many non-Russian nationalities in addition to the ethnic Russians. After the revolution many of these same nationalities were forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union with the Russian language and culture being used as the "cement."

Since 1654, Russification was the official policy in Ukraine. Then in 1876 the Ems Ukase forbade the Ukrainian language, and imposed Russian as the official language. As far as many non-Russian nationalities are concerned, not much has changed. Instead of the czar there is the Communist Party performing the same function of denationalization, repression, and Russification.

The "awesome power of appeals to Russian nationalism" appeals to no one but the ethnic Russians. As far as the "demographic crisis affecting ethnic Russians," I assume the author is speaking about the Asiatic Soviets versus the ethnic Russians. However, in the Baltic states, the Ukraine, and Byelorussia, we have a demographic crisis, for Russians are being brought in to denationalize these countries.

While there are those in ethnic-Russian society who fervently believe in the lofty ideals of human rights and freedom of expression, there seem to be very few supporters of the belief that the Baltic states, the Ukraine, and Byelorussia have the right to be independent, and that Russia should retreat into her ethnographic borders.

Larissa M. Fontana
Potomac, MD

Our leading analysts have been far more interested in the impossible task of trying to find a way to a *modus vivendi* with militant Communism than a way to supersede it.

—James George Jatras

Russia's Democratic Tradition

Dear Sir:

Mr. Moro's proposal provides the first realistic basis for a truly long-term strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union. It is realistic because it does not dismiss nationalism and religious feeling, two of the most influential aspects of 20th century international relations that Americans have often underestimated.

Mr. Moro mentions the most obvious arguments of those who would oppose such a policy. There is one additional problem, however, that our educators should focus upon—the tremendous ignorance of the indigenous traditions of Russian liberalism and democracy. The arguments of skeptics sound convincing because there is almost no popular knowledge of this aspect of Russian history. The names of V. A. Maklakov, P. B. Struve, P. N. Milyukov, M. M. Kovalevsky, M. Ia Ostrogorsky are scarcely known even among professors of recent Russian history. The writings of Sir Paul Vinogradoff, Sergei Utechin, Michael Karpovich, and Sergei Pushkarev, on Russian populism, opposition to serfdom, the *zemstvo* movement, and even Russian constitutionalism after 1905 are slighted in favor of "surveys" of Russian history that focus more on the politics of the 15th century than of the turn of the 20th century.

As with every nation, a tradition of liberalism and democracy did exist in Russia before the revolution abrogated political thinking. Gross generalizations concerning a people being "unprepared" for democracy would have severely handicapped our policies in postwar Germany and Japan had they held sway.

I am reluctant, however, to credit Gorbachev with aspirations for "radical restructuring" following the Russianist model. It strikes me as more likely that he means it when he says in *Perestroika*, "... we are conducting all our reforms in accordance with the socialist choice. We are looking within socialism, rather than outside it, for the answers to all questions that arise.... Those who hope that we shall move away from the socialist path will be greatly disappointed."

Nicolai N. Petro
Center for Contemporary
Russian Studies
Monterey, CA

David Moro replies:

Several ingrained misperceptions cloud the controversy over Russian nationalism and its relationship to the Soviet regime. There is a widespread reluctance to acknowledge

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that homegrown despotisms can be alien or hostile to the nations over which they rule. Americans easily recognize the Polish or Afghan regimes as antinational, because these were installed from without. But we have trouble picturing the Kremlin as hostile to the national interests of its Russian subjects partly because Bolshevism came to power from within the country, and partly because the Soviet government is largely composed of ethnic Russians, ruling from the former Russian capital, with Russian as the official language.

It should be self-evident, however, that when a regime espouses an ideology and policies that negate the basic values of a nation, and resorts to systematic violence to implement them—resulting in the wholesale repression of its culture, historical memory, and religion, and the physical destruction of tens of millions of its inhabitants—that regime becomes antinational and illegitimate, regardless of the ethnic composition of the ruling elite. The Khmer Rouge, who butchered nearly half the Cambodian population, had Cambodian blood coursing through their veins; but no serious observer would dispute that this regime was antinational in the extreme (even more so, in fact, than the Vietnamese invaders who ousted it).

Lenin's and Stalin's Holocausts

That the same is not recognized about the Soviet regime is largely the result of gaping holes in our historical frame of reference. Most Americans have no appreciation for the magnitude of the human tragedy wrought by Communist rule in the Soviet Union. It still raises eyebrows to point out that by the most conservative estimates, the number of noncombatant victims of Lenin's and Stalin's genocides is three to four times the total that perished in Hitler's Holocaust—that ultimate yardstick by which our age measures the great crimes of history. Likewise, there is little recognition of the degree to which the Russian people and culture bore the brunt of this unparalleled domestic brutality in the first two decades of Bolshevik rule (the purges of the intelligentsia and the middle classes, the persecution of the clergy and believers, the extermination of the *kulaks* during collectivization). To point this out is not to minimize the plight of non-Russian victims of Bolshevism, and has nothing to do with "arrogance." It merely provides a much-needed context for understanding how many contemporary Russian nationalists view the Soviet experience.

Despite the immense social problems it faced, 19th- and early 20th-century Russia gave every indication it was following the evolutionary pattern of other modern nation-states: internal democratization and a lessening of imperial ambitions.

—David Moro

Another misperception has to do with pre-revolutionary Russia and its relationship to modern Russian nationalism. Russia suffered a cataclysmic interruption in its national development with the establishment of the modern world's first totalitarian regime in 1917. In a sense, the country under Kerensky's Provisional Government represents the last "snapshot" we have of Russia as an ordinary nation-state. Thus, many of those seeking to define the "Russian national character" (as it might exist outside the Communist conditions) automatically look to pre-1917 Imperial Russia rather than carefully looking at contemporary nationalist thought as it has evolved in the intervening years. If one had tried to define the French or German national character during their respective totalitarian phases (Jacobinism and Hitlerism) using only pre-revolutionary France and pre-Nazi Germany as indicators of those nations' potential, one might well have excluded the possibility that either could evolve into the benign, nonimperial democracies they are today.

Evolving Russia

This problem is compounded by an intellectually sloppy treatment of the pre-revolutionary period, in which centuries of historical experience are lumped together under the rubric of "Imperial Russia" with no consideration for the evolution and maturation of society that took place. People lose sight of the fact that Nicholas II's "Imperial Russia" was a very different place from Ivan the Terrible's. By February 1917, Russia had evolved into a fledgling democracy with a rapidly growing market economy and a vibrant world culture. Despite the immense social problems it faced, 19th- and early 20th-century Russia gave every indication it was following the evolutionary pattern of other modern nation-states: internal democratization and a lessening of imperial ambitions.

With regard to Richard Pipes' argument that Bolshevism was not antithetical to Russia's "national spirit and traditions," a clarification is needed. I never claimed there weren't certain tendencies and weaknesses in Russian society that made it vulnerable to the seductions of totalitarian panaceas. But against the backdrop of the 20th century, these weaknesses appear more and more as a *universal,* rather than a uniquely Russian, phenomenon, and they have led to the establishment of Communist despotisms in China, Vietnam, Yugoslavia, Albania, Cuba, and Nicaragua, to name just a few examples. Nor has the West been immune to them, as demonstrated by the rise of Eurocommunism and the proliferation of extremist Communist groups such as

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Italy's Red Brigades.

Bolsheviks vs. Russia

Lenin came to power promising land to the peasants and factories to the workers. Elements of the Russian working class and peasantry were duped by these promises into supporting him, but it does not follow that the totalitarian order actually imposed by Bolshevism (which broke those promises) was compatible with Russia. Mr. Pipes does not specify which "Russian political culture" the Soviets are supposed to have adapted to; what is beyond question is that once in power, the Bolsheviks abolished the *Russian* Constituent Assembly, reversed the press liberalizations and judicial reforms that had evolved *under Russian governments* over the previous 70 years, and ruled in the name of a radical ideology developed not in Russia but in Western Europe. The fact that Soviet Communism carried out its own brutal version of Russification in minority republics (while simultaneously plundering the Russian populace and culture) does not prove its compatibility with Russian national interests.

Mr. Pipes makes a logical error when he equates "controlling the destinies" of Russian subjects with "protecting their interests." One does not necessarily imply the other. Whether a regime advances the interests of its subjects (as *they* define them) depends on how it controls their destinies. The Kremlin from the outset has done this so ineptly that it has, in fact, set the stage for a wedge to be driven between state and nation—provided a catalyst can be found to mobilize latent nationalist discontent into a dynamic force for change.

Mr. Pipes incorrectly states that polycentric nationalism ("love of one's country that does not disparage other nations") is confined to the Westernizing intelligentsia. Any sampling of the Russianist writings cited in my article will attest to this. He also mistakenly asserts that nationalist publications have been tolerated because they pose no threat to the regime. In fact, (until Gorbachev, at least) antitotalitarian nationalists like Solzhenitsyn, Ogurtsov, and Iakunin have been persecuted as vigorously as the Westernizers. The only "nationalists" that have been consistently indulged by the regime are extremists of National Bolshevik or neo-Stalinist persuasions. Finally, it is disingenuous to cite Solzhenitsyn's *Letter* as evidence that he is "quite willing" to see Communists remain in power. Solzhenitsyn has been unequivocal about his true preferences. The letter in question was a plea written to an all-powerful totalitarian leadership to change some of their most destructive policies. As such, it could not include a demand that they relinquish their personal power.

Hostility Toward Russians

Taken together, the letters from Kohut, Gawdiak, M. Petro, and Fontana confirm my experience that the most difficult task in advancing a new approach to the Soviet problem is to get people to read what you actually say as opposed to what they expect you to say. I never advocated, for instance, a return to pre-revolutionary Russia or czarist imperialism. What I argued was that the *contemporary* Russianist "alternative" represents the most plausible path out of the totalitarian abyss. A major element of that alternative is the Russianists' approach to the nationalities question, which envisions liberalization—up to and including independence—for many ethnic minorities currently under Soviet domination. It is not unreasonable to suppose that this element of the Russianist program would appeal to non-Russians (and Ms. Fontana is wrong to dismiss the possibility out of hand). This is especially true if pains are taken to emphasize the commonality of interests between Russianism and other defensive nationalist movements in the USSR, as I urged in my article.

One can sympathize with M. Petro's passionate calls for "decolonization"; but it is hard to see how that cause is advanced by confronting any manifestation of Russian national sentiment with blind hostility, thus leaving it no choice but to seek an accommodation with the regime. Incidentally, Petro reveals a complete lack of historical perspective when he asserts that the Russian empire was "not much less evil" than the Soviet regime in terms of human rights and expansionist tendencies. The czarist pogroms and persecution of the Old Believers were on a much smaller scale than the genocidal violence of the Soviet period, and expansionism under the czars was not fueled by ideological imperatives.

Gorbachev's Nationalism

Finally, though I hesitate to take issue with a scholar of Mr. Dunlop's stature on matters of Russian nationalism, I believe his conclusion that Gorbachev is "demonstrably" not a nationalist sympathizer is premature. Mr. Dunlop almost recognizes this (implicitly) when he places liberal nationalists of the Solzhenitsyn mold in the "Gorbachevite" category. I am prepared to believe that Gorbachev is, by conviction, a Westernizing reformer. But recent developments, such as his conciliatory gestures toward the Orthodox Church, suggest to me that he is keenly aware that only the nationalist theme can capture the imagination of the grass roots, and give him enough support to overcome the system's uncanny resistance to change.

Mothers and Fathers, Not Parents

Dear Sir:

Karl Zinsmeister's excellent article "Brave New World: How Day-Care Harms Children" (Spring 1988) represents a state-of-the-art critique of day-care. Nevertheless, because covert socialists and overt feminists have dominated the discussion of gender issues for so long, it is practically impossible to clear away the resulting tissue of lies, damned lies, and statistics at one blow. I would therefore like to address the 2 percent of Zinsmeister's article that wanders off center.

The overall problem is that we haven't thought through the role of the father in the family. Contrary to propaganda from the man-haters—Lenore Weitzman, Sylvia Hewlett, Ruth Sidel, and Barbara Ehrenreich come to mind—men are not walking out on their families. Instead, mothers, the courts, and leftist social legislation are pushing them out. Not just in America, but in Western

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Europe as well, 70 percent of divorces are initiated by women. Contrary to the impression Sylvia Hewlett creates in her beguiling book *A Lesser Life,* mothers get child custody in the vast majority of cases. Finally, welfare mothers have absolutely no legal or cultural responsibility toward the men in their lives.

This is tragic, because children need, not just parenting, but, if at all possible, two parents, namely, a mother and a father—not, as careerists imagine, two fathers, or as nonsexists imagine, two mothers.

Fathers should be more involved with their families than they have been—on average—for the past few generations, but the reason for this is that the masculine parent is irreplaceable for his masculine qualities, not for his feminine ones. We must restore paternal authority if civilization is to survive in the long run. Conversely, true respect for the homemaker will come about only if we recover our respect for the feminine role.

I am alarmed at the shortsightedness and ahistoricity with which so many conservatives advocate paying mothers to have children. This arrangement is associated with a 45 percent illegitimacy rate in Sweden, along with related social ailments, and a birth dearth so extreme it makes 1980s America look like a hotbed of fertility. And in our own cities it has resulted in the creation of a vast social problem that has brought anguish and terror into the lives of every urban American.

As Sigmund Freud figured out three generations ago, the father is internalized as a child's superego—the conscience. Yet welfare reformers are not giving carte blanche to ignorant, single teen-agers to receive forced child support from single fathers, without in turn giving the fathers any of a father's rights, which include but are not limited to: sexual access to the mother; at least equal authority over the child's education, discipline, and general upbringing; and equal time with the child.

Of course, to tell the truth, you have to offend feminists. And you also have to start using the word "parent" a lot less, and the words "mother" and "father" a lot more.

The solution to the problem of day-care, whether in its practical or its cultural aspects, lies in the restoration of the traditional family. Viewing day-care as an isolated problem is downright dangerous.

Nicholas Davidson
Author, *The Failure of Feminism*
New York, NY

Dear Sir:

Mr. Zinsmeister very aptly and cogently identifies the pitfalls of socializing child-care, using reams of professional research and opinion to confirm what common sense has always told us: that the people best suited to raising a child are, with few exceptions, the same people who brought that child into the world in the first place.

Zinsmeister's thesis is sound; his presentation, compelling. Rather than issuing a divisive diatribe designed to infuriate career women, Zinsmeister displays a sensitivity to most mothers' legitimate desire to be involved in interesting activities apart from childrearing—including activities that contribute to a family's economic well-being.

As Zinsmeister points out, the challenge for public and private policymakers is to find creative ways to meet this desire without sacrificing a child's need for large quantities of high-quality time with his parents. Apart from tax reductions, which enable families with children to keep more of their earned income (thereby reducing the pressure for two full-time paychecks), a variety of job market changes are needed—most especially in expansion of full- and part-time home-based employment.

Indeed, if Mr. Zinsmeister's own work-at-home life-style is any guide, perhaps the "brave new world" we should be ushering in is a high-tech, computer-driven version of the old agrarian economy where the home is a major center of economic production for both husbands and wives.

However policymakers choose to resolve these matters (and the expansion of home-based employment is not the only answer), Zinsmeister has made a tremendously valuable contribution to the discussion of work and family issues by affirming that the best solutions—indeed, the only acceptable solutions—are those that serve the best interest of children.

William R. Mattox, Jr.
Family Research Council
Washington, DC

Dear Sir:

I applaud Karl Zinsmeister for his excellent article on day-care. It is astounding how many people—even conservatives like Orrin Hatch—are willing to support day-care when the research on its effects remains so incomplete and troubling. Thalidomide was rushed onto the market with comparable scanty and ambiguous research.

Nor are all the issues clinical. The Harvard sociologist Pitirim Sorokin warned that whenever children are "separated earlier and earlier from parents," the trend symptomizes moral and cultural decay. He predicted that the premature separation of parent and child would be accompanied by "suicide, mental disease, and crime. . . . Weariness will spread over larger and larger numbers of the population."

On the other hand, maybe the point of day-care subsidy is precisely to create more jobs for psychologists and social workers.

Bryce J. Christensen
Editor, *The Family in America*
Rockford, IL

Dear Sir:

While Mr. Zinsmeister accurately describes the plight of children incarcerated in day-care centers or at home with sitters, he like others cannot bring himself to face the remedy. Since the cause of this phenomenon is the working mother, not the working parent (fathers having worked since time immemorial) the solution cannot lie with "parental" leave or any other device that treats the parental roles of the sexes as interchangeable. Moreover, and contrary to my own earlier belief, it appears that the mothers of young children who work largely do so because they want to. This is especially true of the upper middle classes, the group that exhibits the highest work force participation by mothers of

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young children. This phenomenon is also worrisome to those who expect the upper middle class to provide the nation's future leaders, and who do not wish to see them socialized by illegal aliens from the Caribbean.

While the desire to have children is not completely extinct among educated women, the desire to mother them very nearly is. Again, the problem is not that parenthood has suffered a disastrous loss of status in the last quarter-century, but that motherhood has. Indeed, most tinkering with the tax code, work schedules, and parental leave reinforce this devaluation by presuming the desirability of keeping women in the labor force. The fact is that women in the work force can't have many children or take much care of the children they do have.

Zinsmeister speaks of "a broad consensus that women as much as men thrive when they are able to take a wide, active role in the world. Increased female education and employment are, on the whole, powerful and positive developments in American life." Perhaps. But as long as paid labor is regarded as more desirable for men and women, and staying at home is regarded as vaguely sinful for women, children will be tended by baby-sitters.

Michael Levin
City University of New York
New York, NY

Dear Sir:

Mr. Zinsmeister assumes that being a parent makes you an expert and that under your care your children will get only the best of care.

Parenting is something we learn as we go—on the job training. Many children in my generation (me included) were raised in a two-parent, loving family where Mom stayed home to cook, clean, and raise the children while Dad worked 40-60 hours a week, or more. In all honesty, I cannot say that I was better prepared for adulthood or had a more nurturing childhood because Mom stayed home, because her career was raising the children. Both my parents were good parents but by no means experts on child-rearing and they certainly made mistakes. Some women are just as good parents by working out of the home as those who choose to work at home, in whatever capacity.

The article referred to family day-care providers who were not in compliance with regulations when a visit was made to the home. Although I don't condone this, I question its relevance in light of the content of the article. Why don't we make an unannounced visit to a home where Mom is home rearing her children. I wager you might find that Mom and home are out of compliance occasionally also. Even quality parents can be found watching a soap opera or having a yard full of their children's friends playing while they doze in a lounge chair.

Statistics show that children are abused more often by their own family members than by day-care providers. It is just that only the day-care incidents make headlines.

As a quality family day-care provider for 15 years, I loved, nurtured, and took part in the growth and development of many children from age 5 weeks to 12 years. I loved the children as I did my own two. However, as close as I was to the day-care children, I never interfered with the bonding between the child and his/her parents. They bonded with me as the caregiver; they bonded with their mother and/or father as their family unit.

The economic level today in this country (and all the exemptions and tax credits you can think of won't change that) is such that two-parent working families are a necessity. And there are a high number of single-parent families (mostly headed by women) who would like to do the best for their families but cannot because affordable day-care is not available; their parents, aunts, uncles, and grandparents are forced to be out working; and our welfare system just breeds more welfare—and certainly not necessarily unusually qualified parents.

As a former family day-care provider who meets and talks with quality family day-care providers all over the country, and a parent who has successfully raised two children, I found the entire article counterproductive to meeting the challenge of child-rearing in this country today. Let's start dealing with reality—not the abstract.

Sandra Gellert
National Association for
Family Day Care
Washington, DC

The masculine parent is irreplaceable for his masculine qualities, not for his feminine ones. We must restore paternal authority if civilization is to survive in the long run.

—Nicholas Davidson

Dear Sir:

There has been for almost 10 years now considerable intense debate in the media and elsewhere on the subject of substitute care for young children. I have been in the thick of it since I gave a newspaper interview to the *Los Angeles Times* back in 1979 expressing my severe reservations about certain practices in child-care. It is rare for an advocate on either side to produce clear, well-argued, comprehensive statements. As Mr. Zinsmeister points out, Jay Belsky has been vilified for his recent statements, and this sort of powerful diatribe is not at all uncommon. This state of affairs is most sad, particularly since the people who are at odds all share a sincere commitment to the well-being of young children.

In any event, I think the author has done a superb job. I would add only one modest modification to the use of my ideas in the article. Where

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the quote on page 43 refers to "... a child of my own...," it should more properly read, "I would not think of putting an infant or toddler of my own (a child less than three years of age) into any substitute care program on a full-time basis, especially a center-based program." My concern about substitute care for children over the age of three years is considerably less than it is for infants and toddlers. In any event, the article is really extraordinarily good and, while I consider myself a political liberal, I certainly endorse it totally.

Burton L. White
Center for Parent Education
Newton, MA

Perhaps the "brave new world" we should be ushering in is a high-tech, computer-driven version of the old agrarian economy where the home is a major center of economic production for both husbands and wives.

—William R. Mattox, Jr.

Why We Closed Our Day-Care Center

Dear Sir:

My husband and I have been concerned with the issue of day-care for 10 years—and I must say it has often been lonely and frustrating on this side of the fence. We were directors of an unusually high quality non-profit day-care center. We had credentialed teachers (BA, plus one year of graduate training), low ratios and small group size, and lots of educational equipment. We were surprised to find that despite this, the children were under stress. We saw an increase in aggressive behavior in some, loss of previously acquired skills and withdrawal in others. We were so distressed by our observations that we closed the center in 1978 and wrote a book on the subject.

We make the same points that Mr. Zinsmeister makes: Parents are doing an important job, studies show problems in emotional and educational development, group care can lead to health problems, and alternatives are needed.

We also emphasize that quality group care for infants is not affordable, whether the government, parents, or industry pays for it. To attract well-trained staff and reduce turnover you have to pay decent wages. If you raise current day-care workers' salaries to the median wage for preschool/kindergarten teachers, add a few standard benefits, and use the 3-to-1 ratio recommended for children under one, you'll come up with a cost of approximately $18,000 a year per child for infant care!

We would like to see the government subsidize choice instead of day-care with an interest-deferred loan that parents could use for child-care or to supplement lost income of the spouse who is home full- or part-time with the children. This would help both couples and single parents, and would get far more mileage out of available federal dollars.

Wendy Dreskin
Author, *The Daycare Decision*

Dear Sir:

I open my *Policy Review* to read yet another in an endless series of articles in conservative journals urging "parents" (by which is meant mothers) to stay home with young children. Once again I ask myself: If taking care of one's own young children is so very rewarding, and important, and vital to the nation's well-being, why don't men leave their jobs and do it? I doubt that any so-called expert quoted in your article has devoted three weeks, let alone three months or three years, to the day-to-day care of his children. I doubt that any of your editors would dream of doing so.

The conservative men who delight in telling women what they should do and how they should run their families would accomplish far more by starting a national trend. Every pro-family man should quit his job for a couple of years to stay home with the kids. Admittedly, it's a tremendous sacrifice and the boss won't be too pleased. It's frustrating and disconcerting to put aside years and years of training and time spent painstakingly climbing the career ladder—but as they always say to us women—"It's worth it!"

Of course, young women know better than to hold their breath until this happens. Far easier to dream up ways to drive young mothers and pregnant women out of the work force altogether—except that such efforts simply induce young women to give up the idea of having families altogether. Meanwhile, young women of education, pride, and ambition—women of every political stripe—aren't fooled for a minute. Actions speak louder than words.

Ann L. Walicke, M.D.
Wheaton, MD

Dear Sir:

I commend *Policy Review* for giving space to this unpopular and often misrepresented viewpoint.

In April, Benjamin Spock, T. Berry Brazelton, and I addressed a large meeting organized by the Boston Parents' Paper. The forum, "Making Work and Family Work, aimed to provide parents with useful tips for finding "adequate day-care" and maximizing "quality time."

Before the forum, I made it clear in an interview on the "Today Show" that I would not share in applying band-aids to one of society's most gaping wounds and that while I welcomed T. Berry Brazelton's pressure for legislation for America's first maternity leave, I did not regard *unpaid* leave as more than cosmetic.

The forum's most heartening aspect was that parents enthusiastically

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responded to the idea that they themselves might change social attitudes toward parenting. They accepted that having a child necessarily and appropriately alters life, and applauded the suggestion that working parents should "come out of the closet" and support each other in making young children their priority, rather than behaving as if they were childless and stabbing the backs of parents who had to take leave because of a child's illness or other need. Many were so conscious that parents need employers that they overlooked that employers also need parents. They welcomed the concept of using "parent power" to induce employers to provide workplace nurseries, flex-time, part-time, and job-sharing.

Mr. Zinsmeister will no doubt be accused of making parents feel guilty and of refusing to accept the realities of life today. Such charges are painful, as I know, but they are seldom leveled by people currently rearing children. Parents do not truly believe that a care-giver (or -seller) can do as well for their beloved children as they could themselves. They find themselves caught in a society that lives to work rather than works to live, but that does not mean that they would not choose another way of living if it were available, economically possible, and socially acceptable.

Penelope Leach
London, England

Karl Zinsmeister replies:

I have been struck as I've followed the day-care debate to see how infrequently it is approached with a child's eye view. It is argued as a "women's issue," as an "employment issue," as a "productivity" issue, but scarcely anyone asks, "Is it good for children?" I am pleased that most of the responses printed here, like my article, take that as their essential starting point.

There are a couple of points to which I would respond. First, I do not, as implied, favor "driving mothers out of the work force," or "paying mothers to have children." Nor do I advocate mandating "parental leave." (Not only is a 90-day "magic bullet" useless in the long run, it is ultimately just one more accommodation of dual full-time working parents, when we really need to be accommodating, encouraging, and underwriting more full-time parenting when children are very young.)

Second, unlike Messrs. Davidson and Levin, I would argue that the degradation of childrearing from a great social imperative to a pitiful branch of the service economy is the result of *both* men and women abandoning the best interests of their children. I accept that women and men have demonstrably different biological and psychological systems that make them complementary, not interchangeable, as parents. And it is true that having long been the main transmitters of humane virtues women have fallen particularly far in the new careerist, materialistic, anti-family climate. Too often, the feminist creed on family matters has been, "Men are such selfish, nonparticipating slobs—let's become more like them."

But I must continue to argue that the root problem is not with women alone; rather it is that Americans generally are much less willing than they once were to exchange short-term gratifications of achievement and comfort for the longer-term satisfactions of knowing their children intimately.

If Dr. Walicke had read my article more carefully she would have realized I don't let men off the hook. Many discussions of family questions today begin by pitting men against women. Issues like child-care are presented as a zero-sum game where mothers and fathers struggle to push as much as possible of the responsibility onto the other (or a third) party. There is no sense of collectivity, or synchronism. Instead, this view transforms each human transaction into a careful, sometimes even spiteful, metering of relative contributions.

Testing every relationship against the litmus "What's in it for me?" produces a lot of human sadness. If one doubts that raising children could be "so very rewarding" to persons of "education, pride, and ambition" why have them in the first place? Making children pay the bill for their parents' fulfillment seems like a frightening inversion of the age-old pattern. Dr. Walicke doesn't have much to say about the child's stake in this.

There is no question that mutual dependency can be a drag—whether it involves children and parents, husbands and wives, the elderly and the young. But it is part of what we call "civilization." It is one of the things that separates humans from gerbils, who eat their young.

To answer the personal suggestion of hypocrisy: Please spare the clucking. It so happens I work at home (with two children under age two), at productive and economic cost, so that I can share the pleasures and responsibilities of rearing my family with my wife.

I would like to help more people be able—and willing—to spend more time with their children. Participating in the future through one's offspring—that is to say, family-making—is no longer instinctual. It is no longer strongly culturally supported. All that is left to motivate it is the personal satisfactions of training young souls, which many Americans apparently find too subtle to compete with modern life's blaze of competing pleasures.

Though we are less interested and willing to rear children, most of us intuitively understand that they will usually be ill-reared if we don't do it ourselves. But because that fact is so frightening, a multitude of evasions have grown up. Ms. Gellert puts forth one in her letter, where she argues that parents are no better at giving a child what he needs than paid baby-sitters. This is a nonideological version of Betty Friedan's claim that day-care is "good for" children, or Kate Millet's statement that "the care of the young is infinitely better left to trained professionals rather than to harried amateurs with little time nor taste for the education of young minds."

We may well live to see a world where most parents pay someone else to transform their children into adults, where clinical training and skills have been substituted for love and trust. But I cannot believe that the children—or our nation—will be the better for it.

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

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On Jeane Kirkpatrick:
In a POLICY REVIEW interview Jeane Kirkpatrick said: "The single most important change in my views in the last decade has been a much greater appreciation of market economics." *John Chamberlain, King Features Syndicate*

On Our Judeo-Christian Heritage:
In POLICY REVIEW Rabbi Joshua Haberman said that the bulwark we have against tyranny in this country is our firm belief in God and our firm belief in some standard of authority above government. *Pat Robertson, "Candidates '88 with Marvin Kalb"*

On the Evil Empire:
Picking up from President Reagan's phrase "evil empire," POLICY REVIEW's article, "Seventy Years of Evil," encapsulates some of the grimmer episodes of Soviet history. It is important reading. *Boston Globe*

On High Tech Trade with the East Bloc:
Senate Foreign Relations Committee aide William Triplett wrote in POLICY REVIEW that the Toshiba-Kongsberg machine tool sales did more damage to national security than previously reported. *Washington Times*

On SDI:
Bob, you've talked about support for SDI, but you wrote in POLICY REVIEW that you would use it as a negotiating chip. *Representative Jack Kemp to Senator Bob Dole, NBC Presidential Debate*

On Anti-Communism:
POLICY REVIEW . . . is the organ of the Heritage Foundation—the brain center of the most rabid reaction. *Pravda*

On Conservatism's Parched Grass Roots:
Amy Moritz wrote in POLICY REVIEW that the current state of the conservative movement is weak because in most cases leaders don't call on the millions of grass-roots activists except for financial contributions. *Washington Times*

On Media Bias:
ABC-TV reporter Rebecca Chase admitted that network producers, hell-bent on locating dire hunger, asked her "to scour the small towns of Mississippi to find hungry people . . . but I couldn't find any," she said in POLICY REVIEW. *Fred Barnes, Reader's Digest*

On Balancing the Budget:
[Compared with George Bush] Jack Kemp has been getting off a bit easy. Now he's surfaced with an article in POLICY REVIEW entitled "My Plan to Balance the Budget." *Michael Kinsley, Wall Street Journal*

On Crime and Punishment:
[In POLICY REVIEW Charles] Colson, former special counsel to President Nixon, makes a pretty good case for alternative sentencing, including restitution to victims of nonviolent crime. *William Raspberry, Washington Post*

On Marcos:
The Director of Central Intelligence, William J. Casey, originally proposed to Ferdinand E. Marcos that he call the early presidential election that ultimately led to Mr. Marcos' exile, according to an article by Senator Laxalt in POLICY REVIEW. *New York Times*

On Angola:
Savimbi's strategy, as he outlines in POLICY REVIEW, is " . . . to raise the costs of the foreign occupation of Angola until the Cubans and the Soviets can no longer bear the burden." *Norman Podhoretz, Washington Post*

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

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